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ABSTRACT
Between 1928 and 19 30 Nazi electoral support rose 
from 2.6 to 18.3 percent. This expansion of the NSDAP 
constituted a political breakthrough of unprecedented pro­
portions. The Nazis alone of the totalitarian parties of 
the twentieth-century were able to attract a mass following 
before they came to power. The Nazi electoral victory was 
the result of the conjunction of a series of fortuitous 
events and the skillful exploitation of these opportunities. 
The Young Plan, the great depression, and the German consti­
tutional crisis of 1930 all served to discredit the Weimar 
Republic and to heighten Nazi appeal. Nevertheless, these 
opportunities were only useful to the party because the 
NSDAP was able to exploit them. The means utilized by the 
Nazis to transform discontent into votes was a continuous 
propaganda campaign of truly gigantic proportions covering 
all of Germany. This dissertation examines the development 
and character of the political machine which enabled the 
party to stage this campaign.
The basic principles of Nazi propaganda were formu­
lated by Hitler in Mein Kampf and worked out in practice 
in the party's rally system. The Nazis emphasized emotional
appeals and the development of a series of concretely
* * * i n
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objectified impressions that conjured up images of a 
mythical world of the future. The NSDAP also consistently 
shunned efforts to "educate" the public in National Social­
ist ideology. The task of the party after 1928 was to 
devise methods for creating similar impressions on a mass 
audience as those already presented at the party’s major 
rallies.
The Nazi techniques to do this consisted of a number 
of programs either started or eventually adopted by the 
Munich Reichsleitung. Deputy propaganda leader Heinrich 
Himmler initiated the first such device in late 1928. 
Utilizing the principle of concentration, he developed the 
Nazi saturation campaign which involved the presentation of 
up to two hundred speeches, marches and meetings in a short 
span of time within the confines of a single region. These 
campaigns were designed to leave an impression of the 
party's strength and dedication in areas previously lightly 
canvassed. Such campaigns could not be implemented every­
where at once or sustained for long periods because of the 
dearth of trained Nazi agitators. This problem of quantity 
was first dealt with by Gauleiter Fritz Reinhardt, who de­
veloped a way of cheaply training numerous Nazi orators 
through his correspondence school for speakers. By the 
1930 election Reinhardt's school had produced over fifteen 
hundred new speakers. Street work was also re-organized 
during these years with the founding of the Muchow street
Vcell organization. This organization mobilized ordinary 
party members in small groups for everyday propaganda 
activities. Such programs made it possible for the Nazis 
to blanket Germany with propaganda activities. Based upon 
the willingness of party members to volunteer their services 
for the cause, the new Nazi political machine was virtually 
financially self-sufficient. Its participatory character 
also heightened party morale and helped the Nazis create the 
impression that they were a militant political order of con­
siderable strength.
The Nazis also sought to create the impression that 
they were a blood order of specially dedicated men who were 
destined to bring about a rebirth of Germany. The theme 
of blood sacrifice was emphasized in such quasi-religious 
ceremonies as the festival at Caub and the Reichsparteitag 
of 1929. In this scheme of things, the SA fulfilled the 
dual role of martyrs and angels of death, the specially con­
secrated embodiment of the purification of Germany. By 
creating this series of impressions the NSDAP was able to 
persuade millions of frustrated and desperate voters that 
the party offered a viable alternative to the crumbling 
Weimar Republic.
CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL
BACKGROUND
On September 14, 1930, Germans went to the polls 
to select a new Reichstag to lead their country through 
the ever worsening great depression. The results of this 
election came as a rude shock to the leaders of Germany's 
first democracy, the Weimar Republic. Everyone had 
expected the extremist parties to do well, but the magni­
tude of their success was astonishing. The Communists 
gained over a million votes and elected seventy-seven 
deputies. This represented an increase of 40 percent 
in their strength.^ The Communist success, however, pales 
to insignificance when compared with the extraordinary 
expansion of the radical rightist Nazi party 
(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP). 
In May, 1928, the NSDAP and its leader Adolf Hitler had 
only been able to attract 810,00 votes2 or 2.6 percent
^S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy:
A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 196l>) p~ 446.
2Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New
York: Bantam, 1961) p. 112.
2of the total^ in a national election. On September 14,
4
1930, 6,409,600 votes were cast for the Nazis, 18.3 per­
cent of the total.^ The NSDAP delegation to the 
Reichstag increased from twelve deputies to one hundred 
and seven. As Karl Dietrich Bracher observed, "Probably 
never before had a party registered such gains within a 
two-year period. It was a development of truly historic 
significance.”  ^ The size of Nazi gains startled contem­
poraries and has left historians with a very difficult 
problem. How were the Nazis able to perform this polit­
ical miracle in a mere twenty-seven months?
One of the reasons that the Nazis did so well 
in 1930 was the fact that the Weimar Republic was suffer­
ing from a series of complex problems which made voters 
receptive to Nazi appeals. In the late 1920*s the 
Republic underwent economic, foreign policy, political
3
Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler's Rise to Power: The
Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933 (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1973) pT T?2.
^Bullock, Hitler, p. 128.
^Pridham, Hitler*s Rise, p. 322.
6Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship:
The Origins, Structure and Effects of National Socialism 
trans. Jean Steinberg (New York and Washington: Praeger, 
1970) p. 182.
3and constitutional crises7 all of which served to dis­
credit democratic government. These crises were short­
term manifestations of long-range seemingly insoluble 
problems that had plagued Germany since the end of World 
War I. In the first eleven years of its existence, the 
Weimar Republic had been unable to find any permanent 
solutions to these problems. This failure convinced many 
voters that no answers could be found within existing 
political institutions and increased the attractiveness 
of the extremist, anti-republican parties.
The most serious crisis facing the government in
7
The best discussion of the crisis of German 
democracy from the late twenties to the advent of Hitler 
can be found in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auf losung der 
Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart: Ring Verlag, 1957). As 
the title implies this book deals with the dissolution 
of the Weimar Republic. It concentrates upon discussions 
of the social, political, constitutional, economic and 
international weaknesses of the Republic and only inci­
dentally deals with the rise of the NSDAP. Bracher attempts 
to draw lessons from the past to instruct contemporary 
Germans on the dangers to democratic institutions. He 
tends to be somewhat deterministic in his argument con­
tending that a number of serious defects in the structure 
of German society and republican institutions led almost 
inevitably to the collapse of German democracy. This 
deterministic aspect of Bracher's study has been criti­
cized, especially by Waldemar Besson in his Wurttemberg 
und die deutsche Staatkrise, 1928-1933 (Stuttgart:
Tubingen Verlag, 1959). However, Bracher's work remains 
the most complete and perceptive analytical treatment 
of the collapse of Germany's first democracy. For a 
general treatment of the political history of the Republic 
see either Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy or Erich 
Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic (2 vols.; Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard U.P.“ r962-1964) .
4o
1930 was the severe weakening of the economy. The
German economy was never very healthy in the twenties,
but major problems began to appear in the agricultural
g
sector starting in 1926. From that time on, the price 
of produce and stock declined. At the same time, in­
terest rates on farm loans and taxes remained high. The 
farmers were caught between the economic scissors of 
rising costs and shrinking income. The agricultural de­
pression hit farmers expecially hard because they had 
experienced little prosperity at any time since 1919.
The Weimar governments had tended to follow policies 
favorable to consumers and had slighted the interest of 
the farmers.*® By 1930 farmers were thoroughly disen­
chanted with the Republic and ready to support its 
extremist enemies.
The urban segment of the German economy enjoyed 
a fleeting period of prosperity from 1925 to 1929. These 
good times were based primarily upon a continuous influx 
of foreign short-term loans, especially from America.
p
For a discussion of the German economy see 
Gustav Stolper, The German Economy, 1870-1940: Issues
and Trends (New York: Raynal & Hitchcock, 1940).
9
Rudolf Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism: A
Regional Case Study on Political Parties-In Germany 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State U.P~ 1945) 
p. 112. Heberle states that the agricultural depression 
developed in three phases. In 1926-27 there were two 
severe slumps in hog prices. This slump was repeated in 
1929-30. In 1930-31 similar slumps occurred in cattle 
prices, and from 1929 credit became difficult to obtain.
10Ibid., p. 42.
5The foreign loans financed many German businesses and 
municipal projects. With the collapse of the New York 
stock market in October, 1929, this period of prosperity 
came to an end. The short-term loans were recalled, and 
many businesses and local governments, unable to find new 
sources of ready cash, faced bankruptcy.
The effects of the great depression were felt 
almost at once. The construction industry began laying 
off large numbers of workers as civic building projects 
were cancelled for lack of funds. The business sector 
responded to the emergency by cutting its expenses. This 
usually took the form of discharging employees. Thus, 
the great depression led immediately to a rapid rise in 
the number of unemployed workers, a problem exacerbated 
by the fact that a relatively high level of unemployment 
was endemic even during the years of prosperity.^
There was little direct connection between the 
rising number of unemployed workers and the growth in 
Nazi strength. The growing army of the jobless came 
largely from the lower class and tended to gravitate to­
ward either the Communists or the more moderate Social 
Democrats. Nazi gains, on the other hand, came largely 
from the middle class and farming populace. The effects 
of the great depression on these groups were significant
^ F o r  a description of unemployment during the 
years of prosperity see Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern 
Germany 1840-1945, Vol. Ill (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1969) 
pp. 639-40. Unemployment rose from 1,320,00 in September, 
1929 to 3,000,00 in September, 1930, Bullock, Hitler, p. 119.
6though less dramatic than the widespread unemployment of 
the working class. Both the middle class and independent 
farmers saw their profits dwindle. They were forced to 
cut back on their operations in a variety of ways, often 
including the dismissal of a few employees. These pro­
cedures were painful and meant a declining standard of 
living for small employers, but they did not entail 
immediate economic ruin, loss of status or unemployment.
It was not so much the economic consequences of the de­
pression as concern for the future that turned the middle 
class toward Nazism. As William Sheridan Allen, in his 
book describing the rise of Nazism in a small town, put 
it, "It was the depression, or more accurately, the fear 
of its continued effects, that contributed most heavily 
to the radicalization of Thalburg's p e o p l e . T h e  middle 
class and landowners saw the growing army of unemployed
12William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of 
Power; The Experience of a Single German Town, 1930-1935 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965) pp^ JT5-2TI The Alien 
book provides the best picture of the political effects 
of the great depression on the German middle class, pp. 3- 
138 passim. His book is based primarily upon interviews 
with people who lived through the period. It presents a 
vivid and personalized portrayal of the impact of the 
great depression and the rise of Nazism in the context of 
a single town. For a discussion of the middle class basis 
of Nazi support see Alfred Milatz, Wahler und Wahlen in 
der Weimarer Republik (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fttr politTsche 
Bildung, 1965} pp. 62, 113, 135. The term middle class is 
rather vague especially for this period. During the 
Weimar Republic persons tended to consider themselves to 
be part of the middle-class if they were businessmen, 
shopkeepers, white collar workers, skilled artisans, or 
university educated. The designation often had little to 
do with income.
7workers as an active threat to their continued existence 
and status. The growth in Communist support and the in­
creasingly militant stance of the Social Democrats only 
tended to reenforce this idea. The German middle class 
believed that any successful Marxist seizure of power was 
certain to end in the destruction of both their status 
and few remaining advantages. The Nazis exploited this 
fear by portraying themselves as vigorous enemies of 
Marxism ready to defend the middle class against expropria­
tion. As long as the NSDAP could convince middle-class 
Germans that it would and could defend them against the 
Marxists, it was able to count on heavy support from this 
segment of German society.
Almost purely by coincidence, the Republic faced 
a crisis in foreign policy at the same time as the advent 
of the great depression. In June, 1929, the Allies pre­
sented the German government with a new scheme for making 
reparation payments. This proposal was called the Young 
Plan after the American banker Owen Young, who was instru­
mental in working out the final report.^ The plan itself 
made a number of concessions to Germany, the most important 
of which was the evacuation of the Rhineland. Objectively, 
the Young Plan improved Germany's position. Yet it also
l^For a discussion of the struggle over the Young 
Plan see Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, pp. 388-402 and 
Holborn, Modern Germany, pp~ 642-51, 667-83.
8revived the bitter debate over reparations and provided the 
right with a useful issue with which to attack the govern­
ment.
On July 9, 1929, a committee was formed to oppose
the Young Plan including Hitler, Alfred Hugenberg-the leader
of the conservative-monarchist Deutschnationale Volkspartei
14(DNVP)-the Stahlhelm, and the Pan-German League. Using 
a provision of the Weimar constitution, this committee 
initiated a campaign to defeat the new reparations settle­
ment through a referendum. Over four million signatures 
were obtained on petitions, and an election was held in 
December, 1929. The referendum failed, getting less than 
six million votes,^ but the issue of continued reparations 
was very much in the public eye at the same time that the 
economic situation was deteriorating.
The reparations issue and the Versailles Treaty 
were painful long-term problems of the Republic. In the
l^Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy p. 393.
1^Ibid., p. 395.
16Ibid., p. 399. For the "Law against the enslave­
ment of the German people” to have been enacted into law 
more than twenty-one million votes were required. The 
referendum failed largely bacause the Young Plan was an im­
provement over the previous reparation agreement, the Dawes 
Plan. A yes vote on the referendum was a vote to reject 
the Young Plan. However, if the "Law against the enslave­
ment of the German people" had been adopted, the older 
Dawes agreement would have remained in force.
9eyes of many Germans, the Weimar regime was discredited 
from its beginning because it had signed the Versailles 
Treaty. The treaty cost Germany land, power, and prestige. 
These losses were severe enough, but what continued to en­
rage Germans a decade after the end of World War I was the 
war guilt clause and the resulting reparation payments.
The Allies in 1919 decided that Germany should pay for all 
the damage resulting from the war. In order to justify 
this legally, a clause was inserted into the peace treaty 
stating that Germany was guilty of having caused World 
War I and thus was liable for all damages resulting from 
her criminal conduct. This legalistic nicety outraged 
German opinion. Most Germans thought that the war guilt 
clause was nothing more than a hypocritical lie that the 
victors had forced the vanquished to a c c e p t . T h e  pay­
ment of reparations was a continuing reminder of national 
humiliation and national weakness.
The rightist parties, especially the Nazis, ex­
ploited the righteous indignation aroused by the war guilt 
and reparation issues. The Nazis argued that the war 
guilt clause was a malicious falsehood and cited works by 
prominent contemporary historians to support their conten­
tion. They described reparations as a form of tribute money 
unjustly extorted from the German people by naked threats
17Theodore Abel, The Nazi Movement: Why Hitler
Came to Power (New York: Atherton Press, 1966) pp. 30-34.
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of force. Finally, the Nazis contended that most of their 
opponents were collaborators and besmirchers of German honor 
because of their pragmatic acceptance of the Versailles 
Treaty and subsequent reparation settlements. In debate 
the Nazis were able to appear to be virtuous defenders of 
simple justice, while their opponents, who were trying 
gradually to improve Germany's position, seemed to be 
opportunists and knaves. By its very existence the Young 
Plan rekindled old animosities and allowed the Nazis to 
exploit deep-seated bitterness over the Versailles Treaty 
and reparations at a time when many Germans were becoming 
thoroughly dissatisfied with the Republic due to the 
economic crisis.
The most effective Nazi argument against the 
Young Plan had nothing to do with moral or historial con­
siderations. The NSDAP from its earliest years contended 
that reparation payments led to economic disaster. In 1929 
the Nazis attacked the Young Plan as leading to the enslave­
ment of the German people by a clique of Jewish Wall Street 
financiers. For the NSDAP the advent of the great depres­
sion was a fortunate occurrence. It appeared to validate 
their statements made in the campaign against the Young
Plan. For many Germans in 1930, the Nazi contentions of
181929 seemed to have been prophetic. The great depression, 
after all, began with the collapse of the New York stock
18Bracher, German Dictatorship, pp. 162-64.
11
market. Was not this proof that German prosperity was in
the hands of a few Wall Street bankers?
As the depression continued to worsen, resentment 
against reparations increased. The government continued to 
pay, even though its budget was badly strained by the in­
creasing demands of those living on unemployemnt insurance 
and welfare. Under these circumstances the hard-pressed
miudle class could expect no tax relief and was forced to
support the unemployed and pay reparations through their 
taxes. After June 30, 1929, this burden became even more
unpalatable. On thac day the last Allied troops evacuated
19the Rhineland. Thus, the most obvious advantage of the 
Young Plan was an accomplished fact before the September 
Reichstag election, and only the liabilities of that plan, 
fifty-eight more years of reparation payments, remained. 
With the last occupation troops off German soil and with 
increasing economic want, Nazi arguments against further 
indemnities to the Allies became even more appealing.
The Nazi success in linking economic disaster with 
foreign policy was not merely a result of good timing.
Such an hypothesis seemed plausible to Germans given the 
history of the Weimar Republic. On two separate occasions 
since the birth of the Republic, economic disaster had been 
caused by foreign policy failures. The first of these
1 QHalperin, Germany Tried Democracy, p. 427.
12
instances occurred in 1919. In the immediate aftermath 
of the German military and political collapse of 1918, the 
economy went through a period of severe depression. War 
industries were rendered instantly obsolete, and they were 
unable to convert to civilian production because of the 
continuing British blockade, which made it impossible for 
Germany to export manufactured goods. The blockade, which 
was not lifted until after the signing of the Versailles 
Treaty, also precluded the possibility of importing much- 
needed agricultural goods and led to widespread food short­
ages, malnutrition, and even cases of starvation. Returning 
veterans swelled the ranks of the unemployed. Faced with 
the disastrous consequences of military defeat, the new 
republican government was virtually powerless to do anything 
about the growing economic crisis.
The second example of a foreign policy failure 
leading directly to economic catastrophe occurred in 1923. 
German recovery in the early twenties had been slow and 
painful. Under these straitened conditions reparations 
served to retard recovery and were difficult to pay. In 
late 1922 Germany had failed to deliver a shipment of tele­
graph poles to France. The militant French government of 
Raymond Poincare denied German requests for more time and 
dispatched troops to occupy the highly industrialized Ruhr. 
The German government was then curtly ordered to comply 
with all future demands or suffer continued military
13
occupation of this vital region. The German government 
was in no position to dislodge the French militarily due 
to a provision of the Versailles Treaty that limited the 
German army to a mere 100,000 men. Under these circum­
stances the government responded to French incursions in
the only practicable way by calling a general strike in
20the Ruhr.
The decision to employ a strategy of passive re­
sistance to French aggression by means of the general strike 
led to economic disaster. The workers in the Ruhr dutifully 
abided by the government's decision and stopped working.
The rich industries of the area ceased to function almost 
at once. This meant that the already hard-pressed govern­
ment lost the income that it normally would have received 
from the Ruhr, but what made the situation intolerable was 
that the Weimar government now had to support the striking 
workers through unemployment payments. The German govern­
ment had been unable to comply with reparation demands 
before 1923. Now, stripped of all income from the Ruhr, 
it simply did not have the money to support striking workers. 
Unwilling to capitulate to naked force, the government tried 
to save its policy of passive resistance by printing un­
supported paper money to pay strikers. This expedient pro­
gram led to a disastrous period of hyper-inflation which 
wiped out the cash savings of the middle class and reduced
20Ibid., pp. 247-50.
14
the economy virtually to the level of barter. In the end, 
the government was forced to admit defeat and openly accept 
the continuation of the French occupation.
In 1929-30 when the Nazis linked reparations and 
foreign policy failure with economic collapse, Germans were 
prepared to believe them. The entire history of the Weimar 
Republic seemed to support this contention. In reality 
the Young Plan had little to do with the advent of the 
great depression, but voters were easily persuaded that 
such a connection existed.
The economic and foreign policy crises of the late 
twenties severely damaged the Republic; but if Germany had 
enjoyed a stable political system, it is probable that the 
spectacular Nazi gains of 1930 would not have occurred. 
Voters turned to the NSDAP primarily because they were con­
vinced that the traditional parties of the Weimar Republic 
were impotent to deal with the worsening situation. It was 
the political and constitutional crisis of the late twenties 
that finally discredited the Republic.
Political disunity had existed in Germany for cen­
turies. The country was divided on religious lines between 
Catholics and Protestants. The old conflict between farmers 
and city dwellers continued unabated. With the growth of 
industrialization in the nineteenth century, a new division 
appeared in German society between factory workers and 
employers. The situation was further exacerbated by the
15
existence of a number of differing political traditions 
that were only superficially overcome by the establishment 
of a unified German state in 1871. Strong local identifi­
cation was especially prevalent in Bavaria and Hanover.
Under the second Empire little had been done to overcome 
these internal rifts. The authoritarian Imperial regime 
favored one group and then another. Occasionally, it sup­
ported legislation that was much desired by one or more of 
Germany's factions, but no real attempt was made to draw 
the various elements of German society together and to find 
a political consensus. The relative weakness of the 
Reichstag under the Imperial constitution enabled the 
Kaiser and his government to avoid coming to grips with the 
problem of disunity. Under the best circumstances the 
Weimar Republic faced a difficult task in attempting to 
bring together Germany's disparate elements in the context 
of a democratic republic. Unfortunately, the Weimar system 
tended to make a bad situation worse.
One of the greatest problems facing the Weimar 
Republic was the proliferation of small parties representing 
special interest groups. Industrial and some agricultrual 
laborers were represented by either the moderate Socialists 
(SPD) or the Communists (KPD). Catholics were represented 
by the Center party (Z) or in Bavaria by the Bavarian 
Peoples' Party (BVP). Middle-class support was divided 
among a multitude of parties including the Democratic Party 
(DDP), the Economic Party (W), and the German Peoples'
16
Party (DVP). The DVP also tended to represent the interests
21of industrial employers. Finally, the old aristocracy and
some of the farming populace were represented by the German
National Peoples* Party (DNVP). This multiparty system was
based upon a provision of the Weimar constitution which
stated that members of the Reichstag would be elected by
proportional representation. For electoral purposes,
Germany was divided into large districts. Voters did not
elect individual candidates but instead voted for the party
of their choice. Each party was then awarded representation
roughly proportional to the vote it attracted. Even if a
party received only a minute percentage of the total vote,
it could expect to elect some deputies. For example, in
1928 the Nazis received only 2.6 percent of the national 
22vote. Nonetheless, the NSDAP elected twelve deputies to
23the Reichstag. In practice, proportional representation
21 The literature on the various political parties 
during the Weimar Republic is quite extensive. For the 
Social Democrats see Richard N. Hunt, Social Democracy 1918- 
1933 (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1964). The Communist party has 
been dealt with in Eric Waldmann, The Spartacist Uprising of 
1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement (Mil­
waukee, Wisconsin: Marquette U.P., 1958) and in Werner 
Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power
in Germany, 1921-?3 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U.P., 
T563)^ For a discussion of the DVP the reader would be well 
advised to consult Henry A. Turner, Stresemann and the 
Politics of the Weimar Republic (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 
1965). Finally Bracher1s Auflffsung does an admirable job of 
discussing the activities of theseparties in the critical 
last years of the Republic.
22Pridham, Hitler1s Rise, p. 322.
2^Bullock, Hitler, p. 112.
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meant that every sizable special interest group could hope 
to win seats in the Reichstag.
The German electoral system created a number of 
problems for the Weimar Republic. At election time this 
system produced a high degree of divisiveness. Each party 
tried to maintain the support of its followers by empha­
sizing the differences between its supporters and other 
Germans. In this manner, social, economic and religious 
divisions were accentuated. This was bad enough, but the 
problem with proportional representation was that no one 
narrowly based party could ever hope to gain a majority in 
the Reichstag. Thus, at the conclusion of an election cam­
paign some of the parties were forced to unite to form a 
coalition government. In the Weimar Republic all govern­
ments were by coalition. This situation led to such strange 
marriages of convenience as the inclusion of both the SPD, 
representing workers, and the DVP, representing employers, 
in the same government. In practice such combinations meant 
that the most treasured schemes of all parties were doomed 
never to be enacted. Under this system decisive leadership 
was virtually impossible, since coalition members could 
never support the full program of another party without 
alienating their own backers. This situation was especially 
hard to accept in a country like Germany where a tradition 
of parliamentary government and a willingness to compromise 
with political foes was almost completely lacking. For the 
immature parties of the Weimar Republic participation in
18
coalition governments was a frustrating experience.
The Weimar system of government by perpetual dead­
lock exacerbated yet another problem of the Republic. Two 
important traditional Weimar parties, the DNVP and the SPD, 
not only represented major special interest groups, but also 
espoused principles which made it very difficult for them to 
play an active role in coalition republican governments.
The DNVP was the major spokesman of the interests of 
Germany's Protestant farmers. It was also the principal 
advocate of reactionary, monarchist politics in the Republic. 
In order to retain its rural base, the party was forced to 
compromise with the various republican governments, and for 
a short time in the mid-twenties, the DNVP actually entered 
ministries. However, as a monarchist party dedicated to the 
restoration of the old Imperial form of government, the DNVP 
was theoretically unable to cooperate with the Republic.
This conflict between principles and the DNVP's obligation 
to represent its supporters' interests was very hard to re­
solve. In practice, the DNVP could only justify partici­
pating in republican government if it was able to make real 
gains for its rural backers. Unfortunately, the Weimar 
system of government by broad coalitions made it difficult 
for the DNVP to enact legislation useful to its constituents. 
Given this situation, the monarchists turned away from co­
operation and embraced a policy of strident opposition to 
the Republic from 1928 on. The Republic could expect no
19
help from the DNVP in dealing with the great depression.^ 
Within the DNVP the consequences of this policy of 
irreconcilable opposition to the Republic were considerable. 
The party's anti-republican faction, led by Hugenberg, sys­
tematically forced out other, more moderate elements which 
did not support its policy. In July, 1930, internal dis­
sension in the DNVP finally led to the resignation of
Hugenberg*s predecessor as party leader, Count Kuno von 
25Westarp. For the elections in September, therefore, the 
forces of German conservatism were divided into no less than 
four separate parties: The DNVP promising continued vocal
and bitter opposition to the Republic; the more moderate 
Konservative Volkspartei under Westarp; the Landvolkpartei 
supported by the powerful white collar union, the Deutscher 
Handlungsgehilfenverband; and the Christliche Volksdienst,
The crisis of the DNVP from 1928 to 1930 has not 
been dealt with directly. However, several studies covering 
earlier years or on tangential subjects cast much light on 
the problems facing German conservatives in the twenties. 
Lewis Hertzmann's DNVP: Right-Wing Opposition in the Weimar
Republic, 1918-1924 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1963) is best for this purpose. Other works 
that should be consulted include Werner Liebe, Die 
Deutschnationale Volkspartei, 1918-1924 (Dlisseldorf: Droste 
Verlag, 19 56), Walter Kaufmann, Monarchism in the Weimar 
Republic (New York: Brookman Associates, 195^), Kurt Sonn- 
theimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik: 
Die politlschen ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 
l9i8 und 1933 (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlag, 1962), and 
Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in
the Rise of the Germanic ideology (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, 1965).
25Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, pp. 432-33.
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2fia reactionary Protestant party.
The political consequences of the break-up of the 
DNVP were considerable Nazi gains in areas previously con­
trolled by the conservatives. Farmers had formerly sup­
ported the monarchists largely because they thought the 
DNVP would effectively represent their interests. Now, 
they left the party by the thousands. The three conserva­
tive splinter parties were unable to attract significant 
followings; they were new and not taken seriously by voters. 
Only Westarp commanded a substantial personal following, and 
his party came into existence a mere two months before the 
September, 1930 elections. The DNVP itself was unable to 
outdo the Nazis in bitter opposition to the Republic and was 
thoroughly discredited by its perpetual infighting. Further­
more, Hugenberg was no match for Hitler either as a leader
or as a charismatic figure. Only the Nazis benefitted from
27the collapse of German conservatism, and this collapse was 
a direct result of the inability of the DNVP to make meaning­
ful gains for its constituents between 1924 and 1928, when 
the moderate Westarp faction pursued a policy of cooperation 
with the Republic. The Weimar coalition system led to 
Hugenberg*s victory over Westarp and ultimately to the
26For the impact of the break-up of the DNVP 
regionally see Dietrich ThrSnhardt, Wahlen und politische 
Strukturen in Bayern, 1848-1958 (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 
1973) pp. 140-41.
27Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 183.
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disintegration of German conservatism.
The loss of conservative support damaged the 
Republic, but the withdrawal of Germany's principal working 
class party, the Social Democrats, from an active role in 
Weimar government was little short of catastrophic. The 
SPD always supported the Republic in principle, but like the 
DNVP it represented a set of political ideas as well as a 
special interest group. Ideologically the SPD was a Marxist 
party and thus theoretically opposed to cooperation with the 
bourgeoisie. This made it difficult for the party to parti­
cipate in coalition governments. Nevertheless, in practice 
the SPD, which represented a majority of Germany's workers 
through its close association with the Freie Gewerkschaften 
or free trade unions, was expected to support laws helpful 
to workers. This left the SPD torn between a revisionist 
policy of seeking to ameliorate the lot of Germany's workers
through piecemeal legislation and an ideologically dictated
28policy of opposition to all bourgeois elements. In the
2 8The best discussion of the split within SPD ranks 
over whether or not to participate in bourgeois governments 
are found in Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy, 
1905-1917 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P ., 1955) and Peter 
Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bern­
stein 1s Challenge to Marx (New York: Columbia U.P.l 1952). 
Both of these books cover an earlier period, and conditions 
changed from the Empire to the Republic. However, the 
ideological dilemma of whether or not a Marxist party could 
properly cooperate with bourgeois parties remained the 
same.
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twenties, the Socialist leadership tended to pursue limited 
objectives while paying lip service to such Marxist ideas 
as class consciousness, expropriation of the bourgeoisie and 
social revolution. The final acceptance of revisionism as 
the party's official policy was not to occur until after 
World War II.
Between 1928 and 1930 the SPD led a coalition govern­
ment. The party did well in the May, 1928, elections and 
expected to be able to enact a sweeping program of reforms. 
The party leaders who favored a policy of active participa­
tion in government were in firm control, and the SPD entered 
a national government for the first time since the early 
days of the Republic. The experience was far from pleasant. 
The SPD Reichstag delegation was sizable, but by no means a 
majority. The Socialists were only able to gain a working 
majority by including both the Center party and the DVP in 
a ministerial alliance. These predominately bourgeois 
parties opposed most of the more radical and comprehensive 
SPD programs. Since government proposals had to be approved 
by all coalition partners, most of the Socialist programs 
were not enacted. In the twenty-two months of the SPD 
government of Hermann Miiller next to nothing was accom­
plished.
By 1930 the Mtlller ministry was facing the first 
stages of the great depression. At this key moment the 
government found itself virtually paralyzed. Cooperation 
between the coalition partners was becoming more difficult
23
largely because the Mtiller regime included both the SPD 
representing workers, and the DVP representing employers. 
Until October 3, 1929, some degree of cooperation had 
existed between these two antagonistic parties, but on that 
date the DVP leader Gustav Stresemann, Germany's perennial 
foreign minister, died. Stresemann had been able to force 
his colleagues in the DVP to participate in various govern­
ments and to subordinate their special interests to what 
he considered to be overriding national concerns. With 
Stresemann's death the DVP became little more than the 
special interest party of Germany's industrialists. Even 
if Stresemann had lived, it is doubtful that he could have 
saved the coalition. The great depression tended to ex­
acerbate existing differences between the SPD and the DVP.
The increasing tension within the coalition culminated in a 
governmental crisis over the issue of unemployment insurance. 
With the number of jobless workers increasing, the unemploy­
ment insurance fund began to experience financial diffi­
culties. The SPD favored increased employer contributions 
to maintain payments at the 1930 level, while the DVP wanted 
benefits to the unemployed reduced. Attempts at compromise
initiated by the Center party failed, and on March 27, 1930,
29the Muller cabinet resigned.
For the SPD the Milller ministry was the worst of all
29For the Milller regime see Halperin, Germany Tried 
Democracy, pp. 358-66, 403-406.
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possible worlds. The party participated in a bourgeois
government and thus tarnished its Marxist purity. At the
same time the SPD failed to enact any meaningful reforms
benefitting workers. Even the 1927 conservative-bourgeois
regime had a better record, passing a comprehensive un-
30employment insurance bill. Ironically, the Muller govern­
ment fell when the Socialists tried to defend that unemploy­
ment insurance program. The failure of the SPD government 
worsened the threat to the party from the left. The SPD 
shared the support of German workers with the extremist 
Communists. Both of these parties were theoretically 
Marxist, but the Communists were irreconcilably opposed to 
any cooperation with the "bourgeois" Republic. The Muller 
fiasco convinced SPD leaders that any further participation 
in government would only serve to aid their rivals. This 
conclusion was reenforced by reports from the free trade 
unions of growing worker discontent and of Communist 
successes. Thus, in 1930 the SPD, Germany's largest politi­
cal party, withdrew from any role in solving the country’s 
problems and concentrated its full attention on dealing with 
the Communist threat to its power base. The continuing 
deadlock in government produced by the Weimar system cost 
the Republic the active participation in government of this 
vital party at a time of increasing misery.
The withdrawal of the SPD from government precipi-
^ Ibid., p. 355 and Holborn, Modern Germany, p. 640.
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tated a major constitutional crisis. It became impossible 
to form a new coalition with the support of a majority of 
the Reichstag. President Paul von Hindenburg decided to 
deal with the problem by appointing a minority government 
under the Catholic Center politician Heinrich BrUning. 
Hindenburg further determined to pass legislation by means 
of emergency decrees. Hindenburg's decision amounted to 
an abrogation of parliamentary rule. Briining did not have 
to command a Reichstag majority to stay in office or to 
pass laws; all he had to do was retain the confidence of the 
aging President. On July 16, 1930, the irreconcilable 
elements in the Reichstag responded to this form of dicta­
torial rule by rejecting a major Presidential decree. Two
days later Briining ordered the dissolution of the Reichstag
31and new elections for September 14. With the DNVP, the 
SPD and the two extremist parties, the Nazis and the Com­
munists, unwilling to serve in coalition governments and 
unwilling to tolerate rule by Presidential decree-German 
democracy had reached a point of almost complete paralysis. 
Faced with the worsening economic situation and frantic 
demands from the public for action, any kind of action, the 
Weimar Republic had virtually declared its own bankruptcy 
in mid-1930. Democratic institutions and parties seemed 
discredited in the eyes of desperate voters looking for a 
way of averting economic ruin. The scene was set for a vast
^1Halpern, Germany Tried Democracy, pp. 429-32.
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expansion of the strength of the totalitarian parties.
The crises facing the Weimar Republic in the late
twenties "explain why people were impelled to join groups
and support collective efforts toward a change of the
32existing order." However, these crises alone are not 
enough to explain the Nazi electoral breakthrough. It is 
unwarranted to assume that widespread discontent led 
automatically to Nazi victory at the polls. The problems 
facing the Republic in 1930 simply provided a background 
which made the NSDAP electoral triumph possible.
The best evidence that Nazi success was not the 
automatic result of widespread dissatisfaction with the 
Republic or of economic disaster can be found by examining 
the political impact of the agricultural depression. This 
depression began in 1926, and by late 1927 and early 1928 
the Nazis were trying to take advantage of the situation. 
Intensive campaigns took place in north-central Germany and 
in other isolated areas to attract rural and middle-class
33voters who were suffering from the agricultural depression. 
Nationally, Hitler published a "clarification" of point 17 
of the Nazi party program,which called for "the expropria-
32Abel, Nazi Movement, p. 171.
33For discussions of the rural campaign see Jeremy 
Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921-1933 (London: 
Oxford U.P., T?7l5 pp. T08-l2l, Geoffrey Pridham and Jeremy 
Noakes (eds.) Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (New York:
Viking Press, 1975) pp. Uo-91, Heberle, From Democracy, 
pp. 23-89, Gerhard Stoltenberg, Politische Strfimungen im 
schleswig-holsteinischen Landvolk 1918-1^33 (DvtsseldorrT~ 
Droste Verlag, 1962) pp. 142-66.
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tion without compensation of land needed for national pur­
poses, the abolition of ground rents and the prohibiting of 
land speculation."3  ^ In an article in the party newspaper, 
the Nazi leader explained that his party planned to 
nationalize only land which had fallen into the hands of
Jewish speculators and had no intentions of seizing the
35property of good German peasants. This conscious attempt
to exploit agrarian discontent produced mixed results. In
areas where active programs of intense agitation took place,
the Nazis did reasonably well. However, in most of rural
Germany where little if any agitation occurred, the NSDAP
3 6received few votes in the Reichstag election of 1928.
Discontent and economic distress did not automatically lead
to Nazi electoral successes. As Joachim Fest observed in
the context of the 1930 election, it was not possible to
exploit distress "simply by making empty promises to all and
sundry. There were too many politicians trying that same
37dodge; it soon ceased to fool anyone."
The task of translating discontent, economic disas­
ter and widespread disenchantment with republican parties
■^Bullock, Hitler, p. 50.
O  C
Ernst Deuerlein (ed.), Per Aufstieg der NSDAP in 
Augenzeuqenberichten (Diisseldorf: Karl Rauch Verlag, 196$y 
p. 292.
36Pridham, Hitler1s Rise, pp. 80-84.
37Joachim Fest, Hitler trans. Richard and Clara 
Winston (New York: Random House, 1975) p. 271.
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and institutions into Nazi votes required an effective long­
term propaganda effort. As one Nazi local leader put it,
O  Q
"Propaganda is the only thing that brings us forward."
The NSDAP had to convince voters that it could solve Germany’s 
problems* Moreover, the Nazis had to use unconventional 
means to do this. Statements of party programs and vague 
promises were not enough. This technique had been tried in 
1928 with Hitler's revision of point 17 of the party program. 
The cynical and disgusted public was in no mood to be swayed 
by such simple appeals. That was one of the lessons of the 
1928 Nazi rural campaign, but there had also been another 
lesson of that abortive effort. In districts where the 
party had conducted intensive campaigns the Nazis had scored 
major victories. Deeds, open professions of faith, and, 
above all, physical proof of a willingness to act impressed 
voters facing economic ruin. Millions of Germans were so 
alienated from existing institutions that only the promise 
of a complete renewal of Germany could attract them. This 
promise could not be presented simply in words, because 
German voters had learned to distrust mere words. What was 
needed was a concrete objectification of the promised reborn 
Germany through deeds. In order to exploit discontent the 
Nazis had to create a series of vivid images of the counter­
society that they would create once in power. In order to 
do this, the Nazis had to build a political machine embracing
1REitel Wolf Dobert, Convert to Freedom trans. Heinz 
and Ruth Norden (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1940) p. 163.
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all of Germany. Without such a political machine it is very 
improbable that the Nazis would have been able to score a 
political victory approaching the magnitude of that of 
September, 1930.
This dissertation will examine the development and 
character of the Nazi political machine primarily between 
May, 1928 and September, 1930. It will examine the general 
tenets on propaganda developed by Hitler and then discuss 
how these ideas were applied in the Nazi rally system. Much 
emphasis will be placed on the methods that the Nazis uti­
lized to create a series of concretely objectified impres­
sions and vague images. These impressions and vague images 
lent coherence to the disparate elements of Nazi propaganda 
and helped the party to paint a vivid picture of the Nazi 
world of the future. The Nazi approach to propaganda was 
best exemplified in the party's major rallies, but other 
parts of the Nazi political machine attempted to create 
similar impressions. These programs included the Himmler 
saturation campaigns, the Reinhardt speakers' school to 
train thousand of orators, the NSDAP slide and motion pic­
ture services, the Muchow street cell organization for 
saturating cities and towns with propaganda announcements, 
and the storm troopers' use of violence and development of a 
cult of death. The side issue of how the NSDAP was able to 
finance its intense campaigning will also be discussed. The 
development of an effective and omnipresent political 
machine was the greatest accomplishment of the NSDAP in the
30
late twenties. As George Mosse observed, "the invention of
a new political style was the chief innovation of National
Socialism; political acts became the dramatization of the
39new myths and cults." This dissertation will describe 
the development of the Nazi political machine and examine 
its character. It will also attempt to describe the role 
of this propaganda apparatus in bringing about the Nazi 
political breakthrough of 1930.
^George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses: 
Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from~tEe 
NapoleonicWars Through theThird Reich (New York: Howard 
Fertig, 1975) p. 1.
CHAPTER 2
THE NAZI PARTY TO 1928
The Nazi party was largely a product of World War I. 
Its founder, Anton Drexler, was a patriotic Munich mechanic 
who sought to win workers to nationalist ideas. Drexler’s 
activities were viewed with favor by the Imperial govern­
ment, which encouraged him in his work during the closing 
days of the War. His activities continued after the German 
defeat, and he attracted a small following of men who shared 
his goal of weaning workers away from internationalist 
Marxism.^- It was in these days that the basic characteris­
tics of the Nazi party were established. The party was 
based upon a community of accepted ideas and ideals. It was 
not the special representative of any group, class or insti­
tution of the German power structure. Finally, the NSDAP 
was led from the beginning by new men with little previous
The early history of the Nazi party is exceptionally 
well documented. It has been dealt with in a number of 
studies. The best recent account of the party’s early 
history are Georg Franz-Willing, Die Hitler - Bewegung 1^
Per Ursprung 1919-1922 (Hamburg: r9^2) and Werner Maser, Die 
Frtthgeschichte der NSDAP (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag Anstalt,
1965). The earITer studies of this period by Konrad Heiden, 
Per Fiihrer: Hitler1 s Rise to Power (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin & Co.7 1944) and A History of National Socialism 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, T935) are still valuable for the 
early period of Nazi development because Heiden was a percep­
tive eyewitness of Nazi activities in the early twenties.
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leadership experience and no real opportunities to gain such
positions within established organizations. The early
NSDAP was just one of a number of "National Socialist"
parties and clubs that sprang up in Germany, Austria and
Czechoslovakia between 1900 and 1920. It was in no way
distinguished from these other lilliputian parties.
Drexler's "party" in 1919 was little more than an
3impotent debating club. It survived and prospered only be­
cause Hitler decided to join it and took over responsibility 
for party propaganda. Hitler’s skill as a speaker was the 
only real asset of the early NSDAP. Ernst (Putzi) 
Hanfstaengl, an early party member, provides an excellent 
description of Hitler's unique speaking style. Hitler's 
choice of words managed to catch:
"the casual camaraderie of the trenches, and 
without stooping to slang, except for special 
effect, the] managed to talk like a neighbor 
of his audience. In describing the difficulties 
of the housewife without enough money to buy 
the food her family needed . . .  he would pro­
duce just the phrases she would have used her­
self to describe her difficulities, if she had 
been able to formulate them. Where other
2
M. W. Fodor, "The Austrian Roots of Hitlerism," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XIV, 1935-1936.
3
The Nazi party was so insignificant before Hitler 
joined it that there are very few contemporary eyewitness 
reports on it. Ironically, Hitler, in his capacity as an 
intelligence agent for the army, was sent to gather informa­
tion on the group. Hitler was hardly an unbiased witness, 
but in this case his description of the early NSDAP seems to 
be accurate. He described a meeting of the early NSDAP exec­
utive committee in the following terms. "Terrible, terrible! 
This was club life of the worst manner and sort." Adolf 
Hitler, Mein Kampf trans. Ralph Mannheim (Boston: Houghton, 
Mifflin and Company, 1943) p. 222.
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national orators gave the painful impression 
of talking down to their audiences, he had 
the priceless gift of expressing exactly their 
thoughts.
As Ernst Nolte stated, Hitler 1 was the medium who communi-
5
cated to the masses their own, deeply buried spirit.” All 
of Hitler's speeches followed a pattern designed to impress 
his audience. He never dealt merely with contemporary pro­
blems. Instead, he insisted upon discussing the past, 
present and future of every issue. Each speech ”appeared to 
be a complete historical survey of the situation. In 
order not to bore his audience, Hitler broke up his speeches 
with timely impersonations of imaginary opponents and then 
proceeded to demolish the arguments presented by these hypo­
thetical foes. He would then return "to his original line 
of thought." Hanfstaengl concludes by describing the last 
eight to ten minutes of a Hitler speech as "an orgasm of 
words.
Hitler’s speaking abilities kept the NSDAP together 
during the early twenties, but the party remained a small 
movement. Its ideological doctrines were formulated in the 
party program of 1920, the twenty-five points. This program
^Ernst (Putzi) Hanfstaengl, Hitler: The Missing
Years (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957) pp. 67-68.
5Ernst Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism trans.
Leila Vennewitz (New York: Mentor^ T565T p. 373.
6Hanfstaengl, Hitler, p. 68
Ibid., pp. 68-69. For another account of a Hitler 
speech see Dobert, Convert, pp. 165-67.
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contained "with sufficient clarity the three basic trends of 
subsequent National Socialist rule: national restitution,
g
conquest of living space, and world salvation.” In addi­
tion to a common ideological commitment, the early Nazi 
party now began to be increasingly identified with personal 
loyalty to Hitler and with a belief in his special mission
9
to bring about a rebirth of Germany. Both Nazi ideology 
and the charismatic quality of Hitler's leadership were 
established in these years. The ideology was later elab­
orated in Hitler's book Mein Kampf, but at no time did it 
drastically change. The Nazi party was always anti-Semitic, 
nationalistic and anti-democratic. Some of Hitler's earliest 
speeches centered upon denunciations of the Versailles Treaty 
and the Weimar Republic, which he always linked to the treaty. 
The party also consistently supported the idea of a greater 
Germany including all Germans, and a policy of eastward ex­
pansion of the Reich. As early as 1919 Hitler was actively 
defending the expansionistic Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
Finally, as a positive counterpoint to the party's anti- 
Semitism, the Nazis favored the establishment of a racially 
based community of all Germans, where class and religious
o
Nolte, Three Faces, p. 403.
q
The Hitler cult began in earnest m  1921. It was 
first developed by Dietrich Eckart, Hermann Esser and Rudolf 
Hess. Fest, Hitler, p. 142.
^Bullock, Hitler, p. 41. For a description of one 
of these speeches see" Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 463-68.
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differences would be submerged by the rekindling of the 
spirit of racial unity.^ The idea of the Volksgemeinschaft 
or racial community dates back in Nazi history to the period 
before Hitler joined the party. Drexler was talking about 
just such an end to class antagonisms in early 1919.
The Nazi party of the early twenties can best be 
described as a small, geographically limited, political 
splinter movement. In the beginning the NSDAP scarcely 
existed outside of Munich. It was able to expand into other 
parts of Bavaria mainly because Hitler succeeded in per­
suading several other major racist orators to join the Nazis. 
The two most important of these speakers were Julius 
Streicher and Hermann Esser. The support of Streicher was 
especially crucial; with his help, the NSDAP was able to 
establish itself in his home town of Nttrnberg. Hermann Esser, 
the party's other major early speaker, entered the NSDAP in 
the early twenties and was able to take some of the speaking 
burden off Hitler in Munich. However, the party did not 
have the human or material resources to expand greatly. It 
remained a local movement with only modest support. Even 
its designation as a political party was mainly a matter of 
legal convenience,for the early NSDAP had little in common 
with traditional Weimar political parties.
The contrast between the NSDAP and its traditional
^ F o r  a discussion of the Volksgemeinschaft see 
Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 284-329, 442-51T
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opponents was very great in the early twenties. The major 
parties in the Weimar Republic tended to be identified with 
important special interest groups. The advantages of such 
identification were considerable. The Catholic Center's 
political apparatus was largely an extension of church 
activities. Thus, the party was present wherever there was 
a Catholic church. The Social Democrats existed wherever 
a free trade union was established. Again the party's 
political organization functioned locally as an adjunct of 
the union. The Nazis, on the other hand, were associated 
with no omnipresent organization. The NSDAP only existed 
in areas where it had an active and effective political 
organization. In the early twenties this meant that the 
party was really confined to Munich and to a few other 
Bavarian cities and towns. The early party's alienation 
from major special interest groups also meant that the 
NSDAP suffered from a perennial shortage of funds. Party 
income until 1930 was extremely small. Membership dues and
occasional gifts were the primary sources of money. Major
12contributors were almost completely lacking, and the Nazis 
were incapable of financing major campaigns along expensive 
traditional lines.
Realizing that the NSDAP was in no position to com­
pete successfully with the established Weimar parties. Hitler
12Henry A. Turner, Jr. (ed.) Nazism and the Third 
Reich (New York: Quadrangle, 1972) "Big Business and the 
Rise of Hitler" by Henry A. Turner, Jr., pp. 89-108.
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forced an international congress of National Socialists at 
Salzburg in 1922 to adopt a resolution opposing participa­
tion in elections. The early Nazi party sought to gain 
power outside existing institutions by means of a quasi­
military uprising. Until November 9, 1923, Hitler's efforts 
were directed toward building up support, so that his party 
could play an important part in an eventual violent seizure 
of power. He allied his new party with other dissident 
elements in Bavaria including the monarchist state commis­
sioner, Gustav von Kahr, and the regional Reichswehr 
commander. On November 8, 1923, Hitler announced the over­
throw of the Weimar Republic and the establishment of a new 
"national" government at a public meeting addressed by von 
Kahr in the BdrgerbrSukeller, a large Munich beer-hall. The 
next day the "beer-hall Putsch" ended in disaster when the
Bavarian green police fired on a mob of marching Nazis
13"celebrating" their victory of the previous night.
The beer-hall fiasco marked the end of the first 
phase of Nazi history. The party as constituted in 1923 was 
at a dead end in any case. It was incapable of much further 
growth because of its limited human and material resources.
It was not surprising that the Nazis resorted to the gamble 
of trying to seize power by violence. They had few other
13For the Nazi uprising of 1923 the best source is 
Harold J. Gordon, Jr., Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U.P.7 1572). An enter­
taining and clever description of these events and of Hitler's 
early career can be found in Richard Hanser, Putsch: How
Hitler Made Revolution (New York: Pyramid, 1971).
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options in 1923.
The failure of the Putsch, however, taught the party 
a number of lessons and altered its goals. The beer-hall 
revolt failed miserably at least in part because Hitler 
precipitated the uprising without previously consulting his 
allies. He assumed that after the first overt act of re­
bellion the various leaders of the Bavarian state government 
and the Reichswehr commanders involved in this conspiracy 
would automatically follow his lead. When none of his allies 
supported him on November 9, Hitler was furious. He accused 
his co-conspirators of failing to live up to their "obliga­
tions" and of betraying the national cause. The experience 
of the Putsch convinced Hitler that the established extreme 
rightist leadership was too timid and untrustworthy to lead 
a National uprising. This was a departure from Hitler's 
outlook before the Putsch. Originally he viewed himself as 
a drummer or salesman of the national movement. He was to 
recruit followers who were organized in the paramilitary 
Sturm Abteilung, or SA. The SA, which at the time was 
closely tied to the Reichswehr, was to carry out the actual 
revolt, but after its successful conclusion, Hitler, the 
NSDAP and the SA were to play only a subordinate role in the 
new "national” government. Better known personages such as 
Erich Ludendorff were to assume the key positions in the new 
regime. With the failure of the Putsch, Hitler became thor­
oughly disillusioned with the men to whom he had previously 
been willing to subordinate himself. After November 9, 1923,
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Hitler refused to play a secondary role to the more estab­
lished rightist leaders. He would later form alliances of 
convenience with these men, but he always insisted upon 
maintaining his own independence and usually dictated the 
terms of such agreements. Ironically, it was the Putsch and 
Hitler's subsequent trial for treason that made it possible 
for Hitler to assert his independence. Before November 9, 
Hitler was an obscure demagogue virtually unknown outside of 
Bavaria. The myth of Hitler's heroic actions during the 
Putsch plus his dramatic conduct during his trial made the 
Nazi leader into a national figure, around whom German 
rightists could rally.
The lessons of 1923 altered the outlook of the NSDAP, 
but did nothing to overcome its disadvantages or to provide 
the party with a viable strategy for attaining power. Hitler 
and some other leading Nazis were jailed for their participa­
tion in the Putsch. Others were forced to go into temporary 
14exile. Hitler was released from prison in December, 1924, 
and the party was officially re-established in February,
1925. The only major decision made by Hitler at this stage 
was that he would no longer attempt to seize power by a 
quasi-military revolt. The beer-hall debacle had convinced 
him that this was a risky and highly questionable road to 
power that should be avoided in the future. In his first
^For an account of the impact of the failure of the 
Putsch on the party see Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 11-32 
and Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 41-55.
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public pronouncement after his release from prison, Hitler
stated that the newly refounded NSDAP would follow a policy
15of strict obedience to the law. Initially the policy of
legality was little more than a rejection of the previous
strategy of gaining power by a Putsch. The Nazis were still
too weak to enter into active competition with the tradi-
16tional Weimar parties. It was still predominantly a move-
17ment limited to Munich and other Bavarian cities. Between 
1925 and 1928 the party concentrated its attention upon 
developing an effective organizational structure and upon 
finding a new strategy for achieving political ascendency.
The primary asset of the refounded NSDAP was Hitler's 
reputation as an heroic leader and inspired orator, but his 
actual role as a speaker tended to decline. On March 9,
1925, Hitler was forbidden to speak in Bavaria on the grounds 
that his oratorical performances incited audiences to vio­
lence and might be the prelude to yet another uprising. All 
other German states-except Thuringia, Mecklenburg and 
Brunswick-joined Bavaria in banning Hitler from speaking.
These prohibitions were not lifted until 1927 in most states
18and not until September, 1928, in Prussia. The restrictions
•^5Bullock, Hitler, pp. 98-104.
^®Pridham, Hitler1s Rise, pp. 27-28.
^7Ibid., p. 56.
18z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd ed. (London: 
U.P., 1973} pp. 6-7.
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tended to add to Hitler's prestige as a leader. Nazi propa­
ganda of the period emphasized Hitler's unique qualities by 
making much of the fact that of all the people on the face 
of the earth only he was forbidden to speak in Germany.
This interval completed Hitler's transformation from the
role of a skillful orator to that of the charismatic leader
19of a movement.
The speaking prohibition meant that Hitler was able
to spend more time "organizing the Nazi party into a pliable
20instrument for his tactical aims." Until 1923 Nazi organi­
zation was loose and incomplete below the highest levels.
As long as the party concentrated upon seizing power by a 
quasi-military revolt in Munich, the development of Nazi 
organizations in other parts of Germany was only of peripheral
1QThe best description of charismatic leadership can 
be found in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. trans. and 
intro.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Ox­
ford U.P., 1946) pp. 295-96. Weber describes charismatic 
leadership in the following terms: " . . .  the term 'charis­
ma' shall be understood to refer to an extraordinary quality 
of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, 
alleged, or presumed. 'Charismatic authority', hence, shall 
refer to a rule over men . . . to which the governed submit 
because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the 
specific person . . . .  The legitimacy of charismatic rule 
thus rests upon the belief in magical powers, revelation and 
hero worship." Hitler's appeal was consciously charismatic. 
In discussing how to overcome emotional resistance to the 
NSDAP he recommended an appeal to "mysterious powers" as the 
most effective method; Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 471. For a 
discussion of charismatic authority see Gerth and Mills 
(eds.) From Max Weber, pp. 52-54, 246-52, 295-96 and Reinhard 
Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1960) pp. 299-307.
20Fest, Hitler, p. 228.
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21interest. In 1926 efforts were made to formalize party
22institutions in a circular letter issued by Hitler.
The basic unit of the Nazi party was the Ortsgruppe,
the local or village group. The Ortsgruppe was described as
"the propaganda cell of the movement and the germ cell for
23the expansion of the party." In 1926 its organizational
structure was regularized. Each Ortsgruppe had to have a
24minimum of six members. The chairman of the Ortsgruppe
25was elected by the membership. He appointed a deputy, a 
chief writer and a treasurer. In large local groups the 
chairman could appoint Vertrauensleute to supervise the 
activities of part of the Ortsgruppe. The Vertrauensleute
21Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 37-38.
2 2For the 1926 reorganization of the party see 
Albrecht Tyrell (ed.) FUhrer Befiehl . . . : Selbstzeugnisse
aus der Kampfzeit der NSpAP=Dokumentation und Analyse
(D t f s seldoDroste Verlag^ pp. 230-^1 for the docu­
ment entitled "Aufgaben und Gliederung der NSDAP im Juli
1926. "
24 Ibid., p. 230. In 1928 the minimum number of mem­
bers necessary to form an Ortsgruppe was increased to fifteen. 
See Ibid., p. 245 document "Richtllnien fttr die 
Untergliederungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutscher 
Arbeiter - Partei, 15 September 1928.’’
25On September 9, 1929, the last vestige of demo­
cracy within the NSDAP was eliminated. From that date the 
Gauleiters appointed all Ortsgruppenftlhrer. In practice 
this action had little impact on the party since the Reich 
leadership prior to 1929 had consistently supported the 
Gauleiters in any dispute with a local leader. See Ibid., 
p. 264 and Wolfgang Dorn, Fflhrerideoloqie und 
Farteiorqanisation in der NSDAP, 1919-1933 (Dtlsseldorf:
Droste Verlag, 1972) pp. 278-67.
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usually existed only in cities where the party had over one 
hundred members. Internal disputes were handled by a party 
court, which was made up of the three oldest members in good 
standing. The Ortsgruppen recruited new members for the 
party and carried on campaigns in their cities, towns or 
villages. Their principal duty was to make sure that the 
party became known in their localities. In places where 
Ortsgruppen existed and were active, the NSDAP ceased to be 
an alien Bavarian party and became part of the local politi­
cal scene.
Above the Ortsgruppen regional party offices known 
as the Gauleitung developed. The Gauleiters or regional 
leaders coordinated the activities of the local groups. They 
communicated directly with the Munich leadership, and worked 
to establish new Ortsgruppen. The various Gauleiters were 
appointed by Hitler and served at his pleasure. They 
appointed subordinate Gau officials including a deputy, a 
chief writer and a treasurer. The Gauleiters supervised all 
propaganda activity in their regions and were often major 
speakers in their own right. This division of the party 
freed the leadership in Munich from much time-consuming paper 
work, and insured the presence of a reliable party leader in 
each region of Germany to make necessary decisions. The 
Gauleiter was likely to be far better informed on regional 
peculiarities than national headquaters in Munich, and thus 
he was less prone to make decisions that would upset local 
sensibilities. If blunders were made, it was a simple
44
2 6matter for Hitler to remove an incompetent Gauleiter*
With the slow but steady growth of the NSDAP a new 
position intermediate between the Ortsgruppen and the 
Gauleitung was created. This official was known as the 
Bezirksfiihrer, or district leader. In 1927 Fritz Sauckel, 
deputy Gauleiter of Thuringia, issued a series of directives 
clarifying the duties of the Bezirksftlhrer. These district 
chieftains were responsible for following all orders issued 
by the Reich leadership or the Gauleitung. They regulated 
and planned activities for the local groups under their 
supervision and directed campaigns in previously unworked 
areas. District leaders also supervised the distribution of 
propaganda material to local groups and made sure that the 
press covered Nazi activities thoroughly and fairly. Finally, 
they acted as human links tying together all the party mem­
bers in their districts. The Bezirksftlhrer did this by fre­
quently visiting each Ortsgruppe and being familiar with 
every party member in their districts. This close personal 
contact with the membership enabled the district leaders to 
promote unity within the party and to suppress any internal 
quarrels promptly and effectively. The Bezirksftlhrer became 
more important as the party expanded. He freed the 
Gauleitung from much commonplace labor making it possible 
for the Gauleiter to spend more time on overall coordination 
and planning. The Bezirksftlhrer were appointed by the
26Tyrell, Ftlhrer Befiehl, pp. 230-31.
45
Gauleiters and were subject to removal if their work was
27unsatisfactory.
The final elements of Nazi organization developed be­
tween 1925 and 1928 were the various party auxiliary organi­
zations. The Sturm Abteilung, or SA, was the party's para­
military organization. It existed before the Putsch, but 
was reconstituted in 1925 along somewhat different lines.
The early SA was subsidized by the Reichswehr and was a true 
paramilitary organization, complete with weapons supplied by 
the army. After 1925 the SA was forbidden arms by Hitler in 
his directive refounding the organization. The principal 
duties of the new SA were propagandistic in nature. The 
storm troopers guarded party rallies and occasionally broke 
up opposition meetings. They participated in marches and 
distributed propaganda literature. Finally, the brown shirt 
uniform of the SA created the illusion in the minds of both 
storm troopers and the public that the NSDAP was a quasi­
military movement embodying all the old and often treasured
2 8qualities of German militarism. The Schutzstaffel, or SS, 
was an elitist off-shoot of the SA and, at this time, little 
different from its parent organization. In the late twenties 
SS units were under the command of the SA leadership and 
little more than special units of the SA.
27Ibid., pp. 237-38 document entitled "Instruktionen 
fiir die Bezirksfiihrer, 9 June 1927, Weimar."
28por the SA see Heinrich Bennecke, Hitler und die 
SA (Munich: G. Olzog Verlag, 1962).
46
Other auxiliary organizations also developed after 
1925. The Hitler Youth (HJ) and the National Socialist Ger­
man Students' League (NSDStB) were formed for youth and 
student activities. The NSDStB was active in promoting 
Nazism on university campuses and in demanding a quota on 
the admission of Jewish students. However, both of these 
organizations were primarily clubs for party members or 
supporters from a special segment of the population, in this 
case the young. The other auxiliary organizations, the
Women's Order (Roten Hakenkreuzin), the Lawyers' League, and
29and Doctors' League, were also mainly clubs. They served 
the twofold purposes of isolating party members from out­
side organizations and of developing the beginnings of a 
dual society. These clubs were extremely useful in the years 
after 1933 in the establishment of a totalitarian regime by 
coordinating all activities into Nazi organizations. How­
ever, in the late twenties they played little part in the 
expansion of the party, but mainly served the internal func­
tion of providing members with professional and group activi­
ties, so that these members would not be tainted by contact 
with non-Nazi organizations.
The organizational developments of the period 1925 
to 1928 were of vital importance for understanding later 
Nazi expansion. The Ortsgruppen, Gauleitung, Bezirksfiihrer
^®For a discussion of these "front organizations" 
see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism {New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich", 19737” pp^ 364-75 passim.
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and SA all played key roles in the transformation of the 
party into a mass movement. Furthermore, this organizational 
structure remained intact from its inception until 1945. At 
the time, however, these reforms were considered to be of 
only secondary importance. The major problem facing the 
NSDAP in 1925 was how to gain power. The party desperately 
needed to develop a new strategy.
In 1925, when Hitler refounded the NSDAP, little had 
changed from the period before the Putsch. The party was 
still small (considerably smaller than it had been in 1923). 
It was still without financial resources, and it still was
30not associated with any major German special interest group. 
The party remained primarily a Bavarian movement and was 
little known elsewhere. In 1925, any attempt to seek power 
within the existing democratic context by electoral victories 
seemed destined to fail. Between 1925 and 1928 a new strat­
egy was devised which Hitler hoped would bring the party to 
power.
This strategy was first developed by a group of 
radical Nazis under the leadership of Gregor Strasser. Since 
the days of Anton Drexler, the NSDAP had claimed to be a 
movement to wean workers away from international Marxism. 
Strasser*s group, geographically concentrated in the indus­
trial Ruhr, took this idea seriously. From 1925 to 1928 the 
faction conducted a strenuous campaign to attract industrial
30pridham, Hitler* s Rise, pp. 56, 63.
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workers to the party. They emphasized the socialist aspects 
of National Socialism and devoted virtually all their politi­
cal efforts to addressing working class audiences. The 
Strasser group included such major orators as Strasser him­
self , Joseph Goebbels, Erich Koch, Karl Kaufmann and Robert
Ley. Other than Hitler, these were the best speakers that
31the party possessed. The ultimate purpose of this cam­
paign was to gain control of workers in a dozen or so key
cities and then to stage mass strikes that would force the
32government to capitulate to the Nazis.
This plan had a number of merits. It was modeled
after the tactics that Mussolini used to achieve power.
Hitler, an admirer of Mussolini, especially appreciated this
33characteristic of the plan. Furthermore, it seemed to 
conform admirably to the party's capacity for campaigning; 
in the period from 1925 to 1928, the NSDAP had adequate 
resources to canvass a dozen cities. Finally, the plan
31For firsth&nd accounts of this campaign see 
Albert Krebs, Tendenzen und Gestalten der NSDAP: Erinnerungen
an die FrUhzeit der Partei (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag 
Anstalt^ 1959), Werner Jochmann (ed.), Nationalsozialismus 
und Revolution: Ursprung und Geschichte der NSDAP in Ham­
burg : Dokumente (Frankfurt am Main: EuropSische
Verlagsanstalt, 1963) and Joseph Goebbels, The Early Goebbels 
Diaries: The Journal of Joseph Goebbels from 1925-1926 trans.
Oliver Watson, ed. Helmut Heiber (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1962).
32Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party: I,
1919-1933 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 196?) 
pp. 90, 105.
•^Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 141.
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reflected existing Nazi strength, which was almost entirely 
urban. This syndicalist scheme seemed to be the ideal 
strategy for the newly refounded party. It did not involve 
the risks of another Putsch, and it did not force the party 
to develop the broad political machine necessary to achieve 
power through electoral success.
The urban plan, so attractive in theory, failed in 
practice. The first problem with it was the composition of 
the NSDAP. Prom 1925 to 1928, the Nazi party was a pre­
dominantly urban movement, but it was not made up primarily 
of industrial workers. In Bavaria, where most party members 
resided, the NSDAP was mainly a middle-class movement.
This situation forced Hitler to be somewhat less than whole­
hearted in his support of the Strasser group's "socialism" 
for fear of losing the party's Bavarian base. In northern 
Germany, on the other hand, the situation was entirely 
different. Here, the party was much smaller and had a much 
higher percentage of workers as members. Furthermore, in 
this region the Nazis had competition from another racialist 
party, the Deutschvolkische Freiheitsbewegung, which drew 
most of its support from rural areas. In the North, the 
"socialist" strategy seemed to be a necessity. The party 
was in no position to compete with its rightist rival in 
rural areas, and it seemed that the NSDAP could expand 
only in the cities. Indeed, one advantage of the "socialist"
^Pridham, Hitler1 s Rise, pp. 47-48.
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approach was that it served to differentiate the NSDAP from
its reactionary, rural, racialist rival. Since the Nazis in
1925 were weaker in northern Germany than the Deutschvftlkische
Freiheitsbewegung, it was important for the NSDAP to estab-
35lish its own identity. Again the situation was quite 
different in Bavaria, where the absence of any other extreme 
rightist party made it unnecessary to pursue a radical 
socialist policy.
In late 1925 a crisis occurred within the party 
pitting the radical northerners against the Munich leader­
ship. The issue that precipitated this struggle was a 
referendum to expropriate the property of the former German 
princes. The "socialists" favored the referendum and wanted 
to join the Marxist parties in supporting it. The issue was 
considered to be crucial, if the Nazis were to establish 
their credentials as a workers' party opposed to all reac­
tionaries. Hitler, on the other hand, thought it equally 
essential to support the right of private property even in 
this context. His Bavarian middle-class support hingSd on 
this issue. The northerners openly opposed Hitler's position 
and came close to breaking off relations with Munich. Hitler 
interpreted this as a threat of internal revolt against his 
leadership and responded by calling a conference at Bamberg 
on February 14, 1926. At this meeting he reaffirmed his
35For a discussion of the development of the NSDAP 
in northern Germany and its struggle with the DeutschvPlkische 
Freiheitsbewegung see Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 56-101.
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position on the referendum in such positive terms that the 
northerners were forced to choose between abandoning their 
stand or leaving the party. The conference, which was 
dominated by Bavarian delegates, overwhelmingly supported 
Hitler. The Strasser faction, realizing that Hitler was 
indispensable to the movement, capitulated on the issue of 
the referendum.^ The two major leaders of the "socialist" 
faction were courted by Hitler and brought back into the 
fold. Gregor Strasser was eventually transferred to Munich, 
where he headed the party's national organization section. 
Goebbels was made Gauleiter of Berlin. "Thereafter, and 
until the end, there were no longer any battles over princi­
ples, no longer any ideological disputes; what remained was
^There is a good deal of controversy over the 
motives of the Strasser group and the extent of their oppo­
sition to Hitler. Even the events themselves are not clear. 
There are two published contemporary accounts of the con­
flict: Goebbels, Early Diaries, pp. 45-67 and Otto Strasser,
Hitler and I trans. Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher (Boston: 
Houghton, MXfflin and Co., 1940). Unfortunately, Otto 
Strasser*s grasp of the truth was limited, and he tended to 
lie or misremember as often as he accurately reported events. 
Otto Strasser*s entire interpretation of the "socialist" 
program is open to question. He is not even reliable in 
matters of detail. His book is full of errors in factual 
reporting. He gives the wrong dates for meetings, and often 
describes discussions that never took place. Goebbels' 
account is more trustworthy, but he discussed the controversy 
with Hitler only incidentally. Other documentary evidence on 
the northern faction is equally sketchy. For a discussion 
and valuable interpretation of the struggle between Hitler 
and the Strasser group, the reader should first consult 
Joseph Nyomarkay's brilliant Charisma and Factionalism in 
the Nazi Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
19^71 pp. 71-109. Other useful studies include Orlow, Nazi 
Party, pp. 46-127 passim and Jeremy Noakes, "Conflict an3 
Development in the NSDAP, 1924-1927" Journal of Contemporary 
History, October, 1966.
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37only the struggle for office and favoritism.M
The conflict over the referendum to expropriate 
princely property damaged the "socialist" campaign, but it 
did not put an end to the urban strategy. Until late 1927 
almost all Nazi activities were concentrated in the cities. 
Even in Bavaria the urban campaign was wholeheartedly pur­
sued, though without the "socialist" emphasis. The urban 
strategy was not abandoned because of internal party differ­
ences, but because it failed. From 1925 to May, 1928, some 
of the party's best orators spent the bulk of their time 
trying to attract working class supporters for the NSDAP.
By late 1927, it was becoming clear that the party was making 
little headway in proletarian districts. One indication of 
the failure of the urban plan was the effort of the Nazis to 
exploit rural discontent in 1927 and 1928. The Nazi rural 
campaign of those years represented a tentative attempt to 
find an alternative to the abortive "socialist" strategy.
On May 20, 1928, the syndicalist scheme of gaining power by 
mass strikes was dealt a fatal blow. In the Reichstag 
election on that day, it became clear that the NSDAP had 
failed to attract any broad proletarian support. The 
"socialist" campaign was a complete failure. Mass strikes 
need strikers, and since the NSDAP was unable to attract 
any sizable working class following, the syndicalist strat­
egy had to be abandoned.
^Fest, Hitler, p. 241.
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The failure of the urban strategy forced the NSDAP 
to develop a new means of gaining political ascendency. A 
Putsch had failed; a policy of seizing power by means of 
mass strikes was impossible. Virtually the only untried 
strategy available to the party was to gain power legally by 
winning elections. This strategy had been rejected pre­
viously on the grounds that it was impractical and inappro­
priate for a totalitarian, anti-democratic party to operate 
within the hated democratic context of the Weimar Republic. 
Hitler opposed participation in elections in 1922 and only 
reluctantly accepted it after the Putsch. Even in 1928,
Hitler agreed to participate in the national elections only
38after long hesitation. The decision to follow the elec­
toral road to power was made largely for want of any other 
option and without much enthusiasm.
The NSDAP in 1928 had few assets with which to pur­
sue an electoral strategy. To be sure, there were some 
factors in the party's favor. Hitler's reputation as a 
leader and major German figure still remained paramount; the 
National Socialist ideology, especially its negativism to­
ward the Republic, placed the Nazis in a position to exploit 
discontent, and the political organization developed be­
tween 1925 and 1927 was easily adapted to an electoral strat­
egy and quite useful for that purpose. Nevertheless, the 
key to any electoral victory was lacking. The party had to
■*®Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 141. Fest,
Hitler, p. 255.
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overcome its image of being merely an impotent splinter
group. Only through a major propaganda drive could the Nazis
hope to dispel that impression, to exploit discontent and to
transform themselves into a nationally prominent party. In
1928 the means for staging such a massive campaign did not 
39exist. The subsequent chapters of this dissertation will 
examine the development of these means and the resulting 
Nazi political machine, but some theories about the nature 
of propaganda and even some tactical approaches to converting 
a mass audience were developed before 1928. These general 
ideas and tactics were later applied by the Nazi political 
machine and deserve some consideration here.
In his polemical autobiography, Mein Kampf, Hitler 
provides the clearest picture of Nazi attitudes toward pro­
paganda. For Hitler "the function of propaganda is to
40attract supporters." Since Hitler sought to appeal to 
people in mass audiences, his attitude toward the masses is 
crucial for understanding his view of proper propaganda 
techniques. Hitler generally regarded the masses with con­
tempt. "The people in their overwhelming majority are so 
feminine by nature and attitude that sober reasoning deter­
mines their thoughts and actions far less than emotion and 
41feeling." Accordingly, effective propaganda must be
^^Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 92.
40Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 581.
41Ibid., p. 183.
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adjusted "to the most limited intelligence among those it is
addressed to" and "the greater the mass it is intended
to reach the lower its purely intellectual level will have 
4 2to be.” Hitler summarized his opinions on propaganda in
the following statements.
"The receptivity of the great mass is very 
limited, their intelligence is small, but 
their power of forgetting is enormous. In 
consequence of these facts, all effective 
propaganda must be limited to a very few 
points and must harp on these in slogans 
until the last member of the public under­
stands what you want him to understand by 
your slogan.4^
propaganda . . . consists in attracting 
the attention of the crowd, and not in 
educating . . . [it] must be aimed at 
the emotions and only to a very limited 
degree at the so-called intellect."44
Hitler's interest in propaganda was primarily tech­
nical. He was not "much concerned with the actual content
45of propaganda." Instead he viewed the whole matter as ”a
46problem of political salesmanship." His contempt for the 
masses meant that Nazi appeals were consistently designed 
to arouse popular emotions and equally consistently dis­
dainful of any attempts to persuade audiences of the correct­
ness of Nazi doctrines by rational argument. The party's
4^Ibid., p. 180.
43Ibid., pp. 180-181.
44Ibid,, p. 180.
4^Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. xv.
46Ibid.
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emphasis on emotional appeals was a persistent element of 
Nazi propaganda from its earliest days.
National Socialist propaganda was always dogmatic 
and aggressive in character. Hitler consistently refused to 
alter the party's program, the twenty-five points. Indeed, 
Hitler attacked the "socialist” wing of the party at Bamberg 
in 1926 partly because they had discussed plans for a new 
platform. When the twenty-five points hindered the expansion 
of the movement, as in the case of point seventeen on agri­
culture, Hitler simply "clarified" the program in a public 
announcement. Officially approved Nazi programs and posi­
tions were never repudiated. Instead, they were "clarified," 
ignored or vigorously defended depending upon the immediate 
circumstances. This unchanging doctrine consisted primarily 
of the twenty-five points, Hitler's statements in Mein Kampf 
and his published speeches. Official party position papers 
were often revised in detail, but the general principles, 
upon which these papers were based, always remained sacro­
sanct. The Nazi treatment of agricultural problems exempli­
fies the common procedure. Vague general statements were
made on this issue in 1928, and subsequently in 1930 a de-
47tailed position paper was issued incorporating the general 
propositions. Nazi contentions were always presented in an 
aggressive tone with "no mincing of words, no politeness,
^For Hitler’s manifesto on agriculture see Norman H. 
Baynes (ed. & trans.) The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April, 
1922-August, 1939, Vol. I (New York, London, Toronto: Oxford 
U.P.,1942) pp. T9-37.
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48and little concern with the facts and logic." Nazi 
ideology was to be either accepted or rejected, but never to 
be debated.
This extreme dogmatism tended to set the NSDAP apart 
from other parties. George Mosse has described this char­
acteristic of the party perceptively:
"National Socialist thought cannot be judged 
in terms of traditional political theory. It 
has little in common with rational, logically 
constructed systems such as those of Hegel or 
Marx . . . .  it was, in fact, a theology which 
provided the framework for national worship."49
The doctrinaire, quasi-religious character of the NSDAP50 
enabled it to present to the world an image of monolithic 
determination and helps explain how the party was able to 
maintain and expand its following after 1925. Acceptance of 
the NSDAP and Hitler was presented to the public as an act 
of faith, not as a conscious, pragmatic decision. Once 
conversion had taken place, the convert was submerged in a 
movement replete with a well developed ideology and an ex­
tensive set of rituals. Leaving the party was tantamount to 
a religious crisis of faith and left the former member iso­
lated in an atomized and seemingly incomprehensible universe.
Another major element of Nazi propaganda was its 
emphasis on violence. "To stimulate emotion and violence,
48Abel, The Nazi Movement, p. 61.
49Mosse, Nationalization, p. 9-10.
^°Arendt, Totalitarianism, pp. 349-50, 377-78.
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51and to benefit by their interaction" was a primary aim of
National Socialist activity. From the earliest days of the
party in Munich Hitler initiated violent confrontations with
his opponents in order to attract much needed publicity. As
Hitler commented,
"It makes no difference whatever whether 
they I the newspapers and public} laugh at 
us or revile us, whether they represent us 
as clowns or criminals; the main thing is 
that they mention us, that they concern 
themselves with us again and again, and 
that we gradually . . . appear to be the
only power that anyone reckons with at
the moment. " 52
Violence also helped in maintaining the militancy of the 
movement. It emphasized the need for unity by providing 
vivid examples of the existence of a real external enemy.
In addition, the escalation of violence between the Nazis 
and the Marxist parties in the late Weimar Republic was 
instrumental in forcing many Germans into a position which 
impelled them to choose either one group or the other. This 
tactic was especially effective after the advent of the 
great depression when class antagonisms deepened.
Two examples are helpful in illustrating the Nazi's 
provocative methods. In October, 19 22, Hitler decided to 
hold a rally in the city of Coburg, knowing that the Marxist 
parties had dominated the streets of that city since the 
close of World War I. Previous bourgeois or nationalist
51Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 18.
^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 485.
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rallies had been broken up by the "reds.” Hitler's inten­
tion was either to cow the Marxists into allowing him to 
speak or to drive them from the streets. SA men from all 
parts of Bavaria were dispatched to Coburg, and on the day 
of the rally the Nazis were able to rout their opponents.
As Hitler put it, "coercion is broken only by coercion, and
53terror only by terror." Coburg later became a Nazi
stronghold giving the party an absolute majority on the city
54council as early as 1929. The impression of strength and
determination displayed by the party in 1922 seems to have 
been received favorably by the city’s bourgeois residents.
Another example of the use of violence occurred in 
Berlin in 1927. Gauleiter Goebbels decided to follow 
Hitler’s example and hold a rally in the Communist section 
of town in the Pharus Saale, a hall usually reserved 
for Communist meetings. All Goebbels1 posters were in 
bright red in order to enrage the Communists further. 
Goebbels1 intentions were clearly to incite Berlin’s 
Marxists to violence. The city’s SA contingent assembled 
at the Pharus Saale on the night of February 11, ready for 
action. A large Communist crowd greeted Goebbels with jeers 
and profanity. Before the Gauleiter could speak, the crowd 
tried to attack him. A full-fledged battle ensued in which
53Ibid., pp. 454-55.
^ F o r  a description of the electoral history of 
Coburg see ThrSnhardt, Wahlen, p. 162.
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many combatants on both sides were injured. Finally, the 
police cleared the hall of Communists, and Goebbels 
apparently delivered his oration from a speaker's stand 
covered with wounded and bleeding SA men. Goebbels claimed
that in the days after the rally a record number of men
. . . 55inquired about joining the SA.
The tone and style of Nazi propaganda were estab­
lished long before the electoral breakthrough of 1930. Nazi 
propaganda was dogmatic; it emphasized emotional appeals, 
and it employed violence as a standard tactic. The problem 
facing the party in 1928 was not how to campaign, but how 
to reach and impress a massive public. Nazi propaganda was 
effective only in dealing with a large audience from a 
position of some strength. The Coburg rally worked because 
Hitler was able to concentrate most of the Bavarian SA in 
the city. Goebbels followed Hitler's example and had the 
entire SA of Berlin at the Pharus Saale. In small towns and 
villages, especially in areas where there were few if any 
party members, these techniques were inapplicable. Simi­
larly, the number of speakers available to the party was far 
too limited to allow the Nazis to stage rallies in every 
city and town in Germany. These limitations were the major 
reasons that the party initially rejected the idea of seeking
■^For a discussion of the Pharus hall incident see 
Ernst K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propa­
ganda (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State U.P., 1965) 
pp. 20-22, Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 16, and Helmut Heiber, 
Joseph Goebbels (Berlin: Colloquim Verlag, 1962) pp. 63-64.
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power by democratic means. Hitler always realized the
necessity of concentrating the party’s few resources for
effective agitation. He initially favored the concentration
5 6"of all activity in a single place: Munich." After 1925
most party work took place in the various German cities in 
accordance with Strasser's syndicalist scheme. In 1928, 
however, the party finally determined to seek power through 
electoral victories. This decision forced the NSDAP to 
develop tactics and programs that would enable it to appeal 
to a geographically diverse, mass audience.
The model for the propaganda apparatus was, perhaps, 
the highly developed Nazi rally system. The mass meeting 
brought together all of the various elements of Nazi pro­
paganda. Hitler regarded such gatherings as a means for 
party supporters to overcome feelings of loneliness and
fear of isolation by experiencing "a large community, which
57in most people has a strengthening effect." One of the 
high points of any major Nazi rally was the use of music to 
play on the emotions of the crowd. This music "underscored 
the irrational element of the movement. The shouted primi­
tive tune, the shabby lyricism of the text, the total lack 
of humour, the insistent beat of drums and the thin reedy 
sound of pipes provided the answer to Hitler's followers:
^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 348.
^ Ibid., p. 478.
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5 Sno questions had to be asked." Party members later often 
admitted that "they were roused to a fever pitch by martial 
music, stirring songs, displays of banners, and other
C Q
customary paraphernalia of mass meetings.  ^ The mass 
meeting with its emphasis on emotional appeals both in the 
speeches and non-verbal means of persuasion was a major form 
of Nazi propaganda. These rallies provide excellent exam­
ples of the themes and methods used by the NSDAP to impress 
larqe audiences. The Nazi political machine of the late 
twenties tried in a variety of ways to create the same im­
pressions on a geographically diverse audience that were 
so effectively developed at mass meetings. The next chapter 
will examine some of the major Nazi rallies of the late 
twenties.
C Q
Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 10. 
5^Abel, The Nazi Movement, p. 117.
CHAPTER 3
THE NAZI RALLY SYSTEM AND THE HOLISTIC 
NATURE OF NAZI PROPAGANDA
In 1928 the Nazis already had an effective rally 
system that was capable of presenting most of the party's 
major propaganda themes as a unified whole. Rallies helped 
the party to develop a new style in politics. George Mosse 
has described this new politics as an attempt "to draw the 
people into active participation in the national mystique 
through rites and festivals, myths and symbols which gave a 
concrete expression to the general will."^ This feature 
of National Socialist propaganda remained basically un­
changed in the late twenties. The series of impressions 
and images that were presented and acted out at these 
rallies formed the basis of Nazi appeal. Other campaigning 
techniques that were developed after 1928 tried in differ­
ent ways to project the same impressions and images that 
were produced by the major Nazi rallies.
The mass meetings of the late twenties tried to 
create a concretely objectified picture of the Nazi
^Mosse, Nationalization, p. 2
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2
"fictional world." Hannah Arendt's fictional world "con­
sists in using and at the same time" transcending, the elements 
of reality, of verifiable experience, in the chosen fiction, 
and in generalizing them into regions which then are de­
finitely removed from all possible control by individual 
experience. With such generalizations, totalitarian propa­
ganda established a world fit to compete with the real one, 
whose main handicap is that it is not logical, consistent, 
and organized."^ The Nazi major rallies created such a 
"fictional world" for a brief period of time and helped the 
NSDAP present itself to the public as a movement rather than 
a simple political party. At these meetings the party was 
depicted as the embodiment of an alternative society-not as 
just a collection of programs and policies. National 
Socialist propaganda tended to emphasize the holistic nature 
of the party rather than its stands on individual issues; 
Nazism was to be accepted as an organic whole on the basis 
of faith without petty squabbling over minor points. The 
principal appeal of the NSDAP was its claim that it would 
renew Germany; the details of how the party would bring 
about this rebirth were only of secondary importance. The 
goal of Nazi propaganda was to convince the public that the 
NSDAP would bring about this renewal; and the major rallies 
were effective ways to present images designed to persuade
^Arendt, Totalitarianism, pp. 341-88 passim.
3Ibid., p. 362.
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the general populace that the National Socialist ”fictional 
world” was a viable alternative to the reality of the Weimar 
Republic.
This chapter will examine the party's regional
rallies and attempt to analyze the propaganda content of
these meetings. It will then discuss two major national
rallies of the late twenties that furnish useful examples of
the ritualistic and quasi-religious underpinnings of Nazi
appeals. These rallies provide insight into why so many
Germans turned to the NSDAP when faced with the crises of
the late twenties. As Walter Laqueur observed, "Choosing
Hitler was not an act of political decision, not the choice
of a known programme or ideology; it was simply joining a
4
quasi-religious mass movement as an act of faith." Mass 
meetings provide a coherent picture of various elements of 
Nazi appeal— elements which, though seemingly unconnected, 
were woven together to form a unified whole that the public 
could accept on faith.
Major Nazi regional rallies tended to be carbon 
copies of each other, even though they were organized by the 
various Gauleiters apparently with no unifying direction 
from the Reichsleitung. The similarity of these rallies 
indicates that they followed a previously accepted pattern; 
but the weight of evidence seems to suggest that the various 
elements of that pattern were adopted piecemeal over a period
4Walter Z. Laqueur, Young Germany; A History of the 
German Youth Movement (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,-T962T 
pp. 196-97.
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of years. In any case by 1928 all the key ingredients of 
Nazi propaganda were incorporated in these meetings. The 
following is a typical schedule of one of these rallies:
Saturday afternoon: Arrival of members and SA men
from other towns.
Saturday evening: German festive evening, torch­
light parade or mass meeting.
Sunday: 6:00 A.M. Reveille.
8:30 A.M. Field religious services.
9:00 A.M. Muster and speech at the war
memorial followed occasionally 
by a visit to the local cemetary 
to decorate the graves of the 
war dead.
10:30 A.M. Bandstand music and SA drive 
through neighboring villages.
12:00-1:00 P.M. Mass feeding.
1:00-4:00 P.M. March through the streets by
SA led by an SA band, sporting 
events, bandstand music.
4:00-6:00 P.M. Speeches.
6:00 P.M. on Out-of-town members and SA men
depart, German dance.5
^This is a composite sketch of a large number of 
rallies. Almost all of these rallies included the above- 
mentioned activities though occasionally at different times. 
In some cases one event would be omitted, but most rallies 
included all of the above. Some examples of this type of 
rally can be found in the VSlkischer Beobachter (henceforth 
abbreviated VB), July 19, 1928, p. 3. "Parteitag der 
Pfalzischen Nationalsozialisten"r VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, 
"Grosse nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in Herrsching”;
VB, July 25, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Kundegebung 
in Steppach"; VB, August 7, 1928, p. 3, "Grossdeutscher Tag 
in Dingolfing"; VB, August 18, 1929, p. 3, "Freiheitstag in 
Gera"; VB, September 16/17, 1928, p. 3, "Gau=Parteitag des 
Gaues WUrttemberg"; VB, October 20, 1928, p. 3, "Gauparteitag 
des Gaues Schlesien"; VB, November 3, 1928, p. 3, "Gautag 
Hessen-Nassau-Sud"; VB, March 15, 1929, p. 3, "Freiheitstag 
in Koblenz"; VB, April 10, 1929, p. 3, "Parteitag des Gaues 
Westfalen in Bochum"; VB, May 26/27, 1929, p. 3, "Gauparteitag 
Oberfranken"; VB, August 24, 1929, p. 3, "Gautag Oberbayern”; 
VB, October 1, 1929, p. 3, "Unser OstermMrkertag in Sorau"; 
VB, April 16, 1930, p. 3, "Oberfranken Gauparteitag"; VB,
May 17, 1930, p. 3, "Gautag des Gaues Sachsen"; VB, July 13/ 
14, 1930, p. 3, "Ein Tag der Thttringer Nationalsozialisten"; 
NSDAP Hauptarchiv (henceforth shortened to H.A.) Reel 5, 
Folder 137, "Programm zum oberfrSnkischen Gau-Parteitag der
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The first major feature of the Nazi "fictional 
world" brought out at regional rallies was the party's 
social ideal of establishing a Volksgemeinschaft or racial 
community. At these meetings the racial community took on 
concrete form. Party members and SA men from an entire re­
gion assembled on Saturday night to meet and to socialize 
at the "so-called" German festive evenings. These affairs 
were primarily intra-party functions, re-enforcing party 
unity; but they also provided a picture of the National 
Socialist future in which men and women of different social 
and economic backgrounds, but united in their dedication to 
the party, would be able to meet and greet on the basis of
(continued) NSDAP am 3/4 Mai in Bayreuth"; H.A.
Reel 70, Folder 1516, "Gautag in Ingolstadt 11 Mai 1930"; 
H.A. Reel 9, Folder 18 8, "Ortsgruppe Dingolfing 8 Juli 
1928"; H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 10." These are 
just a few examples of this type of rally. On the average 
two or three of these rallies were held in various parts of 
Germany every two weeks. The Nazis did not originate the 
nationalistic rally. Rather the NSDAP drew upon a long 
tradition of mass meetings dating back to the early nine­
teenth-century. Nevertheless, National Socialist regional 
rallies were not copied from any of their precursors since 
the party's mass meetings fulfilled a "liturgical function" 
peculiarly designed for presenting Nazi ideas. Mosse, 
Nationalization, p. 10. For a discussion of nineteenth 
century nationalistic rallies and their connection with the 
rise of National Socialism see Mosse, Nationalization, 
passim.
**The Nazis rarely presented the more esoteric parts 
of their ideology to the public. In these rallies no at­
tempt was made to distinguish between Germans and Hitler's 
ideal type Aryan supermen of the distant future. The racial 
community described at these rallies was to include all 
Germans, and the fact that the party viewed contemporary 
Germans as inferior to the purified Aryans of the future 
was not even mentioned. Such knowledge was only for those 
interested in the "deeper" meanings of Nazi ideology, 
meaning at this time the party elite.
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racial equality. The German festive evening was an inte­
gral part of the Nazi regional rally. Even in cases in 
which other events such as a mass meeting or a torchlight 
parade were scheduled, a social affair would invariably end 
the night's activities. The German dance on Sunday evening 
represented a return to the same type of event as the 
"Festive evening." In effect the Nazi rally followed a 
circular pattern beginning with an activity designed to em­
body the party's social ideal and ending with another 
gathering that emphasized the NSDAP's desire to found a true 
Volksgemeinschaft.
Other items on the agenda of party rallies also 
helped to lend concrete form to the Volksgemeinschaft. In­
variably party members arose together at 6:00 A.M. They
often ate lunch together out of a common mess. Occasionally,
7
this took the form of a mass feeding from several locations.
At times a large soup kitchen would be established to feed
8
several hundred at once. In any case considerable emphasis 
was placed on the shared meal, which heightened party soli­
darity and provided a clear example of egalitarianism within 
the movement. Even sports were used to evoke the image of 
the Volksgemeinschaft. Competition between SA men in such 
events as swimming and relay races underscored the party's 
promise of physical rebirth. The competition of strong,
7H.A. Reel 5, Folder 137, "Programm zur 
oberfrankischen Gau-Parteitag."
®H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel "So 
kaempften wir."
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young SA men was designed to show the public that Germany
had the sound physical raw material from which to build a
g
healthy racial community. Yet, this aspect of Nazi propa­
ganda was not presented in a verbal form. Participants were 
not asked to subscribe to the ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft 
before they were allowed to dance, eat, swim or run. For 
many people who took part in these events their propaganda 
content probably went almost unnoticed. After such activi­
ties, however, Nazi speeches about founding a racial com­
munity based upon the brotherhood of all Germans must have 
seemed more practical and desirable than if these same 
speeches had been given without any preliminaries.
The first task of Nazi propaganda on this issue was 
the creation of a series of concrete examples of the 
Volksgemeinschaft; then an articulation of the goal in ver­
bal form came later. It is not surprising that the party's 
opponents denounced Nazi social ideals as a fraud. They 
were only listening to what party speakers said about the 
Volksgemeinschaft. They dealt with the oral expression of 
Nazi propaganda. Unfortunately, their denunciations failed 
to come to grips with the fact that the party systematically 
inculcated a belief in the racial community through its
g
For a description of the sports events at these 
rallies see H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 10.” This 
type of activity may have been copied from Father Jahn, a 
nationalist and founder of gymnastic clubs at the time of 
the war of liberation against Napoleon. Jahn believed that 
"the ancient Germans had . . . competed in sports in order 
to show their manly nature and virility." Mosse, 
Nationalization, p. 83.
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social events. Theoretical refutations of the 
Volksgemeinschaft were unlikely to be persuasive when large 
numbers of observers and participants at party rallies had 
seen it being formed before their very eyes.
Another persistent element of Nazi propaganda was
the attempt to identify the party with traditional German
values. Nazi regional rallies did this in a number of ways.
Perhaps, the clearest example of this type of appeal was
attendance by party members at religious services to begin
a rally day. Often members marched together to a common
church, especially in regions where one sect predominated.^"®
In other cases members would disperse to attend the churches
of their choice.^ Occasionally, a local minister or priest
would actively collaborate with the party as in Bayreuth at
a Gau rally held during May, 1930. Here, a local priest
named Hannemann opened the city church for the Nazis and
delivered a fifteen-minute speech emphasizing the religious
orthodoxy of the party. Later in the day this priest intro-
12duced the speeches with an "admonition to all Christians."
^®VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Grosse 
nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in Herrsching"; VB, July 
28, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in 
Steppach"; VB, August 7, 1928, p. 3, "Grossdeutscher Tag in 
Dingolfing."
^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1516, "Gautag in Ingolstadt."
12H.A. Reel 5, Folder 137, "Prograram zum 
oberfrSnkischen Gau-Parteitag der NSDAP am 3/4 Mai in 
Bayreuth." This technique was employed extensively by the 
party after 1930; see Allen, Nazi Seizure of Power, pp. 33, 
81, 109, 125, 128, 134-35, 14^T~l50, 199, 222-23, 242.
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The situation in Bayreuth was ideal for the Nazis. Their 
relationship to traditional religion was affirmed in the 
city's church by a local priest, but even when such an im­
pressive affirmation of the party's religious orthodoxy was 
not possible, the Nazis still tried to demonstrate their tie 
to organized religion by marching to services in unison.
This link with organized religion was taken very 
seriously by the party. In 1928 Gauleiter Artur Dinter was
expelled from the NSDAP for his attempt to found a "German
13religion." The Nazis consistently contended that they in 
no way threatened established faiths. Indeed, the party 
sought to portray itself as the defender of German spiritual 
values against the assault of liberal and Marxist material­
ism. The fact that this pose was insincere did not diminish 
its effectiveness in attracting pious, middle-class Germans. 
As long as the party refrained from directly attacking reli­
gion, consciously sought to identify itself with orthodoxy, 
and talked of spiritual values, it was safe from charges of 
being anti-Christian. In this manner the National Socialist 
attitude was carefully hidden from the public only to be 
revealed after the party came to power. For its anti- 
Christian zealots, the ceremonial affirmation of organized 
religion was rationalized as a political necessity, and for 
the general public the open support of orthodoxy was taken 
as partial proof that the NSDAP was not a revolutionary
1 -a
Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 14 3.
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movement inimical to traditional German values.
Other features of Nazi rallies that emphasized tra­
dition were the quasi-military garb of the SA and the use of 
band music. The propaganda effect of the SA will be dis­
cussed later. Music represented both a familiar form of 
entertainment and an effective way of introducing other 
elements of rally propaganda. Band stand performances were 
used to divide morning and afternoon activities; they pro­
vided a necessary lull, allowing party members to relax and 
act as tourists after the initial church services and cere­
monies at the war memorial. At the same time Nazi band 
music set the stage for what was to come; it consisted 
primarily of patriotic pieces that helped to get party mem­
bers in the proper mood for the inevitable SA march through 
town. In turn these SA processions were usually led by 
bands. All of this was designed to bring back memories of 
World War I and of Germany's former military might. The 
musical performances prepared the way for the speeches that 
brought the rally to a close, and the addresses themselves 
were often introduced by a series of selections. For exam­
ple, speeches during the Gau party days in Bayreuth on 
May 4, 19 30 were presented immediately after the SA band 
played pieces from Wagner's opera Rienzi. Band music was 
both a traditional form of entertainment that attracted 
attention and interest in the party and a non-verbal means 
of presenting Nazi propaganda.
A third objective of National Socialist rallies was
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the presentation of an image of party strength. Invariably 
all SA men from a region were required to attend Gau rallies. 
This concentration of personnel left the impression that 
there were hundreds if not thousands of Nazi storm troopers 
in the area. Such displays were used to create a bandwagon 
effect and draw in people who would normally be indifferent 
to a small, weak political movement. Lastly, mass marches 
helped the Nazis convince many voters that they would and 
could do something about Germany's problems. Orderly, 
purposeful columns were conspicuous demonstrations of faith 
in a period of growing cynicism, when many people thought 
that problems were insoluble. Voters might not believe that 
the Nazis could solve Germany's problems, but such doubters 
were often willing to give them a chance for want of any 
alternative.
The final function of Nazi re p.onal rallies was the 
articulation of ideas. Speeches at such events rarely con­
centrated upon specific problems or remedies. The whole 
thrust of National Socialist campaigning was to present the 
impression that the NSDAP would renew Germany. Such a re­
newal was not to be accomplished by a few piecemeal reforms. 
Thus, party speeches usually dealt with general themes and 
attempted to paint a picture of the Nazi future in words, 
just as other elements of the rally tried to do on a non­
verbal level.
The first speech at the rallies was usually at the 
local war memorial in the morning. On July 15, 1928 at
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Herrsching, Gauleiter Fritz Reinhardt delivered an oration
which typifies this kind of performance. Addressing an
audience that included a large number of storm troopers in
formation, Reinhardt asked the crowd to remember the fallen
heroes of World War I. These men had died for Germany only
to be betrayed in 1918 by the German revolution. He said,
"On their deaths we dedicate ourselves. Anyone who does not
so dedicate himself betrays their memory and murders their
souls." He went on to castigate the Jews and the newspaper,
the Berlin Tageblatt, which, he claimed, had attacked the
very ideal of heroism as the stupidest of all convictions.
Reinhardt concluded by stating, "We reaffirm our ideals and
belief in Germany. All of us are united in the same blood
14no matter what job we might have." Reinhardt's speech 
incorporated most of the key elements of Nazi propaganda.
He stressed the shared historical experience of the First 
World War, the racially based Volksgemeinschaft, the cult 
of death, and the myth of the betrayal of the army in 1918. 
Not one word was said about practical solutions to Germany's 
problems.
Afternoon and evening speeches were much the same, 
stressing general points. The orators at the Bayreuth rally 
of May, 1930 presented talks on the following topics, "German 
education, idealism and National Socialism in contrast to 
Marxism and materialism, politics and military thinking, and
*^VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Grosse 
nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in Herrsching."
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15some SA poems.1' Only rarely on such occasions did party 
speakers discuss specific problems and Nazi programs. The 
objective of the Nazi rally system was to present a picture 
of a resurrected Germany and not to deal with current issues.
The Nazi "fictional world" presented in both words 
and actions at regional rallies was based on four major 
elements. The Volksgemeinschaft was the party’s solution to 
the problems of industrial society. It promised a unified 
nation in which class differences would be submerged by a 
heightened sense of racial identity. Identification with 
Germany's traditions was accomplished by stressing religion, 
militarism and to a lesser extent such customary entertain­
ment as band stand music. This conscious effort to asso­
ciate the party with the German past was designed to re­
assure voters that the NSDAP was firmly based on accepted 
national values. Marches and concentration of party per­
sonnel for rallies aided the Nazis in presenting an image 
of unified strength to the public. The purpose here was to
i
convince Germans that the party would and could solve 
Germany’s problems. Finally, the Nazis articulated their 
message in a series of speeches starting on the morning of 
a rally and ending either in the late afternoon or evening.
By themselves they were not necessarily impressive, but the 
combination of speeches and non-verbal propaganda painted a
1 5H.A. Reel 5, Folder 137, "Programm zum 
oberfrankischen Gau-Parteitag der NSDAP am 3/4 Mai in 
Bayreuth.”
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picture of the National Socialist future that seemed very 
real to those who experienced such a rally.
One of the major themes of Nazi propaganda was the 
idea that all Germans were mystically bound together 
through common blood, tribal heritage, war and blood sacri­
fice. In the late twenties this aspect of Nazi ideology was 
best expressed at two of the party's major national rallies. 
The summer solstice festival at Caub, a small city over­
looking the Rhine, provides a good example of the party's 
tribal and neo-pagan appeals, while the Reichsparteitag 
rally at Niirnberg shows how the party attempted to exploit 
World War I and to foster a cult of death. Both of these 
major meetings help to explain how the Nazis were able to 
project a believable image of a resurrected Germany to the 
public. At the same time, these meetings show how the NSDAP 
could convince vast numbers of people that it was not a mere 
political party like others but a quasi-religious order 
capable of transforming Germany.
The summer solstice festival celebrated the arrival
of the sun at the equator, the official beginning of summer.
It was an old pagan festival that the Nazis described as
based "on a belief in a sunny future” and as an effort "to
16strengthen" that belief. Party members had been attending 
this ceremony from the early days of the NSDAP. They
16H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der 
Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim
11.7.28, Nationalsozialistische Sonnwendfeier."
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climbed a hill, and then spent the night around a large 
1 7fire talking and listening to speeches. The fire had a
symbolic meaning for the party. Reichstag member Wilhelm
Dreher described it in the following terms:
"As the fire purifies the unclean, so shall 
National Socialism purify all things rotten.
The NSDAP is competent to lead the renewal 
of Germany and to return her to her former 
greatness. Without hard struggle this end 
will not be attained and the need of sacri­
fice will be called on for many comrades 
yet to fall. After attaining victory the 
summer solstice celebrants will again come 
together on the mountain and light a fire 
to the very sky."l®
The rally at Caub was like others except that it was by far 
the biggest of the summer solstice festivals to date. It 
marked the first attempt by the party to use this quasi­
religious holiday as a propaganda tool to impress those out­
side the movement.
It began toward nightfall on June 21, 1928 with the 
arrival in the town of large numbers of party members and 
storm troopers from all of western Germany. Many of the 
celebrants had to pass through territory occupied by French 
or English troops. Nazi flags and banners were waved at the
l^The traditional meaning of the symbolic fire was 
the linking of earth and heaven. It also symbolized the 
idea of everlasting rebirth. Mosse, Nationalization, pp. 41- 
42. Summer solstice festivals were celebrated at various 
patriotic rallies dating back to the nineteenth century. It 
was also one of the rites celebrated by the German youth 
movement. See Laqueur, Young Germany, p. 29.
1®H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der 
Staatspolizei Wiir11emberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim
11.7.28, Nationalsozialistische Sonnwendfeier."
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foreign soldiers as lorry after lorry of storm troopers con-
19verged on Caub. By nightfall one Nazi described the
mountains as "blood red with Hakenkreuz banners and flags
from the old Reich." Column after column of SA and SS men
assembled at the base of the mountain and "snaked up the
hill carrying flaming torches." The celebrants included
"hundreds and thousands" of visiting Nazis, many townsmen
20from Caub and peasants from the vicinity.
Upon reaching the peak of the hill,all participants 
threw their individual brands on a gigantic central bon­
fire. As one celebrant described it, "The great stack of
wood flamed to life together with enumerable little 
21torches." Gauleiter Jakob Sprenger of Hessen-Nassau-Stld
then announced to the assembled crowd, "Here we shall first
22light the fire of freedom, a flame that shall rise high."
His statement was followed with speeches by Goebbels and 
other party luminaries on the coming rebirth of Germany.
The next day the celebrants cleansed themselves in 
the Rhine and were again told of Germany's coming resurrec­
tion, this time at the very site where Bliicher crossed the
^H.A. Reel 28, Folder 532, Willi Altenbrandt 
"Kampferlebnisse," Karlheinz Gritz "Meine Erinnerungen an 
die Kampfzeit," and Karl Herz "Meine Kampferlebnisse."
20H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel "So 
kaempften wir."
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
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Rhine on New Years day 1813/1814 during the war of libera-
23tion against Napoleon. As one participant put it, "it was
24a profound experience."
This peculiar ceremony seems to have impressed many
party members, who mentioned it in their recollections. It
was certainly a grandiose example of the ritual of a secret
society in the open, as Hannah Arendt describes this type 
25of activity. The festival at Caub, however, was more than 
simply an intra-party affair. It was a demonstration on a 
grand scale of the quasi-religious nature of the NSDAP and 
intended for the public at large. An ancient pagan holiday 
was used to show that the party was dedicated to the renewal 
of Germany. Purification was ritualistically obtained first 
in fire, with the flame of each separate racial comrade 
being merged in the central unifying symbol of the giant 
bonfire on top of the mountain. In this manner the indivi­
dual egos and class identity of the celebrants were sym­
bolically consumed in a common purifying conflagration. The 
second purification was by water in the river Rhine at the
23VB, June 28, 1928, p. 3, "Unsere Feuer lodern am
Rhein."
24H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel "So 
kaempften wir." George Mosse has aptly described the impact 
of this kind of event in the following. "For participants, 
it was the symbolic content which took priority, the ritual 
expression of a shared worship that was so crucial to their 
sense of belonging." Mosse, Nationalization, p. 207. This 
statement is especially applicable to the festivities at 
Caub, but it can also be applied to most of the party's 
other major rallies.
25Arendt, Totalitarianism, p. 378.
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very place Germany had begun her purification from the taint 
of Napoleonic occupation over a hundred years earlier. It 
was no coincidence that this ceremony took place in front 
of the occupying army on the opposite bank. The Caub festi­
val was both an act of defiance and a promise of deliverance. 
It presented the NSDAP to the public as a specially chosen
military order cleansed in both fire and water and thus able
2 6to "purify all things rotten." Such a ceremony did not 
require universal belief to be effective. It served to re- 
dedicate the party's faithful and to convince them that they 
were the vanguard of an historically important movement.
It provided other Germans with a vivid promise of renewal. 
Whether the general populace consciously believed this pro­
mise or not was of only minor importance. What mattered was 
that the NSDAP, by using this type of mummery, successfully 
differentiated itself from all other parties. In a crisis 
the quasi-religious character of the NSDAP combined with its 
promise of rebirth was enough; for as Hannah Arendt ob­
served, "A mixture of gullibility and cynicism" was "an 
everyday phenomenon of the masses. In an ever-changing, 
incomprehensible world the masses had reached the point 
where they would, at the same time, believe everything and 
nothing, think that everything was possible and that nothing
2®H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der 
Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 
11.7.28, Nationalsozialistische Sonnwendfeier."
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27was true." The promise of renewal at Caub might not be 
immediately convincing, but it remained attractive, espe­
cially for those facing the mounting problems of the late 
twenties. At the very least, this type of ceremony served 
to persuade the public that the Nazis were serious about 
transforming Germany.
The other major rally to be considered was the
28
Reichsparteitag in NUrnberg from August 1 to 4, 1929.
It was very similar to Nazi regional meetings which often
29copied previous national rallies. The distinctive feature 
of this rally was its emphasis on World War I and on the 
cult of death. Nazi strategists intended this meeting as a 
proving ground for the ritualization of war. In 1929 
fifteen years had elapsed since the start of World War I, 
and the Nazis could no longer count on the memories of a 
population united through participation in the War. In 
order to keep memories of the War alive and to create a 
false memory in the minds of young Germans, the party
27Arendt, Totalitarianism, p. 382.
2 8A book has been written dealing with these 
national party rallies, Hamilton T. Burden, The Nuremburq 
Party Rallies: 1923-39 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1967;. Unfortunately, Burden concentrates primarily on 
rallies held after the party came to power. His account of 
the 1929 rally is sketchy and is based almost entirely on 
accounts taken from the VB for August, 1929. It provides 
little insight into activities and ceremonies at this rally.
29For an example of this see VB, October 1, 1929, 
p. 3, "Unser OstmSrkertag in Sorau 21-22 September," where 
the decorations were an exact copy of the NUrnberg rally 
of August, 1929.
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developed a series of ritualistic ceremonies to reenact
episodes of this world conflict. This was the main purpose
of the rally in Niirnberg of 1929.
Hitler himself set the theme for the Reichsparteitag
at a series of staff meetings from March 22 to 25, 1929.
The rally would celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the
30
"field gray army and the tenth anniversary of the party."
In Hitler's mind the NSDAP and the imperial military forces 
were inextricably linked. The NUrnberg rally was to portray 
this mythical union in both speeches and ceremonies. On the 
night of August 3, a giant fireworks display took place 
entitled "the Western front." Twenty thousand storm 
troopers carrying torches formed a giant ring in the 
NUrnberg Stadion during this event, which culminated in 
massive drum fire. The next day new SA standards were ded­
icated at the war memorial. As a special commemoration of 
World War I, three thousand garlands were placed at the base 
of this monument. Every Nazi group was ordered to gather 
local flowers to make up these garlands. "Thus all the 
different varieties of flowers and all the districts of
greater Germany will be represented at the memorial to thank
31our dead heroes who fell for Germany." These two
^°VB, March 29/30, 1929, p. 3, "Reichsparteitag 
Niirnberg 1929."
•^Ibid. There are a number of eyewitness reports of 
the Reichsparteitag. They include: H.A. Reel 28, Folder 532
Willi Altenbrandt ^Kampferlebnisse" and Karl Herz "Meine 
Kampferlebnisse"; H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel 
"So kaempften wir"; H.A. Reel 26, Folder 517, "Reichsparteitag
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ceremonies are indicative of the techniques the Nazis used 
to link themselves to the War and at the same time to keep 
memories of World War I alive over ten years after its con­
clusion.
World War I was a major subject in Nazi propaganda.
The party was largely a product of that war; Hitler himself
had experienced a personal rebirth in the trenches and at
32Pasewalk hospital in 1918. The war was the common puri­
fying experience upon which National Socialism was built 
and the basis of the cult of death. The fireworks display 
at Nurnberg Stadion was a conscious attempt to rekindle 
old memories. It was also a way for young men and women 
who had played no part in the War to experience the Western 
front on an emotional level. The collection of flowers 
from all parts of Germany was an effort to involve party 
members passionately in the blood sacrifice of World War I. 
The link to the War tended to permeate Nazi propaganda.
The Volksgemeinschaft grew out of the comradeship of the 
trenches. The party's agricultural program and goal of 
eastward expansion were inspired by wartime food shortages. 
The very Nazi promise of a rebirth of Germany was in large 
part based upon the blood sacrifice of total war.
The Nazi fixation on World War I was a major source
(continued) in Niirnberg des Nationalsozialistischen 
Deutschen Arbeiterpartei"; H.A. Reel 57, Folder 1390, 
"Polizeidirektion Nilrnberg-Fiirth, August 29, 1929."
32Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 202-206.
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of party strength. The NSDAP alone of all the post-war 
German parties attempted to deal with this monumental 
struggle as part of a larger pattern. The Nazis lent 
meaning to the war, while other groups either ignored it or 
became bogged down in petty discussions of details. Only 
the Nazis saw World War I as the beginning of a new era 
leading from defeat to rebirth. This view did not make 
much sense rationally, but psychologically it was very 
appealing, especially after the first effects of the great 
depression were felt. For many it seemed intolerable that 
the suffering of total war should be meaningless, especially 
when it was followed by economic disaster. In the Christian 
scheme of things pain and self-sacrifice led ultimately to 
divine rewards in heaven. In the secularized world of early 
twentieth-century Germany, the old Christian pattern re­
mained deeply ingrained. That suffering should lead only to 
more suffering was unthinkable. That the sacrifice of World 
War I should lead to the rebirth of a new Germany, as the 
Nazis asserted, seemed only fair. With the advent of the 
great depression this theme of Nazi propaganda took on a 
new immediacy. Only the NSDAP was willing to promise a 
return to the proper order of things, while the other 
parties seemed lost in an incomprehensible universe.
The Niirnberg rally of 1929 not only reaffirmed the 
blood sacrifice of World War I, it also provided the party 
with two new martyrs to further the Nazi cult of death. On 
Saturday, August 3, Frau Katherina Grlinewald was shot during
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a melee between SA men and local Communists. The next day 
a young storm trooper named Erich Jost was stabbed to death 
in another brawl. These deaths certainly were not planned 
by the Nazis, but the massive NUrnberg rally with the con­
centration of almost the whole SA in one place was an open 
provocation to violence. In this case the two deaths at 
Ntlrnberg represented concrete examples of the continuation 
of the war and of the National Socialist link to the great 
blood sacrifice of the early twentieth century. Nazis 
attending the Nurnberg rally could and did feel themselves
to be part of a combat organization tied by continuing per-
33sonal loss to the field gray army of 1914. These deaths 
and Nazi ceremonial served to reaffirm the party's sense of 
historical continuity. The meeting at Ntlrnberg in 1929 was 
the last national party rally before the seizure of power, 
but it did its job well. After 1929 the association between 
the NSDAP and World War I was continuously reaffirmed first 
in the campaign against the Young Plan and subsequently by 
a long line of Nazi martyrs. It was no longer absolutely 
necessary for the party to evoke the cult of death through 
ritualistic ceremonies; the ever-mounting number of real 
casualties did this effectively. The Ntlrnberg rally demon­
strated that the NSDAP considered the War, struggle, and 
death to be necessary precursors to the idealized Nazi world
^ F or  examples of this type of reaction see H.A.
Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel "So kaempften wir," and 
H.A. Reel 28, Folder 532, Willi Altenbrandt 
"Kampferlebnisse."
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of the future.
The Nazi regional rallies, the festival at Caub, and
the Reichsparteitag all serve to explain the party's
approach to winning public support. Nazi propaganda was not
a disjointed series of programs designed simply to get votes.
The party did not emphasize immediate solutions to particular
problems. Instead, the Nazis always viewed themselves "as
a militant community founded upon charismatic leadership and
34the discipline of faith.” As Joachim Fest commented, the
Nazis thought in terms of an apocalypse led by "messianic 
35figures." It is for this reason that the essence of 
Nazism cannot be found in its specific programs or its 
ideology that was only partially thought out. The reality 
of the NSDAP can more properly be found in the mysticism of 
Caub, the Volksgemeinschaft, and the cult of death asso­
ciated with World War I. It was the vivid impression of the 
movement's quasi-religious character that convinced many 
Germans that the Nazis were capable of bringing about a re­
birth of a cleansed and purified Germany. The task of 
National Socialist propaganda in the years after 1928 was to 
devise ways of presenting this message to the general popu­
lace. Rallies were designed to impress outsiders, but they 
remained primarily intra-party affairs. Only those who were 
previously attracted to the NSDAP by other means were likely
^Fest, Hitler, p. 284.
^Ibid. , p. 207.
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to attend these meetings. The Nazi political machine had 
to develop techniques that would enable the party to present 
the propaganda impressions and images developed at rallies 
more directly to the public. The Nazis had to spread the 
style of a tiny elite to the masses.
CHAPTER 4
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
In the months following the Reichstag election of 
May 20, 19 28, the Nazi party took stock of itself and be­
gan to make plans for the future. The NSDAP had not suc­
ceeded in winning broad support anywhere, but the election 
was invaluable from the point of view of planning. It 
enabled the party to assess the effectiveness of its various 
programs in all parts of Germany using the detailed elec­
tion returns as a blueprint for future action. Discussions 
of new strategy continued throughout the summer culminating 
in a three-day Reich leadership conference in Munich from 
August 31 through September 2.
The Nazis always emphasized their victories and 
played down their defeats. Although the election of 1928 
provided little to be optimistic about, the party leadership 
was able to point to one striking success. Throughout its 
history, the NSDAP had been only one of many vSlkisch par­
ties. Since 1925, its principal rival on the far right had 
been the DeutschvSlkische Freiheitsbewegung, a party that 
enjoyed some rural and conservative support in northern 
Germany. This rival had entered a period of decline begin­
ning in 1926. It did little campaigning during the middle
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twenties and lost many of its most effective leaders to the
Nazis including Count Reventlow and Wilhelm Kube.^ However,
the very existence of a competing racialist party was
troublesome to the NSDAP. The elections of 1928 dealt this
Nazi opponent a crushing defeat. On June 5, the Nazi party
newspaper triumphantly proclaimed that "the vfilkisch block
2has been reduced to Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP." This 
statement proved to be entirely accurate. From 192 8 the 
NSDAP monopolized far-right politics.
The demise of the Deutschvdlkische Freiheitsbewegung 
greatly simplified planning for the Nazis, for the rival 
party had influenced their policy in northern Germany by its 
presence; the earlier "socialist" and urban campaign was, 
in part, forced upon the party by the rural strength of this 
opponent. The liquidation of this unsuccessful policy was 
far easier now that the Nazis stood alone on the extreme 
right. A new strategy of seeking supporters in rural areas 
and among middle-class small town and city dwellers became 
far more attractive after the collapse of the 
DeutschvSlk ische Freiheitsbewegung. Aside from establishing 
National Socialist supremacy on the extreme right, this 
event had also created a political vacuum which the NSDAP 
would enthusiastically try to fill. The DeutschvSlklsche
^For the struggle between the NSDAP and the 
Deutschvdlkische Freiheitsbewegung see Noakes, Lower Saxony, 
pp. 56-101 passim.
2VB; June 5, 1928, p. 3, "Das Erwachen in den 
vSlkischen Reihen.”
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Freiheitsbewegung had once attracted a not inconsiderable 
constituency in small cities and rural areas. The Nazis 
believed that they were now in a favorable position to ac­
quire the support of these voters.
Other less decisive considerations turned the party 
toward a strategy aimed at attracting rural and middle-class 
Germans. In Gau Ruhr the election results led the local
leadership to conclude that "the party enjoyed some success
3
in the cities, but much more in rural areas." This state­
ment was especially significant coming from the Ruhr, the 
very heartland of the urban, socialist campaign. Even in 
this area the results of the 1928 election were suffi­
ciently clear to overcome any remaining attachment to the 
old policy. The Gauleitung of the Ruhr promptly ordered 
its district leaders to found new local groups in rural 
areas where none existed. The already well developed city
Ortsgruppen were used to spearhead the effort to consolidate
4
the party's rural gains.
Other Gauleiters were drawing the same conclusions. 
Hinrich Lohse of Schleswig-Holstein observed that the agri­
cultural Dithmarschen area was "fruitful ground"^ for
3H.A. Reel 5, Folder 136 "Rundschreiben Nr. 79,"
June 6, 1928, Gau Ruhr.
^Ibid. For a report indicating that this program 
was carried out see VB, September 23/24, 1928, p. 3, "Die 
Verankerung des Nationalsozialismus im Rheinland."
3VB, June 12, 1928, p. 3, "Machtvolle 
nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in Burg."
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further growth. Gauleiter Fritz Reinhardt of Oberbayern-
Schwaben, an area consisting mainly of small towns and
villages, also concluded that the party could win in his
region with "a couple of years work like that of the last
7
weeks of the election campaign." The regional Nazi leader 
ship everywhere read the election results the same way.
The party could attract rural and middle class voters as 
long as it was able to stage effective programs of intense 
agitation.
The new strategy was tentatively endorsed by the
party’s national leadership on May 31, 1928, in an open
letter to members. "Clearly, our electoral success in rural
areas has proven that with the expenditure of a little work
money and time greater success can be expected here than
8
in the big cities." The letter went on to comment that 
Nazi meetings held in small cities and market towns with 
good speakers were able to draw audiences of three and four 
thousand. It concluded by recommending that small cities 
and rural areas be methodically canvassed down to the
®Nazi gains in some parts of Schleswig-Holstein in 
1928 were very impressive. The "party received 18.1%,
17.7%, 10.4% and 8.6% of the vote, respectively, in the 
counties of Nordendithmarschen, Siiderdithmarschen, Stein- 
burg and Rundsburg," Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 129.
^VB, August 3, 1928, p. 3, "VorwSrts in Oberbayern- 
Schwaben."
Q
VB, May 31, 1928, p. 3, "Aus der Bewegung: Nach
der Wahl."
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g
smallest village.
By the end of the summer of 1928, the new National
Socialist strategy had been adopted everywhere. Gregor
Strasser applied the official seal of approval at the Reich
leadership conference. In his oration to the assembled
delegates, he wholeheartedly endorsed the rural, middle-
10
class campaign. This speech carried considerable weight 
both because of Strasser*s position as chief of the party's 
organization section and because of his previous association 
with the abortive urban, proletarian strategy. The new 
Nazi plan meant that the party would place greater emphasis 
on recruiting followers in non-urban areas, but not that it 
was abandoning Germany's big cities altogether. Under the 
new strategy the party would no longer devote most of its 
attention to recruiting working class supporters, but in­
stead, would direct its propaganda efforts toward attracting 
small businessmen, shopkeepers, white collar workers and 
skilled artisans.
In the wake of the leadership conference, the first 
major institutional changes were made to implement the new 
policy. On September 3, Hitler ordered a sweeping re­
organization of the existing Gau structure. Until these 
reforms the Nazi Gaus had developed in a rather haphazard 
fashion. New Gaus were usually created as needed in order
^Ibid.
■^ ®VB, September 2/3, 1928, p. 1, "Die 
Generalmitgleidversammlung der NSDAP."
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to supervise a number of already active Ortsgruppen. One 
of the results of such development was that as late as 1928 
such huge regional units as Gau Ruhr and Gau Berlin- 
Brandenburg still existed. Gau Ruhr controlled virtually 
all the Rhineland to Baden. Gau Berlin-Brandenburg con­
trolled not only the capital, but also the agricultural 
districts for a hundred miles around. Furthermore, these 
regional divisions bore little if any similarity to the 
election districts of the Republic. Hitler’s organizational 
reforms were aimed principally at correcting the most 
serious of these disparities.^ Several new Gaus were 
created, and the three largest north German Gaus, Hannover, 
Ruhr and Berlin-Brandenburg, were each broken up into more 
manageable units. Even Bavaria— where Hitler himself served
as Gauleiter— was divided into a series of Untergaue
12to conform with existing electoral divisions. This organ­
izational change represented the beginning of the Nazi pro­
gram of seeking power by democratic means. From September, 
1928, the Nazis would concentrate all of their efforts on
transforming themselves into a mass movement able to win
. . 13preeminence within the existing political system.
In September, 1928, the Nazi party did not seem 
capable of attaining power by democratic means. There were
^Tyrell (ed.), Fdhrer Befiehl, p. 246.
^VB, September 5, 1928, p. 3, "Die organisatorischen 
Ergebnisse der Ftihrertag."
13^ Or low, Nazi Party, pp. 139-41.
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14fewer than 100,000 party members and only 1,124 Nazi local 
groups in all of Germany. The NSDAP did not have sufficient 
income to mount impressive campaigns along traditional lines. 
During the fiscal year ending in September, the party re­
ported that its income totalled only 254,996.33 R M ^  or well 
under $100,000. The most significant indication of Nazi 
financial weakness was the Reich leadership conference. In 
1926 and 1927 the NSDAP had staged large national rallies 
in Weimar and Nilrnberg. One of these massive gatherings
was scheduled for 1928, but the party had to cancel it due
16to lack of funds. The leadership conference was held only 
because of the party's straitened financial condition. 
Finally, the Nazis had very few professional agitators. In 
all of 1928, the NSDAP was able to hold only 20,000 meetings. 
One of the major reasons for this relative lack of activity
^ A t  their leadership conference of September, 1928, 
the Nazis claimed almost 100,000 members. See VB, Septem­
ber 2/3 "Die Generalmitgleidversammlung der NSDAP" and H.A. 
Reel 70, Folder 1516, the police report "Generalmitgleid­
versammlung der NSDAP am 31 August, 1928 im Burgerbraukeller." 
Alan Bullock, on the other hand, estimated party membership 
at 60,000 by the end of 1928. See Bullock, Hitler, p. 109.
It is not at all clear how many people were actually members 
at this time, but 100,000 seems to be the highest possible 
estimate. In any case, the actual number is not very im­
portant. Whether the Bullock or Nazi estimates are accepted, 
the fact remains that in 1928 the number of party members in 
Germany was pathetically small.
*5VB, September 2/3, p. 1, "Die Generalmitgleid­
versammlung der NSDAP" and H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1516, police 
report "Generalmitgleidversammlung der NSDAP am 31 August, 
1928 im BiirgerbrSukeller. "
*6VB, July 26, 1928, p. 3, "Kein Reichsparteitag
1928."
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was the fact that the party had only 300 regular orators.
A mere 113 of these 300 speakers made 7,194 of the party's 
speeches that year.^ Simply in terms of manpower, it was 
difficult to see how the Nazis would be able to make an 
impression on the general public.
The problems involved in launching a full-scale and 
continuous campaign to convert millions of Germans with such 
a small, weak and poor organization were staggering. The 
fact that the Nazis had decided to seek their new legions 
of recruits primarily from rural areas and small cities only 
exacerbated the situation. One of the most appealing as­
pects of the old urban, proletarian campaign was that it had 
allowed the party to concentrate its meager resources in 
geographically small areas. In big cities the party could 
hope to reach hundreds of thousands of people in a few 
square miles. Leaflets and posters obtained a large audi­
ence automatically. Even if the Nazis were able to attract 
only a minute percentage of the population in a big city, 
they could still count on hundreds of supporters at their 
activities. None of these advantages existed in a campaign 
based upon gaining adherents from the countryside and small 
cities. The decision to follow the newly formulated strat­
egy was both bold and desperate. Considering the party's 
assets in 1928, the whole venture seemed quixotic.
17VB, January 26, 1928, p. 3, ”20,000 Versammlungen 
im Jahre 1928” and VB, February 3/4, 1929, p. 3, "Unsere 
Redner Arbeit im Jahre 1928.” For a list of these speakers 
and the number of speeches they delivered in 1928 see 
Appendix A.
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There was never any doubt that the new strategy 
could work only when coupled with an active program of agi­
tation. The overall rural campaign of 1927 and 1928 failed 
because the Nazis were only able to mount an effective cam­
paign in a few districts. In areas where little canvassing 
took place the NSDAP attracted few votes. This part of the 
lesson of the 1928 election was not overlooked by the party’s 
leadership. The men who lauded the possibilities of a suc­
cessful rural, middle-class campaign also made it clear that 
such a strategy could work only where the party was able to 
stage sustained drives to gain new followers. Hinrich 
Lohse, in the same speech in which he extolled the 
Dithmarschen area as "fruitful ground" for further expansion,
decried the fact that his speakers were unable to work the 
18
whole area. The Ruhr Gauleitung, while recounting its
rural victories, made a point of mentioning that the party
was successful only in places effectively canvassed by ener-
19getic district or local leaders. Fritz Reinhardt summed
up the consensus among Nazi leaders when he stated, "in
20
areas where we worked hard . . . we won." Unlike workers,
farmers and middle-class Germans seemed to be susceptible to
18VB, June 12, 1928, p. 3, "Machtvolle national- 
sozialistische Kundegebung in Burg.'1
^9H.A. Reel 5, Folder 136, "Rundschreiben Nr. 79” 
June 6, 1928.
20
VB, August 3, 1928, p. 3, "VorwSrts in Oberbayern-
Schwaben."
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National Socialist appeals, but the party still had to sell 
itself to these people through intense propaganda campaigns 
in order to win their support.
Hard work would certainly be required if the NSDAP 
was to succeed with its new strategy; but given the party's 
palpable weakness, even hard work was unlikely to be enough. 
One of the things the party had to do was develop new tac­
tics that would enable it to heighten the impact of its 
campaigning. Of necessity, the NSDAP's entire approach to 
campaigning in rural areas and small towns had to be un­
orthodox. It could not spend large amounts of money or rely 
upon powerful organizations to do its ground work, because 
the party had neither money nor organizational support. It 
could not wait for elections to begin campaigning, because 
in many parts of Germany the NSDAP was either unknown or 
viewed as an ineffective Bavarian splinter party. The only 
assets enjoyed by the Nazi party in 1928 were a dedicated 
membership and a small but reasonably competent cadre of 
agitators. The party would have to take full advantage of 
both these assets if it were to succeed.
In 1928, the Reich propaganda section assumed re­
sponsibility for developing tactics and adopting programs 
to increase the effectiveness of Nazi campaigning. This re­
presented a departure from previous practices. After the 
Putsch the propaganda section had tended to devote most of 
its attention to routine matters. Under Hermann Esser in 
1925 and Gregor Strasser from 1926 to 1928, the section
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primarily issued notices describing various leaflets and 
posters. On January 2, 1928, Hitler assumed the position 
of propaganda leader, a post he had held before his im­
prisonment. To all intents and purposes, however, the re­
sponsibilities of the office were assumed by Heinrich
21Himmler, who was appointed deputy chief. All orders and 
announcements originating from the propaganda section after 
January 2, were issued over Himmler's signature. Himmler1s 
first eight orders like those of his predecessors dealt with 
routine matters. Seven of these directives announced 
various pamphlets and posters for campaigning; the eighth 
merely requested Nazi national orators to submit a list of 
the places where they planned to speak. It was only after 
the final decision to pursue an electoral strategy in 
September, 1928, that the propaganda section began to play 
an important role in coordinating Nazi campaigning. From 
that time, this office actively directed the party's 
national propaganda efforts.
Heinrich Himmler was the man most responsible for 
the development of the Nazi political machine. He did not 
develop any new theoretical approaches to propaganda.
Rather, he brilliantly applied the principles set down by 
Hitler in Mein Kampf to the expanded campaigning necessary 
to bring about Nazi electoral victory. He started with
21VB, January 4, 1928, p. 4, "Bekanntmachung."
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Hitler's ideas for appealing to mass audiences and devel­
oped the organizational methods that made it possible for 
the party to apply these ideas to a geographically dis­
persed public. Himmler's personal contribution to the 
Nazi political machine was mainly in the area of tactics. 
His other major strength was his ability to recognize val­
uable programs developed by others. Himmler used his 
position at the propaganda section to adopt successful 
regional schemes and impose them on Nazi organizations 
everywhere as national programs.
One of the most difficult tasks facing the NSDAP 
in 1928 was making a favorable impression in previously 
uncanvassed areas. Most of these areas were characterized 
by a dispersed population residing in small cities and 
villages. The results of the 1928 election indicated that 
the party could make progress in these regions, but Nazi 
campaigning techniques were designed primarily for dealing 
with a geographically compact urban population. Hitler's 
personal experience as an agitator was limited to Munich 
and other big cities; thus, his ideas about campaigning 
seemed inapplicable to lightly populated areas. Moreover, 
National Socialist propaganda was designed to appeal to a 
mass audience. The party concentrated upon emotional ap­
peals and the creation of a variety of propaganda images 
that would convince audiences of the party's ability to 
transform Germany. The mass meeting was typical of this 
approach to propaganda. It not only stirred the feelings
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of participants but also created a series of striking im­
pressions of the nature and destiny of the NSDAP. Finally,
it helped to create the picture "of a large community,
22which in most people has a strengthening effect." The 
Nazis had to devise ways of achieving the same responses 
from inhabitants of villages and small cities.
Himmler developed the tactical approach utilized by 
the Nazis to make a positive impression in previously un­
organized areas. His technique was known as the saturation 
campaign. It was designed to exploit the party's meager 
resources to the fullest. There were simply not enough 
Nazi agitators to stage intensive campaigns in all parts of 
Germany simultaneously. In order to overcome this diffi­
culty, Himmler decided to concentrate party activities in 
one Gau at a time. A further advantage of this approach 
was that the local Gauleitung could do all the necessary 
preliminary work to make a saturation campaign successful. 
The first of these intensive regional campaigns took place 
in the Ostmark between January 15 and January 25, 1929,
shortly followed by similar efforts in Halle-Merseburg and 
23Saxony.
The purpose of Himmler's saturation campaigns was
^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 478.
2 3The Himmler program can be found in H.A. Reel 10, 
Folder 203, "Propaganda Aktion" December 24, 1928. It has 
also been published in Tyrell, Ftihrer Befiehl, pp. 255-57.
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24to "bring about a realization of our movement" in areas
25where the party was previously unknown. The centerpiece
of these operations was a series of seventy to two hundred
public meetings in a single Gau in from seven to ten days.
Himmler reasoned that these rallies would both raise the
morale of local party members and force the "enemy" press
to cover Nazi meetings "to combat our ideas and in that way
2 6spread our propaganda." Most importantly of all, such
saturation campaigns were designed to "give the whole pro-
27
vince a feeling of our homogeneity and power."
These campaigns were designed to create a number 
of propaganda images favorable to the party. The emphasis
24 ,Ibid.
25Joachim Fest mentions the saturation campaigns in 
Hitler, pp. 266-67. Dietrich Orlow in Nazi Party, p. 161 
refers to the saturation campaigns as specially designed for 
use in coming elections or as preliminary preparation for 
major party events. Orlow*s interpretation of these cam­
paigns is incorrect. They were developed to introduce the 
party in previously lightly worked areas. The first three 
saturation campaigns were staged in the Ostmark, Halle- 
Merseburg and Saxony in early 1929. No elections or major 
party events were scheduled for these areas at the time.
The party later used saturation campaigns before elections 
and to prepare areas for major party events, but this can­
vassing technique was not initially developed for those 
purposes. Throughout this dissertation many of Dietrich 
Orlow*s conclusions will be criticized. This criticism 
should not be taken as a general attack on Orlow's book. 
Orlow*s History of the Nazi Party is an invaluable pioneer 
work. Orlow made mistakes, but before his study was pub­
lished the field was almost entirely unorganized. His book 
remains the basic study of the party during the Weimar Re­
public. Other research on this topic will, of necessity, 
be based upon Orlow*s work.
2<*H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda Aktion" 
December 24, 1928 and Tyrell, Fiihrer Befiehl, pp. 255-57.
27 Ibid.
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was on quantity rather than quality. Himmler was indiffer­
ent to the specific contents of the speeches delivered 
during a saturation campaign, as long as the local Gau
leadership chose speakers and speaking themes appropriate
2 8
to the region. These rallies did not attempt primarily to
persuade the public of the correctness of Nazi doctrines.
Instead, they were designed to convince local audiences of
the strength, dedication and enthusiasm of the Nazi party.
As Joachim Fest put it, "enthusiasm . . . .  was [the
29party's] greatest strength." The immediate problem that 
these campaigns overcame was the widespread impression 
that the NSDAP was a weak, impotent Bavarian splinter group. 
Such a show of force as a saturation campaign was more 
effective in disspelling that impression than all the party’s 
statements and printed assertions. Proving that the NSDAP 
was a strong and active movement was essential if the party 
was to attract a large number of followers. Those who were 
disillusioned with the Weimar Republic wanted change and 
action. The Nazis could only exploit discontent if the 
public were persuaded that they were capable of transform­
ing Germany; and the massive displays of National Socialist 
enthusiasm and strength during saturation campaigns helped 
accomplish that goal.
Nazi propaganda was rarely limited to speeches.
28Ibid.
29pest, Hitler, pp. 276-77.
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The party tried to involve the public in its activities. 
During saturation campaigns a series of "working evenings" 
were held to recruit new members for the SA or for the 
Hitler Youth and to win additional subscribers to Nazi 
newspapers.^® Thereby, a National Socialist presence would 
be established in the area being canvassed. Ideally, after 
a successful saturation campaign enough local men would 
join the party and its various auxiliary organizations to 
form a series of new Ortsgruppen and SA units, which would 
then carry on party agitation in the future. The "working 
evenings" were also occasions for the Nazis to campaign on 
a more personal level than was possible at formal speeches.
The SA "evening" provides a good example of this 
type of Nazi field work. A number of SA men were dispatched 
to the town being canvassed. They then rented a small 
hall, so that old SA men and prospective recruits would be 
physically close together. This reduced formality and made 
the recruits feel that they were part of the group from the 
beginning. After a brief period of getting acquainted, the 
audience was regaled with musical selections appropriate to 
the Gau performed either by the town band or by a neigh­
boring SA marching band. This was followed by sports events.
First, the old SA men would join the prospective recruits 
in team activities, thus promoting a feeling of solidarity;
30H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda Aktion" 
December 24, 1928 and Tyrell, Fflhrer Befiehl, pp. 255-57.
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then some SA men would put on a display of wrestling and 
jujitsu to impress the audience. After this strenuous 
interlude the meeting settled down for group singing, often 
followed by a display of talent by the nearest SA choir.
The last two events of an SA "working evening" were a 
theatrical performance by an amateur SA troupe and the 
screening of a movie. Himmler was not specific about the 
type of play that should be presented, but it is fairly 
obvious that the sketch would be designed to convey politi­
cal ideas or to portray important events in SA history.
The final event was the screening of the party motion pic­
ture about the 1927 Ntirnberg rally, which featured a seem­
ingly endless column of SA men marching by Hitler on the 
scenic streets of the old city. It was designed to give
the prospective recruits a feeling of the strength and dis-
31cipline of the organization they were being asked to join.
The SA evening exemplifies some of the methods 
used by the Nazis in non-verbal propaganda. No speeches 
were made extolling the virtues of the party? that was the 
traditional approach used by other parties. On these occa­
sions the Nazis preferred instead to present an appealing 
picture of the nature of the party. Those who attended 
these meetings went away entertained. For one evening they 
had been part of the Nazi movement; they had participated 
in sporting events and singing with SA men and had become
acquainted with these dedicated Nazis. After a successful 
SA evening a certain camaraderie developed between old 
members and recruits. At the same time/ the visiting SA 
contingent employed a number of techniques to convince the 
audience of the party’s strength and dedication. They dis­
played their prowess as athletes in wrestling and jujitsu 
performances; SA choirs often performed after group singing 
finally, the party propaganda movie showed thousands of 
marching Storm Troopers to the prospective recruits. The 
composite picture of the NSDAP presented at this "working 
evening1' was of a strong, dedicated and yet comradely move­
ment able to restore Germany.
The Himmler scheme was used during early 1929. It 
provided a workable model for Nazi agitation throughout 
the last years of the Weimar Republic. Most importantly, 
the Himmler plan could be implemented with existing re­
sources. The speakers were provided by the propaganda 
section after prior consultation with the local Gauleitung. 
The campaigns themselves were mapped out by the regional 
leadership, to insure that the most susceptible towns and 
villages were heavily canvassed. The Gauleitung provided 
advance men to distribute propaganda brochures and hand­
bills, and just before the campaign began, to plaster 
seventy to one hundred and fifty towns and villages with 
party placards. The printed material was furnished by 
Himmler’s office either free of charge or for a small fee. 
Finally, most of the work was done by volunteers. Trans-
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portation was provided by using the private automobiles of
party members. Volunteers also furnished most of the
entertainment at "working evenings." The only expenses
involved in this type of campaigning were nominal speakers’
fees, the rent on small halls, and the small rental fee
32charged to show the party’s propaganda film. Himmler's
campaign was both cheap and labor-intensive. It was based
upon an efficient utilization of the party’s prime resource,
its dedicated members.
The Himmler saturation campaigns were in many ways
typical of the National Socialist approach to propaganda.
The NSDAP presented itself to the public through a series
of evocative images. In this case, the Nazis emphasized
strength, dedication and comradeship— ideal qualities which
were concretely objectified through a series of activi- 
33ties. They did not constitute a political program, but 
the Nazis rarely tried to persuade people of the correct­
ness of their doctrines. Instead, the NSDAP attempted to 
paint a picture of the Nazi future. The party was pre­
sented as a holistic movement, all elements of which were
33Ernst Nolte saw this emphasis on concretely 
objectified images as a product of the monomaniacal 
element of Hitler’s personality. He felt Hitler was 
impelled by an "elemental urge toward tangibility, in­
telligibility, [and] simplicity," Three Faces of Fascism, 
p. 368.
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organically linked forming an indivisible whole. The 
public was asked to accept the Nazi party in its totality 
as an act of faith without debating details. In any case, 
the party's propaganda images were too abstract to be de­
bated or even discussed. This vagueness was very helpful 
to the Nazis. It allowed recruits to see the NSDAP as the 
embodiment of their most treasured ideals; it also obviated 
the need to make decisions on clearly articulated programs. 
Recruits could accept the NSDAP for any number of personal 
reasons without having to reconcile themselves to a collec­
tion of doctrines which might or might not appeal to them.
Himmler's second major personal contribution to
Nazi campaigning was to devise a method for using the party's
written and pictorial propaganda as a means of attracting
new followers. From time to time, the propaganda section
issued pamphlets, copies of important speeches, and major
posters to be distributed throughout Germany. Each local
group was responsible for obtaining large quantities of
this printed material and making sure that it was widely
34disseminated. The defect of this type of campaigning was 
that it lacked impact. Only people who already supported 
the party were likely to take the trouble of reading 
speeches or pamphlets. Placards, no matter how graphic, 
tended to blend into the background and rarely stimulated 
much interest. Nonetheless, such propaganda was necessary
^VB, July 29/30, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 28";
VB, December 4, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung 30," etc.
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to communicate the party's position on major issues to the 
public and to retain the active interest of members. The 
problem was how to make Nazi written propaganda more effec­
tive as a weapon for converting previously uninterested 
voters. Himmler solved this problem in late 1928 by
ordering local groups to hold public meetings on the topics
. . , 35
covered in printed material.
By August, 1929, three campaigns featuring the co­
ordination of Nazi written and pictorial propaganda with 
speeches had taken place. The first of these campaigns 
occurred in December, 1928, and January, 1929. The subject 
was a leaflet entitled "Consumer Unions and Department
Stores: Some Facts and Figures that Every German Should
36Know." Every Nazi local group was required to hold a
public meeting exposing consumer unions and department
stores as Jewish threats to the well-being of the German
middle class. Underscoring the importance of this program
37Himmler repeated his order two weeks later, and this
38second order seems to have been scrupulously obeyed. The
35VB, December 4, 19 28, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 30."
36Ibid.
37VB, December 16/17, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 32."
38There are records of rallies being held on this 
subject in Berlin, Munich and Bielefeld to give just a few 
examples. VB, January 3, 1929, p. 3, "Aus der Bewegung=
Gau Gross-Berlin," VB, January 5, 1929, p. 3, "Versamm- 
lungen" and VB, January 5, 1929, p. 3, "Nationalsozialist- 
ische Aufklarungsarbeit."
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second of these campaigns began on June 21, 1929 and dealt
with the continuing imprisonment of Lt. Schulz. Schulz was
a member of the notorious Feme, a political assassination
organization active in the early twenties, and had been
convicted of murder. The Nazis tried to make his case into
a c^use c6l5bre by claiming that this "patriot" should be
released, especially when traitorous communists and crim-
39nals were let out by periodic amnesties. The other occa­
sion when printed matter was used as the basis of a speaking 
campaign involved a poster. The placard in question was an 
attack on the Young Plan depicting a worker and his child 
labeled "Think of the Child and the Future." The Young 
Plan called for the continuation of reparation payments for 
fifty-eight years, and one of the Nazi arguments against 
the plan was that it would enslave future generations. Ora­
tors were ordered to use this poster as a centerpiece for
40public meetings attacking the new reparations settlement.
After mid-1929 National Socialist written and pic­
torial propaganda was designed almost exclusively for use in 
broader campaigns. In connection with the municipal and
^®VB, June 21, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 41." The 
case of Lt. Schulz was apparently common knowledge at the 
time. The Nazis do not describe his crimes beyond mention­
ing that he had committed an "honorable" murder. They do 
not even give his first name. Since Schulz is the German 
equivalent of Smith and no one other than the Nazis seemed 
to be interested in him, it is not possible to recount his 
misdeeds in any detail.
40VB, July 5, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 4 3."
110
communal elections of November and December, 1929, the
propaganda section issued pamphlets entitled "With Marxism
41Marches Corruption" and "Clean Up City Government." In
conjunction with the referendum campaign against the Young
Plan, the pamphlets, "Young Plan— Human Export," "Fifty-
42Eight Years Young Plan" and "The Talmud of the Economy" 
were distributed. Himmler had succeeded in linking written 
and spoken Nazi propaganda to heighten the impact of both.
The advantages of such a union were considerable. 
Pamphlets and posters provided party speakers with effec­
tive props for impressing audiences. People who attended 
meetings at which issues were forcefully presented were 
far more likely to read the party’s literature. Even those 
who did not attend Nazi rallies became more susceptible to 
the party's written propaganda. The fact that a rally was 
held meant that people would be talking about it and about
the subject covered in the public meeting. Even rabid
opponents of the NSDAP were likely to mention the Nazi 
rally, if only to denounce it. All of this stimulated in­
terest in the party’s written propaganda, which was harder 
to ignore when it became a topic of conversation. A last 
favorable feature of this type of campaigning was that all 
Nazi local groups were dealing with the same topic at the 
same time. This allowed the party to present an impression
^VB, November 9, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 49."
42VB, December 6, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 51."
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of monolithic solidarity to the voters that could only 
serve to increase their confidence in the unity and deci­
siveness of the NSDAP, two very desirable qualities in the 
chaotic late twenties.
Heinrich Himmler turned the propaganda section over
4 3to Joseph Goebbels on April 27, 1930. In his two years 
as deputy chief of the section, Himmler had helped to es­
tablish the form and style of Nazi campaigning. He in­
creased the effectiveness of party agitation by organizing 
and concentrating available resources to stage impressive 
and powerful campaigns. This tactical approach enabled 
the party to make its first major inroads in previously 
unorganized areas and left a lasting impression on millions 
who, previously, were barely aware of the existence of the 
NSDAP. In doing this Himmler employed propaganda techni­
ques developed by Hitler. He emphasized emotional appeals 
and the creation of a series of concretely embodied images. 
This approach was similar to the methods used by the Nazis 
in mass rallies with their music, banners, torchlight pro­
cessions and fiery but vague speeches. Himmler's great 
accomplishment was in devising ways to achieve the same 
results when dealing with an indifferent and geographically 
dispersed population. The saturation campaign was a 
reasonably successful means of applying the propaganda 
principles learned by the Nazis at mass rallies to a very
4^Tyrell, Fflhrer Befiehl, p. 225.
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different situation. Thus, Himmler's campaigns reveal the 
key images that the party wished to stress. The Nazis 
wanted the public to see the party as a strong, dedicated 
and comradely movement capable of bringing about change.
In a period of cynicism and indecisiveness the Nazis pro­
jected an image of monolithic solidarity and blind faith. 
All of these impressions were integrated to a greater or 
lesser extent in National Socialist campaigning to produce 
an imprecise but attractive composite picture of the NSDAP 
as a militant, quasi-religious order that was both ready 
and able to bring about a renewal of Germany. Details 
changed over the years, but this composite picture of the 
party remained unaltered. It, in fact, originated in 
Hitler's Mein Kampf, but Heinrich Himmler was the man who 
first devised the tactical methods to present this idealized 
portrait of the party to the uninvolved masses*
Joseph Goebbels, Himmler's successor, made no major
44changes in Nazi tactics before the 1930 election. He 
simply carried on with programs and techniques developed by 
his predecessor. On May 28, 1930, Goebbels issued his
44Hitler did hire R. Walter DarrS on August 25,
1930 to develop a more effective agricultural organization. 
However, Darr€ was hired too late to have any impact on the 
1930 election. For DarrS's appointment see VB, August 29, 
1930, p. 3, "Bekanntmachung." For a description of Darrfi1s 
later activities see Horst Gies "NSDAP und landwirtschaft- 
liche Organisationen in der Endphase der Weimarer 
Republik," Vierteljahrshefte ftir Zeitgeschichte, xv, 1967, 
pp. 341-76, also reprinted and translated in Henry A. Tur­
ner, Jr., (ed.) Nazism and the Third Reich (New York: 
Quadrangle, 1972'J pp7 45-88.
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first orders as chief of the propaganda section. These
directives dealt with the Saxon Landtag election campaign.
He placed the campaign under the control of his section,
thus reaffirming the principle of strict centralization.
He further directed that the party "concentrate all our
propaganda potential on Saxony. All speakers are required
45
to participate there." Here, Goebbels relied upon the
same type of saturation campaign developed by Himmler in
late 1928. Finally, Goebbels notified the party that his
section was dispatching a batch of pamphlets and posters
46
to be used in conjunction with the speaking campaign.
The link between written and spoken propaganda was 
reaffirmed.
The same methods were used in the Reichstag elec­
tion campaign of August and early September, 1930. Here, 
the principle of centralization was even more heavily 
stressed. As the leader of one Gau propaganda section put 
it in a circular letter, "The Reich propaganda section has 
set up a unified election propaganda program for the entire
country to improve our chances of success . . . .  Do not
47use your own stuff." The idea that the most effective
4^VB, May 28, 1939, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 56." 
46Ibid.
4^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Propaganda-Abteilung" 
Gau Gross-Berlin, August 5, 1930.
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way of presenting the NSDAP to the electorate was through 
a well organized, highly centralized and unified campaign 
was firmly established by the time of the 1930 Reichstag 
election.
Himmler's tactical contributions to Nazi campaign­
ing were important, but he made an equally significant 
contribution through his ability to recognize valuable 
programs developed by others. In his position he was able 
to establish successful Gau projects as programs to be im­
plemented throughout the Reich. The next chapters will 
examine two successful Gau projects that were adopted by 
Himmler and the propaganda section as national programs.
CHAPTER 5
FRITZ REINHARDT AND THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST 
SPEAKERS' CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL
Effective tactics were useful in making initial 
gains, but they did not solve any of the party's basic 
problems. In early 1929 the NSDAP was still incapable of 
staging major political drives in more than one region of 
Germany at the same time. It did not even have the experi­
enced personnel to follow up on its saturation campaigns.
If the Nazis were to consolidate their initial gains and 
continue to grow, they desperately needed to augment the 
number of trained agitators available for party work.
Above all, the party needed more speakers. Torch­
light parades, marches and major rallies were high points 
of Nazi campaigning, but the party could not stage these 
activities on a regular basis. They were too expensive 
in terms of manpower, and in any case they were not appro­
priate as weekly events. The commonest form of Nazi pro­
paganda was the public speech. The party tried to stage 
speeches every week in areas where an Ortsgruppe existed. 
These regular meetings helped to establish the party's 
presence as an ongoing political movement with local
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identification. They also served to increase the enthu­
siasm of party members and to attract persons interested 
in the NSDAP. Finally, the speaker communicated the party's 
ideas and programs both to members and to potential con­
verts .
Perhaps the greatest problem facing the Nazis in 
the late twenties was how to increase the number of party 
orators. In 1928 there were fewer than three hundred regu­
lar Nazi speakers in Germany.1 They worked hard, addressing 
twenty thousand meetings that year, but little more could 
be expected from these men. There were simply too few of 
them and too much territory to cover. Besides, major 
figures like Goebbels, Gregor Strasser or Julius Streicher 
were far too valuable to spend their time addressing small 
audiences in isolated areas. In any case, this was not 
necessary. The party did not need brilliant orators for 
this work. Rather, it needed an ample supply of reasonably 
competent speakers, so that Nazi local groups would be able 
to stage regular and frequent public meetings, thereby 
keeping the party's program and activities before the popu­
lace .
The problem of producing a large number of new 
speakers for the party was first dealt with by Gauleiter 
Fritz Reinhardt of Oberbayern-Schwaben. Reinhardt was
^VB, January 27, 1929, p. 3, "20,000 
Versammlungen im Jahre 1928." Also see Appendix A.
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thirty-three years old when he was appointed to his post on 
May 31, 1928. His background was unusual for a Nazi re­
gional leader. By profession Reinhardt was an economist, 
and from April, 1933 until 1945, he served the Nazi govern­
ment as State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Finance. 
From 1919 to 1924, he was employed as director of the 
Thuringian Commercial College. At that time, he wrote a 
six-volume correspondence course for businessmen. The new 
Gauleiter's forte was organization and teaching, not rabble 
rousing. He used these talents initially to establish
3
order and discipline in his Gau political organization, 
and then turned his precise mind to finding solutions to 
long-term problems.
Reinhardt’s goal was to increase party membership 
fivefold in his Gau and to establish an Ortsgruppe in every
4
community with over a thousand inhabitants. A major ob­
stacle to this objective was the dearth of available 
speakers. This was a serious problem, for as Reinhardt put 
it, "the expansion of the National Socialist movement and 
with it of the NSDAP is based primarily on the spoken word
5
and on verbal explanations of our works." In order to
2VB, June 1, 1928, p. 3, "Bekanntmachung."
3For an example of Reinhardt's efforts to bring 
order and discipline to his Gau political organization see 
VB, June 6, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Oberbayern-Schwaben, Anordnung 
1."
^H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3."
^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, a descriptive brochure 
issued by Reinhardt entitled "Rednerschule der NSDAP."
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stage a successful recruiting campaign, Reinhardt needed to 
increase the number of speakers for such work. The solution 
to this problem was not difficult for a man who had written 
a six-volume correspondence course for businessmen. On 
June 11, 1928, Reinhardt announced the establishment of a 
correspondence course for orators in his Gau** designed "to 
cure the acute shortage of speakers especially for meetings 
in small towns and villages."7
Reinhardt had inadvertently found the answer to one 
of the party's most pressing needs, how to increase greatly 
the number of trained orators. The original purpose for the 
establishment of this speakers' course, the recruiting cam­
paign in Oberbayern-Schwaben, paled to insignificance almost 
at once. On August 31, 1928, the new Gauleiter addressed 
the delegates at the Reich leadership conference in order
g
to describe his new school. Reinhardt's appearance at this 
national meeting indicates that his program had attracted 
the attention of the party's national leadership.
What had started as a local, one-time-only course 
soon became a continuing school for neophyte Nazi
eH.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3."
7H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, Police report dated
May 1, 19 30, from the Munich police to the Berlin police
praesidium entitled "Rednerschule der NSDAP zum ers. von 
23.4.1930.” Henceforth referred to as May 1, 1930 police 
report.
®VB, September 4, 1928, p. 1, "Abschluss der 
nationalsozialistischen Fiihrertagung. "
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orators. All Reinhardt courses after September, 1928 were 
announced in the party's official newspaper, the VOlkischer 
Beobachter ^  and students from other Gaus in Germany and 
Austria began enrolling in the program. After January, 
1929, these men were placed under their own Gauleiters* 
supervision for purposes of testing.^ Later that month 
some of Reinhardt's students gave their first major per­
formances outside of Oberbayern-Schwaben, when they
addressed a large party rally in Chemnitz (now Karl Marx
12Stadt) in Saxony.
On May 6, 1929, Himmler designated the Reinhardt
school as the official Reich party office responsible for
13training speakers in all parts of Germany. In a circular
letter to all Gauleiters, Himmler stressed the importance
of preparing a large cadre of new orators. "In order to
expand, we need men who can speak* Without them we cannot
14move the masses." Commenting on the efforts of Reinhardt
^Joachim Fest, in what is probably a misprint, 
refers to the establishment of a speakers' school in late 
1926. Hitler, p. 252.
l^The first of these announcements appeared in VB, 
October 4, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Redner = 
Fernschule."
11Ibid*
12VB, January 3, 1929, p. 3, "Bezirk Chemnitz" 
refers to a rally held in Limbach on January 27.
13H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda - Abteilung 
6 Mai 1929."
14Ibid.
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in this matter, he said, "This problem has been alleviated
by Fritz Reinhardt . . . who on his own initiative opened
a speakers' correspondence school . . . .  The success of
15of this school has been good." The school was not only
recognized as a Reich party office; party discipline was
also invoked to recruit new students. Himmler ordered that
from May, 1929, each Bezirk supply a minimum of two persons
16
to enroll in every subsequent Reinhardt course.
Initially, the school relied upon the enthusiasm and
dedication of party members for recruiting participants. It
also appealed to the greed and ambition of prospective 
17students. They were promised high places as candidates in
18city council elections and advancement within the party.
15Ibid.
17 The Social Democrats created a somewhat similar 
school for training members to become trade union or party 
officials. This school which was started in 1906 provided 
some upward mobility for ambitious workers. See Robert 
Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the
Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy trans. Eden and 
Cedar Paul (New York: Collier, 196T) pp. 68-70. By 1919, 
however, most positions in the SPD and trade union hierar­
chy were controlled by a self perpetuating group that was 
able to place family members and friends in new openings. 
See Hunt, Social Democrats. The possibility of upward mo­
bility offered by the Nazi party to participants in the 
Reinhardt school must have been very attractive for young 
men who had few opportunities to advance in other parties 
during the late twenties. The economic stagnation of the 
Weimar Republic reduced the opportunities for young, un­
connected men to rise socially and economically. The great 
depression simply made matters worse. The Nazis, almost 
alone, provided a way for ambitious young men to succeed 
through hard work and by personal ability.
18H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 7."
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They were also promised speaking fees after completion of
the course, and by 19 30 graduates were receiving "20 RM or
19more per evening in addition to their expenses." After
May, 1929, party discipline insured an adequate enrollment
20in Reinhardt's program, and the abovementioned inducements 
became simply additional rewards for participants. In 
short, the Reinhardt school cleverly exploited the party's 
greatest assets, its established membership and its inter­
nal discipline, in order to solve the problem of producing 
a large quantity of trained orators.
Perhaps, the greatest advantage of the speakers' 
correspondence school to the party was the fact that it was 
inexpensive. The entire operation was run from a post 
office box in Reinhardt's hometown of Herrsching am 
Amersee. The party did not have to bear the cost of setting 
up formal schools and paying instructors. Reinhardt him­
self wrote most of the lessons, and additional ones were 
provided by members of the party's Reich specialist bureaus 
in Munich. As the school expanded, the only added expense
l^Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, p. 101, Prussian 
Ministry of the Interior report on Nazi activities dated 
May, 1930.
^®H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Rednerschule der 
NSDAP." This document gives enrollment figures that indi­
cate that the district leaders did enroll the required num­
ber of students for each course. In any case, Reichsleitung 
orders were rarely disobeyed. Such actions were tantamount 
to defying Hitler, since the Reichsleitung acted as an in­
stitutional extension of Hitler. For a discussion of party 
discipline and the Nazi leadership structure see Chapter 10.
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to the party was the employment of a small number of clerks
to read and correct homework. The fees paid by students
were enough to defray all the costs of this tiny operation
and to make the speakers* school economically self- 
21
sufficient. The cost to the students was also small.
22Originally, students were charged 1.5 RM per month. In
7 1May, 1929 tuition was raised to a mere 2 RM monthly. In
addition to this fee, the student was required to subscribe
24to the Volkischer Beobachter and later to Reinhardt's
25Wirtschaftlicher Beobachter. Since they were taught by 
means of a correspondence course, students did not have to 
travel to distant cities to receive instruction. They did 
not have to sacrifice their jobs to attend a formal school. 
Thus, the financial and personal demands of this kind of 
training were minimal— only large enough to discourage those 
who did not take the course seriously.
A second major advantage of this type of schooling 
was that it guaranteed the participation of students from 
all parts of Germany. Initially two students from each dis­
trict, whether predominantly urban or rural, were required to
21H.A. Feel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3."
22Ibid.
23
H.A. Reel 10, Folder 20 3, "Propaganda-Abteilung 
6 Mai 1929."
2^H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3."
NSDAP."
2^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Rednerschule der
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26 27enroll, and in 1930 every Ortsgruppe had to enter one pupil.
In practice, this meant that the new speakers would come from
all areas. They were likely to be well versed in local pro-
28
blems and unlikely to commit harmful blunders.
2®H.A. Reel 10, Folder 20 3, "Propaganda-Abteilung 
6 Mai 1929,"
^H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Reichspropaganda - 
Abteilung II Anordnung 1, 10 Mai 19 30."
2 8Geoffrey Pridham deals with this issue in a some­
what confusing passage. In a section of his book covering 
the Darr€ agricultural organization, he makes the following 
statement.
"These indoctrination courses and similar 
activities demanded an army of party 
speakers versed in rural propaganda. Darr6 
lacked this at the beginning. Party speak­
ers from Reinhardt's training school were 
at first transferred to rural areas, although 
not always with happy results. Speakers used 
to addressing town audiences sometimes un­
wittingly committed indiscretions. A great 
commotion was caused at a peasant meeting by 
a Nazi speaker in Upper Bavaria, who was 
tactless enough to remark that in the Third 
Reich the 'progressive' peasant who used 
artificial manure would remain on his farm, 
while farms which were uneconomical and in 
debt would be nationalized." Pridham, Hitler * s 
Rise, p. 230.
Earlier Pridham described the role of the Reinhardt speak­
ers in the 1930 Reichstag election in the following passage. 
"The Speakers' School was now beginning to pay dividends 
for many of its trainees were sent out to address NSDAP 
'peasant meetings', having been well briefed and indoctri­
nated in agricultural problems." Ibid., p. 121.
These two statements seem to contradict each other. 
What Pridham probably means in the first passage is that 
Reinhardt speakers from cities were not effective when 
transferred to rural areas. Pridham's example of the tact­
less orator is also confusing, since the man in question is 
not specifically identified as a graduate of the speakers' 
school.
Dietrich Orlow, on the other hand, describes
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Furthermore, they were more likely to be trusted by their 
neighbors than outside speakers sent in by opposition par­
ties. This aspect of the speakers' school served to solid­
ify the position of the NSDAP as an ongoing organization 
with local identification.
The speakers' course lasted one year, but partici­
pants began to address audiences after their initial four 
months of training. Thus, Reinhardt's first students began 
appearing on October 27, 1928 in Oberbayern-Schwaben.
These earliest speeches were presented to audiences of from 
sixty to seventy persons in small towns and villages such 
as Lochhausen, MUnsing and Russdorf, all of which were in 
the vicinity of the Amersee or the Starnberger See. The 
purpose of these speeches was either to found new local 
groups or to recruit new members. Most of the audiences 
addressed by these first products of Reinhardt's school 
were composed of farmers, artisans or burghers from small 
towns, though some socialists and communists also attended.
n O
(continued) Reinhardt speakers as village orators 
not capable of addressing town and city audiences. Orlow, 
Nazi Party, pp. 158-60. This is not correct. In H.A. Reel 
9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3," Reinhardt stated that the 
goal of his speakers' school was to help in agitation to 
found an Ortsgruype in every town with over one thousand 
inhabitants in his Gau. This type of campaign did not re­
strict Reinhardt speakers to village and peasant audiences. 
In truth, Reinhardt speakers came from both rural and urban 
areas (see argument above). Some were undoubtedly capable 
only of addressing village and peasant audiences, while 
others became competent orators. Generalizations about 
them being specifically rural or urban speakers are incor­
rect. Reinhardt speakers were propaganda generalists 
trained on a wide variety of topics. For a discussion of 
Reinhardt school training see Appendix B.
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These speeches— all delivered in October and November—
dealt with the theme "the interest and tax slavery of pro-
29ductive Germans." Like many topics treated by student 
orators, this subject had previously been covered in the 
course. It was designed to appeal to audiences in small 
towns and villages composed of farmers and burghers often 
heavily in debt due to the agricultural depression. The 
"interest slavery" speech was also intended to attract 
socialists and communists through its radical attack on so- 
called finance capitalism. Lastly, this address exploited 
traditional religious prejudice against usury especially 
prevalent in rural Germany. There are few descriptions of 
these early speeches, but it appears that the students were 
expected to perform at length; in one case a four-month 
student named Buchner gave a three-hour oration"*^ before a 
mixed audience of farmers and socialists in the village of 
Traubing.
^®VB, November 13, 1928, p. 3, "Die neuen Reinhardt
Redner."
30Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 159. Orlow states that 
Reinhardt speakers learned only "a set store of speeches, 
and some memorized answers for typical questions from the 
audience." Though an isolated example, the very length of 
Buchner's effort tends to militate against this contention. 
Unfortunately, we know the identity of only a handful of 
Reinhardt speakers. This makes it difficult to assess their 
performances, since we cannot read a series of reports on 
their speeches. Nonetheless, an extant copy of a Reinhardt 
course for 1931-32 provides some indications of what was 
expected of students. The contents of this course tend to 
refute Orlow's contentions on the quality and training of 
students. For a fuller discussion see Appendix B.
^1VB, November 13, 1928, p. 3,"Die neuen Reinhardt 
Redner." No first name is given for Buchner.
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By January, 1928, Reinhardt's students were appear­
ing regularly at party meetings. Participants in the first 
course, which began in July, 1928, were ordered to speak at 
least eight times between February 1 and March 15 on the 
subject of "the expropriation of the farmer." Those in the 
second course, which began in October, 1928, took over the 
"interest slavery" speaking assignments and were required 
to make ten talks each on this topic by April 1, 19 29.
By March, 1929, the participants in the first two courses 
were expected to appear at least once a week; and those in
the third, which began in December, 1928, were beginning to
33address public meetings. After four months of training 
Reinhardt students became regular party orators available 
for addressing small public meetings and rallies. The value 
of this continuing supply of student speakers to Nazi groups 
in isolated and sparsely populated areas was considerable.
The best way to understand the role of this new 
reservoir of neophyte orators in the growth of the party is 
to examine their activities in detail in one area. The 
Oberwesterwald, an almost entirely rural district about 
sixty-five miles north-northwest of Frankfurt-am-Main, is 
ideal for this purpose. In 1928, the Nazis received 231 of 
13,036 votes cast in the district. In the only town with
32VB, January 30, 1929, p. 3, "Nationalsozialist- 
ische Redner^Fernschule."
^3VB, March 16, 1929, p. 3, "Nat.= Soz. Redner= 
Fernschule."
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over 2,000 inhabitants, Hachenburg, they received 46 of 
1,080 votes. No Nazi local groups existed in the area, and 
little if any campaigning had taken place. The process of 
party building did not even begin until June, 1929. A mere 
fifteen months later, the Nazis emerged as the second 
largest party in the district only 4 00 votes behind the 
predominant Catholic Center party. On September 14, 1930, 
the Nazis polled 3,753 of 15,420 votes in the Oberwesterwald, 
and 256 of 1,396 votes in Hachenburg. Reinhardt's student 
speakers played a major role in establishing and then fos­
tering the growth of Nazism in this district. Their work 
here was typical of their activities throughout Germany.
The beginnings of the Nazi party in the Oberwester­
wald took place in June, 1929, entirely by accident. In 
that month a Nazi named Hammer moved to the area from 
Niederschelden bei Siegen/Westphalia. Hammer immediately 
set out to acquaint his new neighbors with the NSDAP. From 
June to September, he conducted a rather haphazard propa­
ganda campaign. A few speakers were recruited, and an SA 
march was staged with the help of fourteen of Hammer's 
former Storm Trooper associates from Niederschelden. This 
march vividly illustrated the difficulties faced by the new 
Nazi organization. As the SA men trooped through the vil­
lage of Winkelbach, they were mistaken for English soldiers. 
In short, the Nazis were wholly unknown in the area. By 
September Hammer's efforts were floundering. His former SA 
comrades were unenthusiastic about returning for another
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march. His most important speaker, a local high school 
teacher, had to return to work. Above all, the Oberwester­
wald Nazis lacked any permanent source of orators to do the 
initial work of recruiting members and firmly establishing 
the party in the district.
On September 15, 1929, Hammer established ties with 
Gau Hessen-Nassau-Siid. Regular field men were provided 
from Frankfurt-am-Main. At first, major speakers such as 
Gauleiter Jakob Sprenger addressed Oberwesterwald audiences. 
These appearances by party luminaries were designed to get 
the new district organization off to a proper start. By 
October, however, the Frankfurt leadership began to grumble 
about the expense and time involved in sending speakers to 
such an isolated and sparsely populated area. Furthermore, 
Hammer's newly founded organization was in no position to 
pay the travel expenses and fees necessary to attract the 
party's few professional speakers. In any case, while the 
Nazis were a new and virtually unknown party in the area, 
attendance at talks was not large enough to justify utiliz­
ing first-line orators. A year earlier Hammer's organiza­
tion might have collapsed, but in October, 1929, the 
Frankfurt Gauleitung had Reinhardt's students at its dis­
posal. Hammer was allowed to draw an adequate supply of 
neophyte speakers to address Oberwesterwald audiences with­
out cost. The arrival of these men marked the real begin­
nings of the establishment of a permanent Nazi presence in
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34this district. Prom October, 1929, Hammer's organization 
expanded rapidly. Meetings were held regularly, and new mem­
bers were recruited from every part of the district. In a
matter of months five village groups were established. From
35these Ortsgruppen SA and Hitler Youth units were recruited.
All of these new organizations made it possible for the 
NSDAP to increase its support from 1.7 percent to 24 percent 
in a mere fifteen months, but without the initial work of re­
cruiting and agitation performed by men from Reinhardt's 
school, it is unlikely that the Nazis would ever have been able 
to establish themselves as a viable political force in this 
isolated part of Germany. Without the readily available sup­
ply of speakers provided by the school, the party leadership 
would have been unable to furnish any lasting assistance to 
Hammer or to men like him in similar areas.
After completion of Reinhardt's course, graduates
were required to make at least thirty speeches over a
3 6period of eight months. Every month they sub­
mitted reports on the meetings they addressed stating the
town, the theme of speech, the number in the audience, and 
37
the results. They were officially attached to their Gau
3*H.A. Reel 6, Folder 142, "Kampferlebnisse des Pg. 
Hammer," Altenkirchen/Westerwald March 25, 1937. No first 
name is given for Hammer.
35Ibid.
3®H.A . Reel 70, Folder 1529, May 1, 1930, Police Report.
37VB, March 16, 1928, p. 3, "Nat.=Soz. Redner= 
Fernschule."
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or Bezirk and received speaking assignments from these
38organizations. Reinhardt students and graduates were 
pledged to be active party workers for at least sixteen 
months. After that time the more able orators could easily 
be induced to continue their activities by fees for appear­
ances and promises of high positions on the party's local 
and district election lists.
By early 1930 the speakers' school had so greatly 
expanded the number of available party orators that Rein­
hardt was able to initiate saturation campaigns on the 
model of Himmler's throughout Germany. On February 20,
19 30, Reinhardt ordered rallies to be held against the 
Young Plan in every town and village; immediately before 
the final Reichstag vote on the issue, every Nazi speaker—  
including some not connected with the speakers’ school 
itself— was to address at least three meetings in as many
days on the subject, "Tear Up the Tribute Plan: Germany
39shall Live." Two other such operations took place later
in the year. Another campaign against the Young Plan began
40in early May lasting eight weeks, and on May 20, 1930, 
Reinhardt ordered speakers' school students to attack the
^®VB, January 30, 1929, p. 3, "Nationalsozialist- 
ische Redner - Fernschule."
39H.A. Reel 58, Folder 14 03, "Berichte der 
Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politische Lage = Geheim, 
19.3.30, Aus der NSDAP."
40H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Reichspropaganda- 
Abteilung II Anordnung 1, 10 Mai 1930.”
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41Schieles agricultural program.
Reinhardt's school in less than two years had pro­
duced enough new speakers, so that the party could stage 
impressive campaigns in all parts of Germany. By May, 1930, 
Reinhardt boasted that twenty-three hundred students had
taken part in the school. By October, fifteen hundred had 
42graduated. This represented an increase of five hundred
percent in the number of Nazi orators from the level in
1928. As early as May, 1930, the Berlin police praesidium
evinced alarm at this rapid increase in the number of Nazi
orators. It sent a letter to the Munich police asking for
an explanation of how the Nazis were able to produce so
many new speakers. The Munich police responded to this re-
43quest with a description of Reinhardt's program.
Long before the Reichstag election the effects of the vast 
expansion in the number of Nazi orators was producing con­
cern in Berlin.
Reinhardt's speakers played a prominent role in the 
national election of 1930. As Joachim Fest put it,
"The 2,000 to 3,000 graduates of the Nazi 
party speakers' school were now thrown into 
the fray for marathon sessions . . . .  The 
mere appearance of these hordes of preachers 
spread the impression of a vast party engaged
^*VB, May 20, 1930, p. 3, "An alle Ortsgruppen-
leiter."
42H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Reichspropaganda- 
Abteilung II Anordnung 1, 10 Mai 1930."
4^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, Police Report, May 1,
1930.
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44in tireless and overwhelming activity."
Fest's estimate of two to three thousand graduates is some­
what inflated. Nevertheless, Reinhardt did release all of 
his personnel to the various Gauleiters on the eve of the 
election campaign. Including both students and graduates, 
the number may well have approached three thousand. In any 
case, police reports indicate that at least fifteen hundred 
Reinhardt speakers were fully trained by the summer of 1930.
These men were ordered to speak at least thirty times each
45in the Reichstag campaign. If they all obeyed orders, 
they delivered forty-five thousand addresses in a month and 
a half. This was over twice as many speeches as had been 
delivered in all of 1928 on behalf of the party. It seems 
unlikely that regional and district leaders failed to use 
Reinhardt's men to the full extent during the feverish 
election campaign. It is far more likely that many orators 
from the speakers' school were used to address more than 
the recommended thirty meetings. Thus, the figure of forty- 
five thousand speeches is probably a conservative estimate, 
especially since it does not take into consideration the 
work of students who enrolled in courses after October, 1929.
The intensity of National Socialist campaigning in 
1930 is confirmed by a report on party activities from the 
Prussian Ministry of the Interior. "Hardly a day passed on
44Fest, Hitler, p. 276.
45VB, July 23, 1930, p. 3, "An alle R .S . =Teilnehmer. "
13:
which there are not several meetings even in narrowly re-
46
stricted local areas." The report goes on to explain 
that most of the speakers involved in this campaigning 
were products of Reinhardt's courses. These speakers 
showed considerable "Rhetorical skill combined with sub­
jects carefully chosen to suit the particular audience" 
insuring "according to our observation, halls which are
almost invariably overcrowded with enthusiastic lis- 
4 7teners."
The Reinhardt speakers' school provided the NSDAP 
with a large quantity of trained orators. It also provided 
the Nazis with a large pool of trained manpower to partici­
pate in massive campaigns in all parts of Germany at once. 
At little if any cost to the party, Reinhardt's innovation 
made it possible for the NSDAP to present itself to the
electorate as a dynamic and strong movement. The Nazi
48tactic of "perpetual campaigning," which convinced so 
many Germans that the party was capable of effective action 
and thus worth supporting, was largely a product of this 
vast expansion of the number of Nazi orators. For people 
disgusted with the indecisiveness of traditional parties, 
the very intensity of Nazi political activity acted as a 
powerful magnet. Without the fifteen hundred participants
48Pridham and Noakes (eds.) , Documents, p. 101.
47Ibid.
48Allen, Nazi Seizure of Power, p. 40.
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in the program, the party would have been physically unable 
to take advantage of the desire of desperate Germans to 
support a strong and decisive movement, because it would 
have been unable to create such an impression using its 
tiny 192B supply of speakers.
The primary purpose of the speakers' school was to 
train new orators, but it also fulfilled a number of secon­
dary functions. Lessons from the program were often used 
as party position papers on various issues. As early as 
September, 1929, the school issued major pamphlets concern­
ing the city council and communal elections of November and 
49December. In April, 1930, a lesson on the Young Plan
e n
entitled "Tear-Up the Tribute Plan” was circulated as a 
major party pamphlet. Finally, the lesson dealing with the 
Schieles agricultural plan was released for general distri- 
bution on May 20, 1930. This function of the school, to 
instruct the membership and supporters in officially ap­
proved party positions, was formalized on August 30, 1930. 
From that time Reinhardt's students were required to in­
struct fellow Nazis on the issues dealt with in their 
current lessons and to answer questions from their audi­
ences. The purpose of these "School Evenings" was to give
VB, September 26, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 45,” 
VB, December 6, 1929, p. 3, "Rednermaterial."
50VB, April 24, 1930, p. 3,"Neue Massenflugschrift."
^ V B ,  May 20, 1930, p. 3,"An alle Ortsgruppen-
leiter."
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the students experience in addressing a group and "at the
same time spread the National Socialist message to . . .
52fellow party members." The Reinhardt courses thus func­
tioned as a school for all party members— not just for 
those officially enrolled in the instructional program.
A more important secondary function of the speakers' 
school was the briefing of Nazi opposition speakers and 
hecklers to disrupt meetings of opponents. In May, 1929, 
when the school was officially recognized as a Reich party 
office, a new service to disseminate "speakers' material”
was also founded. Every Ortsgruppe was required to sub-
53scribe to this service at a rate of 5 RM per quarter.
The "speakers' material" consisted mainly of "attack" lit­
erature for various election campaigns. From the middle of 
19 30 "speakers' material" dealt with the prominent issues 
of the Saxon and Thuringian Landtag elections. The pur­
pose of this propaganda was to familiarize "all party com­
rades . . . with the latest lies spread by our enemies
54
against us, so they can counter them." Members of the 
party were expected to use the information to assail op­
posing speakers at meetings. For the Reichstag election
5^H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Reichspropaganda- 
Abteilung II Anordnung 1, 10 Mai 1930."
53H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda-Abteilung,
6 Mai 1929."
^4VB, July 13/14, 1930, p. 3, "An alle Ortsgruppen-
leiter."
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campaign a more flexible approach was developed. Reinhardt 
requested that all subscribers provide the school with a 
schedule of rival rallies in their areas including towns, 
dates, and themes of speeches. The school would then send 
out the appropriate "speakers' material" to each local 
group for use against the respective opponents. Each sub­
scriber was urged to do his duty as "as opposition speaker
55at these rallies." Party members who acted in this lowly 
capacity were encouraged by the speaking material, which 
was designed to increase their confidence. They would now 
go to their competitors' rallies armed with a number of set 
arguments and some useful data. As Himmler commented in 
chartering this service, "His knowledge of the material
will make him secure even when faced by the sharpest enemy
56orator.” This service was by no means as important as 
the training of orators, but it did expand the capacity of 
the party for effective campaigning, and it had the effect 
of reenforcing the party's image of strength. The existence 
of a cadre of reasonably well prepared opposition speakers 
and hecklers meant that every other party in Germany had to 
deal with the Nazis at almost all of their rallies. In 
Mein Kampf Hitler had stated that the NSDAP should strive 
to convince the public that it was "the only power that
^VB, July 23, 1930, p. 3, "An alle Rednermaterial^ 
Bezieher."
^6H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda-Abteilung,
6 Mai 1929."
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57anyone reckons with at the moment." The activities of 
these opposition speakers and hecklers helped to create 
exactly that impression.
The Reinhardt speakers' school illustrated the 
ability of the party and especially of Himmler to recognize 
useful local programs and transform them into national or­
ganizations. Reinhardt's school vastly expanded the capa­
city of the NSDAP to campaign and at the same time further 
centralized Nazi agitation. Participants in the courses 
and subscribers to the "speakers' material" program were 
all provided with the same information and arguments to 
present to the public. This meant, in practice, that the 
Nazis were able to present massive and homogeneous cam­
paigns that varied hardly at all from one part of Germany 
to another. Reinhardt's school was very useful both in 
establishing the National Socialist image of strength and 
in reenforcing the party's picture of monolithic solidarity. 
The development of the school was consciously fostered by 
Himmler, who was always willing to adopt useful programs 
initiated by others. This openness on Himmler*s part was 
one of his greatest assets and was not limited to his 
support of the Reinhardt school.
^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 485.
CHAPTER 6
MODERN METHODS AND RACISM: BRUNO CZARNOWSKI'S
NATIONAL SOCIALIST SLIDE SERVICE 
AND THE FILM AGENCY
Struggle was a central theme of National Socialist 
propaganda. The Nazis tended to divide the world into two 
conflicting groups, Aryans and Jews. This essentially 
manichean outlook permeated their propaganda^" and lent 
meaning and dignity to the ceaseless campaigning of party 
activists. These dedicated Nazis were able to view them­
selves as soldiers locked in mortal combat with the forces 
of darkness. This picture of the party as a crusading 
order was necessary for the continued operation of the 
political machinery. It inspired party members to work 
hard for the movement; and since most Nazi propaganda work 
was carried out by unpaid volunteers, it was essential that 
these men remained convinced of the importance of their 
strenuous efforts. This internal need of the party was one 
of the major reasons that the NSDAP stressed anti-Semitism. 
As Dietrich Orlow put it, "The mythical dichotomy of Jew
^Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 237.
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2
and German was the basic point of every Nazi speech."
The Nazis tended to articulate the theme of struggle
primarily through their anti-Semitism. For the party
leadership this theme was almost an obsession. As Pridham
put it, "Hitler’s overriding and consistent passion through-
3
out his political career was his hatred of the Jews."
Other Nazi leaders and activists tended to follow the
Fiihrer's lead on this issue, and anti-Semitism was espe-
4
cially prevalent in SA circles. Even in towns and cities 
where there were very few Jews, the NSDAP carried out occa­
sional campaigns against them. Pridham reported that the 
Nazis in Hof, a Bavarian town with only twenty-five Jewish
5
families, smashed the windows of the town's synagogue. In 
Allen's small city of Thalburg, where the tiny Jewish popu­
lation was integrated with the German populace on class 
lines, the party's anti-Semitism was retained in a "ritu­
alistic way." Anti-Semitism was overt and ideological for
7
members of the party.
For the public at large this Nazi doctrine was only 
one among many. These voters were often more concerned with
20rlow, Nazi Party, p. 3.
3
Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 237.
4Ibid,, p. 238.
5Ibid., p. 241.
6Allen, Nazi Seizure of Power, p. 77.
7Pridham, Hitler1s Rise, p. 237.
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economic issues or fear of Marxist revolution. Nazi cam­
paigning tended to be opportunistic; thus in areas where
anti-Semitism had little appeal the party tended to de-
8
emphasize it. Nevertheless, even when dealing with other
problems, the National Socialists usually introduced an anti-
Semitic note. The plight of the middle class was often
9
blamed on Jewish department stores, and Marxism was almost 
always equated with the Jews through "such Nazi terminology 
as 'Jewish Bolshevism.'"^® In terms of general Nazi propa­
ganda the Jew fulfilled the role of an omnipresent devil 
figure. As Joachim Fest commented, "the Jew [was] the in­
carnation of all imaginable vices and dreads, the cause and 
its opposite, the thesis and the antithesis, literally 'to 
blame for everything.'"^* For the NSDAP the Jews were the 
concrete embodiment of the hidden manipulators that caused 
all of Germany's problems. Faced with hard times in the 
late twenties, millions of Germans wanted to blame their 
suffering on someone. It is questionable whether the Nazis 
convinced the public that the Jews were responsible for 
Germany's woes. Nevertheless, one part of the Nazi message 
was clear; the NSDAP would struggle ruthlessly against the
8Ibid., pp. 240-42 and Allen, Nazi Seizure of 
Power, p. 77.
^Pridham, Hitler * s Rise, pp. 238-41.
10Ibid., p. 238.
11Fest, Hitler, p. 211.
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secret forces that were causing Germany's troubles.
Anti-Semitic propaganda was important to maintain
the dynamism of the party and to convince the public that the
Nazis would destroy those causing Germany's difficulties.
For the Nazi leadership the Jews were an obsession. As
Hitler put it, "Was there any form of filth or profligacy
. . . without at least one Jew involved in it? If you cut
even cautiously into such an abscess, you found, like a
maggot in a rotting body, often dazzled by the sudden
12
light— a kike." The only question on this issue was how
best to communicate anti-Semitic ideas to party members and 
the general populace.
The Nazis used traditional methods to spread their 
racial and anti-Semitic ideas from the earliest days of the 
party. National Socialist newspapers and pamphlets contin­
ually attacked the Jews both in writing and in pictures, 
while Nazi speakers spent much of their time exposing the 
"Jewish world-conspiracy" to their audiences. Unfortu­
nately, both of these techniques suffered serious defi­
ciencies. The advantage of printed material in dealing with 
the Jewish question was that it could communicate racial 
stereotypes visually, the anti-Semitic cartoon being one 
of the most effective techniques in this respect. The 
cartoons in Julius Streicher's Niirnberg newspaper, Der 
Stttrmer, were noteworthy for their ability to combine anti-
l^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 57.
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Semitism and pornography, but the most successful efforts
of this sort were probably those produced by Mjolnir for
Goebbels* Berlin publication, Der Angriff. The problem
with this visual approach was that very few people read
National Socialist newspapers. As Hitler put it, "Only a
man who has already been won to the movement will steadily
13read the party organ." As a means of presenting the
party's message, written material had at best a low impact.
The Nazis understood this, and consistently emphasized the
spoken over the written word in their efforts to win public
support. As anti-Semitic propaganda, however, speeches
lacked the persuasiveness of pictures.
The lack of visual appeal in anti-Semitic speeches
was a serious matter to the Nazis. In Mein Kampf Hitler said
that he had begun to become an anti-Semite through ob-
14serving Jews in Vienna. Nazi racism stressed the physical
^ Ibid., pp. 477-78.
^ Ibid., pp. 55-58. The origin of Hitler's anti- 
Semitism is a matter of considerable debate. Eberhard 
Jackel concludes that Hitler's anti-Semitism antedated 
World War I. "It appears to be quite credible . . . that, 
as he was to write later, he had become an antisemite . . . 
during his years in Vienna.” Eberhard Jackel, Hitler1s 
Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power trans.Herbert Arnold
{Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan U.P., 1972) pp. 48-49. 
Rudolf Binion, on the other hand, disputes this conclusion 
and asserts that Hitler's virulent anti-Semitism dated back 
only to 1918. The History of Childhood Quarterly: The
Journal of Psychohistory, Fall, 1973, Vol. I, No. 2,
Rudolf Binion "Hitler's Concept of Lebensraum: The Psycho­
logical Basis." In any case by the time Hitler wrote Mein 
Kampf, he considered "Jewish physical characteristics*1 
sufficiently striking to mention them as one of the causes 
of his conversion to anti-Semitism.
143
15differences between Jews and Aryans. Hitler character­
ized Jews as dirty, stinking,^ “bow-legged, repulsive
17Jewish bastards." MjQlnir invariably caricatured his 
targets by giving them gargantuan noses and little beady 
eyes. One of the lessons in the Reinhardt speakers' course 
consisted of a description of the different physical char­
acteristics of the various races, so that students could
18recognize Jews and Aryans alike by their appearance. The 
problem for the Nazis was how to combine the visual effec­
tiveness of printed material with the popular appeal of the 
spoken word in presenting this issue.
The first serious attempt to solve this difficulty 
began as a regional project in Gau Halle-Merseburg. On 
July 4, 1928, the Gauleitung announced the establishment of
a slide service under the direction of Bruno Czarnowski, a
19regular party speaker from Aschersleben. The Munich
leadership evidently thought the program was promising from
the first and tried to promote it through regular reports
20
on slide shows in the Volkischer Beobachter. On July 19,
ISpridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 237-38.
16Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 57.
^ Ibid. , p. 412.
.A. Reel 14, Folder 274, "Rednerkurspp. 42-46.
19VB, July 4, 1929, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg."
For Czarnowski see Appendix A.
^^e.g. VB, August 7, 1928, p. 3, "Unsere Arbeit*Im 
Kreise Aschersleben" and VB, August 24, 1928, p. 3, "Tagung- 
sarbeit in Falkenberg."
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Czarnowski's service was placed at the disposal of all Nazi
21Gaus and Ortsgruppen. By mid-November, Himmler asked all
Ortsgruppen to work through the new agency and use it as
22
frequently as possible. The major breakthrough for
Czarnowski's endeavor came on January 24, 1929, when
Himmler officially adopted it on behalf of the propaganda
23section as "a worthwhile project for 1929." From that
time periodic announcements of new slide programs were made
by the propaganda section in all official party newspapers.
The Czarnowski service performed two important
functions for the NSDAP. It developed new shows, and it
coordinated the distribution of slides and equipment. The
greatest difficulty facing the early service was obtaining
enough projectors and screens to allow all the local groups
that wanted to stage shows to do so. Initially, Czarnowski
asked those who had these devices to contact him, so that
they could be utilized; his office acted as a referral agency
to bring the owners of needed equipment together with those
24
who wished to use it. In addition, the service had some 
equipment which it rented to local groups for a fee of
2^VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Anhalt."
22VB, November 14, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialist- 
ischer Lichtbilderdienst."
2^VB, January 24, 1929, p. 3, "Das Lichtbild im 
Dienste der Bewegung."
24H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, No title— presumably 
a brief police report, origin unknown, date unknown— first 
page missing.
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2 510 RM. Presumably private owners were also allowed to
charge small fees.
This rather informal system broke down almost at
once. Demand for slide equipment greatly exceeded supply.
The problem was finally resolved by Himmler in January,
1929. The propaganda leader commented at the time, that
"the utility of the slide show as a propaganda vehicle was
already established, but many groups were finding it diffi-
2 6cult to obtain the necessary equipment." To solve this
problem he ordered all Gaus and Ortsgruppen that possessed
the needed projectors and screens to contact Czarnowski,
so that schedules could be set up for their use. All Gaus
and Ortsgruppen that did not own such devices were urged to 
27obtain them. This order overcame the initial problems 
caused by the rapid expansion of the use of slide shows.
These difficulties did not recur mainly for two reasons.
First, Himmler's order gave Czarnowski access to enough 
slide projectors and screens to meet immediate demand; and 
secondly, many regional and local groups apparently fol­
lowed Himmler's suggestion and purchased their own equip­
ment. The reason many Nazi groups undertook this expense 
was put quite clearly in an article in the party paper 
about the service. "With the slide apparatus the smallest
25VB, July 4, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg."
2®VB, January 24, 1929, p. 3, "Das Lichtbild im
Dienste der Bewegung."
27Ibid.
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village can put on a great show. Slide performances easily
28pay for themselves by charging admission.’* Slide shows 
were apparently both a propagandistic and a financial suc­
cess and in no way a drain on the party's meager monetary 
resources.
The other major duty of Czarnowski's office was to 
prepare new slide programs. The service asked party mem­
bers to forward black and white photographs and sketches
29that could be useful; it also made slides from pictures
and cartoons taken out of newspapers and from drawings sub-
30mitted by party men. From this motley collection of 
illustrations the service produced a large number of shows 
in the years after 1928. The overwhelming majority of 
these presentations tried to impart the party's anti- 
Semitic attitudes to the public and emphasized the struggle 
of the NSDAP against the hidden "wire pullers" who were 
wrecking Germany. The following are examples of slide
shows on these themes: "Isidor,” "The Great Power of the
31 32Press," "Racial Knowledge," "The Blood-Drunk
2®VB, August 29, 1930, p. 3, "Lichtbild=Dienst der 
N.S.D.A.P.”
29VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg."
3°H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Berichte uber die 
Versammlung der NSDAP, Ortsgruppe Giesing und Au am 2.6. 
1930 in Miinchen."
^The Nazis invariably emphasized the role of the 
Ullstein chain (Jewish) as an example of Jewish control of 
the press. For descriptions of these two slide shows see 
VB, January 24, 1929, p. 3, "Das Lichtbild im Dienste der 
Bewegung."
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33 34Bolsheviks,” "The Murderers of the Workers” and
"Characteristic Heads in the November Germany: Would You
35Vote for Them Again." The other type of show produced 
by Czarnowski recounted high points in Nazi history, again 
emphasizing the party’s conflicts with its enemies. Such 
programs included "November 9, 1923" and "Up to Nurnberg.”36 
The choice of two principal subjects for all of the party's 
slide shows was not an accident, for the service sought to 
convince audiences of the validity of the party's manichean 
theory of history. For members of the NSDAP it dramat­
ically presented the "depraved and wicked" Jews pictorially 
while using the same approach to emphasize the heroic char­
acter of the Nazi party as the defender of the race against 
this dire Semitic threat. For those who were not convinced 
anti-Semites, perhaps the most impressive message of the 
Nazi slide shows was their portrayal of the party as the 
uncompromising foe of established authority. The general 
public might not accept the National Socialist theory that 
the men behind the scenes causing Germany's problems were 
all Jews; nonetheless, many could easily be convinced that
32VB, March 31, 1929, p. 3, 1 Propaganda-Abteilung."
33H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Berichte iiber die 
Versammlung der NSDAP Ortsgruppe Giesing und Au am 2.6.1930 
in Mfinchen. "
34VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg."
35VB, August 29, 1930, p. 3, "Lichbild-Dienst der
N.S.D.A.P.”
36VB, March 31, 1929, p. 3, "Propaganda-Abteilung."
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there were such hidden manipulators. For these Germans the 
message of the slides was that the NSDAP would fearlessly 
fight the secret corrupters whomever they might be.
These slide shows have not been preserved, but it 
is possible to examine this Nazi propaganda technique on 
the basis of police reports and by inference. The first 
major program of slides was entitled "Isidor." No police 
report describing this effort is available, but it is fairly 
obvious what the show was about. "Isidor" was the Nazi 
nickname for Dr. Bernhard Weiss, vice-president of the 
Berlin police department. Soon after his arrival in Berlin, 
Goebbels was in trouble with the local authorities; his 
aggressive tactics caused one riot after another. The 
police responded by prohibiting the NSDAP for a brief 
period of time, an act that enraged the new Gauleiter. In 
response to the ban, Goebbels decided to attack the Berlin 
police by staging a scurrilous campaign against Dr. Weiss. 
Weiss was a Jew, and his position of authority over gen­
tiles made him a ready target for Nazi abuse. The party 
even took advantage of the fact that he was only vice- 
president of the city's police. In Goebbels' eyes Weiss 
was a prime example of the "hidden” Jew, the "wire puller" 
who controlled things from a technically subordinate posi­
tion. Weiss' superior was portrayed as little more than a 
figurehead behind whom the "hidden" Jew controlled the 
situation. Physically Weiss was also easy to caricature; 
he had a pointed nose, small eyes and wore horn-rimmed
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glasses. The campaign against Weiss continued from 1927 
until mid-1929 without any appreciable slackening. The 
high point of this effort was a series of cartoons drawn 
by Mjolnir.'*7
The "Isidor" slide show of early 1929 was almost 
certainly a showcase for Mjolnir’s sketches. These car­
toons were especially effective, and it is unlikely that 
Czarnowski failed to use them in a show dealing specifi­
cally with the police vice-president. "Isidor," the 
1 hidden" Jew, was relevant both for party members and for 
the general populace not merely for those who had to deal 
with him in Berlin. The slide show technique enabled the 
party to present fine examples of this type of Nazi anti- 
Semitic propaganda to a far broader audience than was 
reached by Goebbels* newspaper.
Some specimens of Mjolnirfs work can serve to re­
capture the character of this major slide show which
38
Himmler approvingly described as "especially coarse."
37 Bramsted, Goebbels, p. 36.
^®VB, January 24, 1929, p. 3, "Das Lichtbild im
Dienste der Bewegung."
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Cartoon Number One: Der Angriff, December 5, 1927, n.p.
Caption: Top: "The New Nero."
Bottom: "'Bernhard' mainly only plays
thankless roles."
Nazi at Stake: "Greetings, you hideous one."
Cartoon number one established the physical images used in 
the MjSlnir series. Weiss' nose, his "beady eyes" and his 
horn-rimmed glasses were accentuated. He was depicted as 
physically repulsive and morally degenerate. The contrast 
between Weiss and the police, dressed as Roman soldiers, 
was striking. The police were seen as straight-backed, 
racially superior types in the service of a depraved in­
ferior. This was an attempt to establish the parallel be­
tween Weiss and Nero. The Nazi tied to the stake
151
symbolized the character and plight of the NSDAP under the
Weimar Republic. He was depicted as a well muscled, tall,
Aryan type unwilling to obey the likes of "Isidor” even
under coercion. He suffered torture with a smile on his
face and openly defied Weiss by saying "Greetings, you
39hideous one." The attempt here was to portray the party
as a dedicated movement of superior and high-minded men
willing to suffer martyrdom rather than yield their beliefs.
Note the contrast between the bound Nazi and the standard-
bearer, Heimannsberg, who was a high-ranking professional
policeman. Although the Nazi appeared happy even while
suffering, Heimannsberg, who is holding up a star of David,
looked ashamed of his role in this scene. The principal
appeal of this cartoon was visual as with most of MjSlnir's
work. The captions were of only secondary interest, and in
this case the bottom caption, "'Bernhard' mainly plays only
40
thankless roles,” was a simple attempt at sardonic humor.
39 Der Angriff, December 5, 1927, n.p. "Der neue
Nero."
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Cartoon Number Two: Der Angriff, December 26, 1927, n.p.
Caption: Top: "Isidor, if he were to
celebrate Christmas."
Record Player: "Daughter of Zion Rejoice."
Cartoon number two was an attempt to exploit religious 
bias against Judaism. "Isidor," the Jew, was depicted 
celebrating Christmas in his own manner; his tree had a 
star of David on its top, and it was decorated with 
hanged Nazis, sacrificed to the Jewish police vice- 
president. A loyal Berlin policeman, depicted as a blood­
hound, stood up on his back legs and awaited further com­
mands from his master. On the wall a portrait of Weiss 
was suspended beneath which were two crossed blackjacks,
"Isidor*s" coat of arms. The picture symbolized the Nazi 
belief that all Jews were egocentric and only really be­
lieved in themselves and their own race. The record playe
was rendering an appropriate seasonal piece, "Daughter of
■ ■ „41Zion Rejoice."
Cartoon Number Three: Der Angriff, January 16, 192 8, n.p.
Caption: "In the well known hospital of 'St.
Bernhard' true Bernhardines bring in 
new sacrifices daily."
Cartoon number three did an admirable job of capturing the 
crusading spirit of Nazi anti-Semitism. This idea was 
developed through the persistent theme of martyrdom. The 
caption read, "In the well-known hospital of 'St. Bernhard
41Der Angriff, December 26, 1927, n.p., "Isidor, 
wenn er das Christfest feiern wttrde."
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42true Bernhardines bring in new sacrifices daily." For 
dedicated Nazis who would be looking for such a meaning, 
this may have been taken as a subtle reference to Jewish 
ritual murders, a continuing theme of Nazi propaganda. In 
any case several other elements of this cartoon are quite 
clear. A picture of "Isidor" was prominently displayed 
between St. and Bernhard on the hospital wall; this was 
another allusion to Jewish egotism. The pious monks all 
had long noses, and the "hospital" was a jail complete with 
one victim sticking his hand out between the bars trying 
to escape. The Berlin police again were portrayed as 
bloodhounds in the service of depravity. The latest Nazi 
"sacrifice" was a strong, young man delivered into the 
hands of his inferiors.
The "Isidor" series attempted to create racial and 
moral stereotypes of Jews and Nazis in the context of an 
attack on the "hidden" Jew. In this show Weiss was de­
picted as representative of all Jews and of the "secret 
wire pullers" who controlled Germany's destiny according 
to the Nazis. This method of presenting general themes 
through attacks on individuals was one of the commonest 
tactics of Nazi propagandists. It was employed in other 
slide shows especially those which communicated the party's 
position on Marxism.
42Per Angriff, January 16, 1928, n.p., "Ins 
bekannte Hospital zum 'St. Bernhard.'"
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The 1930 slide show, "The Blood-Drunk Bolsheviks'**^
provides a good example of how the NSDAP sought to portray
Marxism as a movement controlled by the secret enemy, the
Jews. The show began with a series of photographs and
drawings of the leaders of the Russian Revolution. This
was followed by pictures of mass murder, of slaughtered
men and their wives, and of butchered women, girls, and
babies. The pictures of the Russian revolutionary leaders
were shown again, interspersed with the atrocity scenes.
Toward the end of the program pictures were presented of
German soldiers in the Baltic States being murdered. The
performance concluded with a series of portraits of the
leaders of the German revolution. As the police report
described this effort, "The show emphasized the Jewish
44character of the revolutionaries."
With these slides the Nazis sought to convince 
their audiences that Marxism and especially Communism were 
part of a blood-stained Jewish plot. The method was to mix 
various images and finally drive home the point in the last 
minutes of the presentation. At least in the case of the 
German revolutionaries, this was a fine example of the Nazi 
technique of establishing guilt by association. The show 
began and ended in the same manner with pictures of revolu-
*3H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Berichte ttber die 
Versammlung der N.S.D.A.P., Ortsgruppe Giesing und Au am
2.6.1930 im Mttnchen." Police report dated June 5, 1930.
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tionary leaders. The atrocity scenes in the middle of the 
performance created the impression that the Russian revolu­
tionaries were blood-drunk monsters. The pictures of the 
German revolutionaries at the end of the performance at­
tempted to draw parallels between the two groups. The most 
striking parallel was obviously that both consisted almost 
entirely of Jews. This technique was skillfully designed 
to convince audiences that Communism and more broadly 
Marxism were essentially Jewish movements. Nazi opposition 
to Marxism then could be explained as part of the party's 
anti-Semitic crusade and not merely as the product of dif­
fering ideas.
Both the theme of the "hidden" Jew presented in 
"Isidor" and the show castigating Marxism had one thing in 
common; they emphasized individuals. The basic National 
Socialist message was in the way the pictures portrayed
Nazis, men like Weiss, and the various revolutionaries.
45
This was a typical method used by the party and deserves 
some discussion. A basic element of Nazi ideology was 
racism. Thus, the NSDAP believed in distinct physical and 
moral differences between the races. The physical differ­
ences could best be portrayed by dealing with individuals 
often in caricature. "Jewish" noses, eyes, legs and shapes 
could be most effectively communicated to party members 
and the public by the use of carefully selected pictures
45Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 22.
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and drawings. The intention here and elsewhere in National 
Socialist propaganda was to present Jews as alien beings.
By accentuating physical differences between Jews and gen­
tiles, the Nazis sought to establish their point that 
Judaism was not a religion but a vast conspiracy of de­
praved, sub-human animals masquerading behind innumerable 
facades. This approach tended to reenforce the crusading 
zeal of party members by exposing the enemy to plain view. 
Yet, the effect of this type of propaganda on those who 
were not primarily interested in the party because of its 
anti-Semitism was probably quite different. In small towns 
and villages where there were few if any Jews, the specifi­
cally anti-Semitic message of these shows might well have 
been lost. The Jewish enemies portrayed in slides most 
likely were lumped together in the minds of such audiences 
with others who they thought constituted the shadowy hidden 
rulers of Germany. For the public at large facing a series 
of seemingly insoluble and incomprehensible political and 
economic problems, the notion that a small group wielding 
enormous covert power was causing all of Germany's troubles 
must have been consoling. The very simplicity of this 
message was appealing, since hidden, alien enemies could be 
destroyed. These slide shows might not elicit any overt 
anti-Semitic responses from such persons, but they were 
nonetheless effective. Local, well-known Jews would pro­
bably not be identified by such audiences with men like 
Weiss or the revolutionaries, but the Nazi message that
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the party would struggle ceaselessly against Germany's 
hidden enemies would retain its appeal.
By the middle of 1930 the Czarnowski slide service 
seems to have been a success. At least, eight programs 
were developed between 1928 and 1930. Enough Gaus and 
Ortsgruppen had obtained equipment, so that the shortages 
of early 1929 did not recur. By the summer of 1930, <± small 
group of Nazi agitators were traveling around Germany pre­
senting shows. One such agitator was Richard Buyard, who
46spent his weekends screening slides from town to town.
This type of work seems to have been amply supplemented by 
local groups staging shows on their own initiative. By the 
time of the 1930 Reichstag election, the slide presentations 
were an established and popular form of Nazi propaganda.
Unfortunately, the central records of the Czarnowski 
service are not available. This absence of documentation 
makes it impossible to determine the number, dates, or 
locations of slide show performances. The evidence is in­
sufficient to draw meaningful conclusions about the impact 
of slide shows on various parts of Germany; but, though
scanty, it does indicate that they were both well attended
47
and well received. In any event they were used frequently
46H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, Police Report dated 
June 17, 1930 and "Stadtrat Kitzingen 7 August 1930 NSDAP 
hier Buyard-VortrSge."
4^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Berichte iiber die 
Versammlung der NSDAP; Ortsgruppe Giesing und Au am 2.6.19 30 
in Miinchen," and Police report dated June 17, 19 30, and 
"Stadtrat Kitzingen 7 August 1930 NSDAP hier Buyard-VortrSge
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by the Nazis as a propaganda tool after 1928. In villages
and small towns such performances were likely to attract
large audiences simply as entertainment. In larger towns
and cities shows would be welcome as a diversion from the
more usual round of speeches that tended to dominate Nazi
activities in urban areas. In Mein Kampf Hitler stated
that the principal function of propaganda "consists in
48
attracting the attention of the crowd.” Slide shows were
one effective way for the Nazis to do just that.
The development of the motion picture as a form of
National Socialist propaganda was slower than the growth
of the slide service. Films were not a regular part of the
party's campaigning repertoire until the middle of 1929,
and even then there were only three Nazi movies. The
motion picture was a mildly useful but expensive form of
propaganda. Films cost a great deal to make and then it
was difficult to show them. The propaganda section could
reasonably ask all Nazi Ortsgruppen that did not possess
slide projectors and screens to purchase them, but motion
picture equipment was entirely too costly. The Czarnowski
slide shows were rented to local groups for between 6.5 and
4910 RM a performance. Rentals on films averaged 40 RM per 
50showing. In addition to the cost of the film, a local
J Q
Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 180.
^VB, March 31, 1929, p. 3, "Propaganda-Abteilung."
^°H.A. Reel 9, Folder 190, "Anordnung 64 Oberbayern,
15 Juli 1930."
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group would have to rent a movie house and pay a projec­
tionist. The motion picture as a propaganda vehicle could 
not be used extensively at this stage of Nazi development. 
Nonetheless, a few silent films were produced between 1928 
and 1930.
The films made during the late twenties all at­
tempted to depict the growth and strength of the party.
They generally tried to capture the spirit of the movement 
by showing major Nazi rallies and marches. The earliest 
Nazi film was paid for by the Reich leadership and appeared 
in 1928. It was a thirty-minute account of the Niirnberg 
party rally of 1927, and consisted mainly of footage showing 
columns of brown-shirted Storm Troopers marching by Hitler
and other party leaders. This movie was used by Himmler
51in the saturation campaigns of 1929. The goal here was 
to project an image of the party's vitality. Later, a 
ninety-minute film was made about the Niirnberg rally of 
1929. Like its predecessor, it exhibited a great deal of 
marching, but it also provided footage of the torchlight 
parade and the huge fireworks display of that year. The 
intent of this film was the same as the earlier movie. It 
recorded a major party event and hoped to impress the public 
with Nazi strength.
Other films made in the late twenties were produced 
as Gau projects. Most of them were modeled after the movies
^ S ee  Chapter 4, pp. 104-105.
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of the Niirnberg rallies. Gau Halle-Merseburg released a
film on July 11, 1929 entitled, "Struggle in Middle Germany
52For Freedom and Bread," which depicted party activities
in this area. Gau Hessen-Nassau-Siid undertook a similar
project in 1930. This movie, "Adolf Hitler leads our
53
Columns to a better Future," was banned by the Reich and 
Prussian ministries of the Interior on the grounds that it 
tended to subvert public order. It depicted a Nazi pro­
cession staged on Whitsunday, 1930 from Frankfurt-am-Main 
through the Wetzlar district. SA men in uniforms were shown 
boarding lorries in Frankfurt and marching in larae groups 
through various towns and villages. The film ended with
some scenes of a large SA rally in Wetzlar addressed by
^ 54 various leaders.
These Gau productions served two purposes. They
encouraged Nazis in their own region by recording major
local events for posterity. Party members could be proud of
the fact that National Socialism was strong enough in their
area for them to undertake such a task. They could also be
proud of their activities because such films would be shown
in other parts of Germany before party audiences. The Gau
leadership was in effect telling its members that their work
52VB, July 11, 1929, p.3,"Bin neuer nationalsozial- 
istischer Film."
53H.A. Reel 28, Folder 535, "So kaempften wir" von 
Adalbert Gimbel.
54Ibid.
would be admired by fellow Nazis everywhere. Secondly, 
this type of film was designed to attract followers who 
might otherwise be too timid to join the NSDAP. The por­
trayal of National Socialism as a dynamic, mass movement 
was designed to convince the timid that joining the party 
or at least supporting it was not a futile gesture. In 
this respect the local and national films both served to 
eradicate the widespread impression that the NSDAP was an 
impotent and tiny faction— one of the most difficult tasks 
faced by the party between 1928 and 1930. Aside from 
boosting internal morale and persuading timid supporters 
of the party's strength, the early Gau and Reich films pro­
bably accomplished very little. They did not present any 
of the party's more complex propaganda themes or attempt 
directly to persuade audiences of the correctness of Nazism 
They had very little plot and were unlikely to attract non- 
Nazi audiences, since for those not involved in party work 
these efforts would simply be boring. In any case there is 
little evidence to indicate that the Gau films were widely 
distributed. As morale builders these films were admirable 
As vehicles to convince others to support the NSDAP, they 
seem to have been of small value.
Most Nazi films made in the late twenties seem to 
have been aimed mainly at party audiences, but the Nazis 
did produce one that seems to have been designed to per­
suade the general public to support the party. The first 
Berlin Gau film, entitled, "Battle in Berlin" was produced
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by Goebbels, and unlike its counterparts from other Gaus, 
it attempted to use a number of Nazi propaganda themes.
The first part of this movie showed wandering Galician Jews 
on Berlin's KurfUrstendamm Strasse; their peculiar dress 
and long beards served to differentiate them from the rest 
of the populace. In this manner Goebbels sought to portray 
the degradation of the German people and at the same time 
identify the Jewish culprits in this tragedy. The film 
went on to depict the history of the Berlin SA with empha­
sis on incidents of violence. The SA was shown in a number 
of battles with Communists. These fights were probably 
staged for the cameras, but it is unknown whether Goebbels 
used SA men to provoke actual fights or merely reenacted 
previous skirmishes for filming purposes.5^
Goebbels' production marked the beginning of the 
Nazi effort to use movies to present complex propaganda 
themes. The opening scene with the Galician Jews was a 
fine example of the Nazi visual approach to anti-Semitism. 
The street fights and history of the development of the 
Berlin SA had little to do with Galician Jews, but the 
opening served to identify the enemy and to explain to the 
audiences that Communists and Socialists who fought the 
Nazis were nothing more than the unknowing pawns of the 
Jews. The fight scenes themselves were a new development
55H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Nat. Soz. Propaganda- 
film, Mtinchen, 14 Oktober 1929, Polizeidirektion."
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in Nazi film making. The marches and rallies presented in 
other movies were one way of impressing audiences with the 
party's strength and determination. Fights# on the other 
hand# were convincing displays of Nazi aggressiveness and 
courage. The film "Battle in Berlin" was the first National 
Socialist movie fully to exploit the party's emphasis on 
violence as a means of persuading the masses to support 
the NSDAP. In addition# Goebbels departed from the docu­
mentary approach to film making and actually staged events 
to increase the effectiveness of his work as a propaganda 
vehicle.
"Battle in Berlin" enjoyed far more success than
other Gau movies. By December# 1929, sixty local groups
had shown it to audiences totaling— according to the Nazis—
56thirty thousand. Two subsequent films were produced in 
Berlin before the national elections of 1930. One, en­
titled "Germany Awakened#" depicted the Berlin SA at the 
1929 Niirnberg rally, the SA working in the 1929 city elec­
tions, and finally the storm troopers in combat against 
57"red mobs." The other film from Berlin was a fifteen-
minute feature that concentrated upon showing scenes of the
58
burial and grave site of Horst Wessel, an SA man killed 
by a Communist. This short subject was part of Goebbels'
^6VB# December 8/9, 1929, p. 3, "2 Berliner N.S. Film." 
57Ibid.
58VB, July 20/21# 1930, p. 3, "N.S. = Filme."
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successful campaign to make Hessel into a party martyr.
A total of eight Nazi films were produced between 
1928 and 1930. Aside from Geobbels* efforts, all of these 
movies seem to have been designed primarily for internal 
party consumption. Only the films of the Niirnberg rallies 
of 1927 and 1929 and Goebbels' "Battle in Berlin" appear 
to have been widely distributed. Over all, the impact of 
this type of campaigning on the general public seems to have 
been minor.
Nonetheless, by the middle of 1930 a sufficient
number of films existed to justify the creation of a party
agency for their distribution under the supervision of the
59propaganda section. Fdlms were sent to the various Gaus 
one at a time for distribution. The Gauleiters then con­
tacted their district leaders, who attempted to arrange
showings in seven different towns and forwarded the fees
60for these screenings to the Gauleitung. By 1930 the Nazi 
film was an established if limited form of National 
Socialist propaganda.
H .A . Reel 9, Folder 190, "Anordnung 64 Oberbayern 
15 Juli 19 30." The VQlkischer Beobachter announcement of 
July 20/21, 1930 *'N.S.= Filme” is the earliest announcement 
by the Reichsfilmstelle der Reichspropagandaleitung. Rein­
hardt’ s "Anordnung 64" on the distribution of films also 
dates from July, 1930. The author suspects that this agency 
was created about this time. Goebbels became head of the 
propaganda section on April 27, 1930. His experience with 
film making in Berlin suggests that he would create such an 
agency. Himmler, on the other hand, showed very little in­
terest in the development of Nazi movies, concentrating in­
stead on slide shows. Dietrich Orlow contends that the
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The contrast between the apparent usefulness of 
slide shows as a campaigning tool and the seemingly limited 
value of Nazi movies in recruiting supporters requires some 
discussion. Slide shows were more effective, in large part 
because they were cheaper than movies; local groups could 
use slides more frequently. Yet, the real contrast between 
these two propaganda techniques was in presentation. Movies 
were designed for an audience to sit and watch; there was 
no way of heightening the impact of the silent images on the 
screen with oral commentary. If a speech was presented, it 
occurred after the screening of the film. With the slide 
show no such separation of words and pictures occurred. As 
the pictures were shown, the speaker explained their mean­
ing to his audience. Images and words were presented simul­
taneously increasing the impact of both. This was the pri­
mary advantage of the slide show over the silent movie as a 
method of attracting followers to the party.
(continued) film service was founded in November, 
1928. He further states that local groups were ordered to 
purchase projectors. Orlow, Nazi Party, pp. 160-161. In 
this section of his book Orlow seems to be confusing the 
slide service which he fails to mention with the film ser­
vice. The author has found no evidence to support Orlow*s 
statements and considers it highly improbable that the 
party leadership would order its Ortsgruppen to purchase 
motion picture projectors. These projectors even for 16 m.m. 
movies were very expensive and in November, 1928 only one 
Nazi propaganda film existed.
CHAPTER 7
REGIONAL PROGRAMS: REINHOLD MUCHOW AND
THE STREET CELL ORGANIZATION/
THE N. S. AUTO CLUBS
Nazi programs and tactics were often developed or 
officially adopted by the party's national leaders as in 
the cases of Himmler's saturation campaigns,
Reinhardt's speakers' school and Czarnowski's slide ser­
vice* Other effective innovations were first initiated by 
various Gaus and later copied by other party units without 
any official policy decision by the Reich leadership. In­
ternally the NSDAP tended to function as a large club.
Ready communication existed among its leaders, and whenever 
a useful regional stratagem was developed, party chieftains 
from all parts of Germany became acquainted with it almost 
at once. Such programs were discussed at leadership con­
ferences and by traveling speakers in conversations with 
their hosts. More formally, these programs were described 
in the party's newspapers. In Mein Kampf Hitler described 
these organs as "a running news service— of . . . [thel 
movement,"1 and one of their principal functions was to
^-Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 478.
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print ’news of the Party activities." In practice, this
meant that successful regional experiments were rapidly
transformed into national programs often by direct orders
from the Reich leadership, but occasionally simply by
various Nazi Gauleiters copying them. Two examples of
successful regional organizations adopted elsewhere were
the Muchow Street Cell Organization and the National
Socialist Auto Clubs.
The Muchow Street Cell Organization was founded on 
3
July 9, 1928 as a special project to expand the party's 
capacity for campaigning in Berlin. The idea was to divide 
the city into sections and to work them intensively using 
party members to spread National Socialist propaganda. The 
device was created by Reinhold Muchcw and was copied from 
similar Communist tactics that had been reasonably success-
4
ful in working class districts. Muchow headed Gau Berlin's
organization section, which was in charge of developing "a
unified program for Berlin's sections" and of setting up
5
appropriate "organizational forms" for this purpose. From
2Roland V. Layton, "The Vdlkischer Beobachter, 192 5- 
193 3; A Study of the Nazi Newspaper in the Kampfzeit" (Uni­
versity of Virginia: unpublished doctoral dissertation,
1965) p. 111.
^Der Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p. "Kampf um 
Berlin: Die Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
^Heiber, Goebbels, p. 80.
^Der Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p. "Kampf um 
Berlin: Die Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
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his position as city organization chief, Muchow was able to 
deal with the peculiar problems of urban campaigning.
Before 1928 Nazi city organizations did little to 
exploit the potential of common members as active propa­
gandists. The rank and file were expected to attend meet­
ings and informally to discuss the NSDAP with friends and 
neighbors; but aside from these minor duties, they played 
little part in the party's propaganda efforts. Most cam­
paigning was conducted by professional or semi-professional 
Nazi agitators. This tended to restrict activities, since 
the party had a strictly limited number of regular agita­
tors. These men were used primarily to organize party 
activities, to make speeches, and to write pamphlets or 
newspaper articles. There were not enough of them to con­
duct personal campaigning, and in any case they were in­
appropriate for the task. This left the bulk of what the 
Nazis referred to as "small work" to the SA, but the storm 
troopers had other jobs, such as guarding meetings and 
staging marches, better suited to a paramilitary organiza­
tion. Thus, the NSDAP was not able to conduct sustained 
house-to-house "small work." The failure to use ordinary 
party members for this purpose was a waste of manpower, and 
the relative inactivity of party men also violated the prin­
ciple that all National Socialists should be fully involved 
in expanding the movement. Ideological reasons for this 
aside such activism tended to raise morale; and it also 
helped to establish the impression that the NSDAP was a
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participatory movement in which anyone could play an im­
portant role. Yet party leaders had been unable to find an 
effective means of using ordinary Nazis as active propa­
gandists. Muchow overcame this difficulty with his street 
cells.
The Muchow system divided cities into three organi­
zational levels. At the top, the city's Ortsgruppeftthrer 
(or Gauleiter in metropolitan areas) determined general 
policy and issued orders to subordinate officials. Below 
this level, there was a cadre of Zellenleiter, supervising 
several cells. They were answerable for the success of 
their units and were required to remain in close personal 
contact with the ZellenobmSnner or cell leaders. These 
men in turn oversaw the activities of a small number of cell 
members who did most of the actual work.^ The positions of 
Zellenleiter and Zellenobmann were unpaid but officially 
recognized party offices. Success in these jobs could lead 
to promotions within the party and even to positions as 
National Socialist candidates in local elections. As Muchow 
put it, "the best young men rise through the hard school of
n
Cell Organization service."
The principal duty of the street cells was to conduct
®H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 16.7.30,
Von der NSDAP."
7Per Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p., "Kampf urn 
Berlin: Die Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
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intensive "small work" campaigns. Before big meetings, the 
Zellenobmann received announcements, pamphlets and news­
papers to be distributed from house to house and given out 
in the streets. Cell members were also provided with 
tickets that they were expected to sell. Each of these men 
was required to bring at least two guests to every big
rally. This system enabled the NSDAP to fill a hall after
8
a mere two days of canvassing. The earliest examples of
such accomplishments came in Berlin. Here by late 1929 the
Nazis were able to fill the gigantic Sportpalast for their
9
rallies without any particular trouble. The same degree of 
success was reported in Frankfurt-am-Main,^ a city which 
adopted Muchow's organization early. Aside from promoting 
Nazi meetings the street cells also conducted intensive 
campaigns to distribute written propaganda. The Wttrttemberg 
police reported that after the establishment of the cell 
system, it was possible for the Nazis "to fill Stuttgart 
with propaganda leaflets and posters in a very short time.
The other duties of the street cells were to
8H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim
24.4.30 Aus der NSDAP."
9VB, March 11, 1930, p. 3, "Die Bilanz der Berliner 
Mitgliedersperre."
1®VB, January 8, 1929, p. 3, "Im Gau Hessen-Nassau-
Sttd. "
^H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim
24.4.30 Aus der NSDAP."
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"educate" party men and to maintain discipline. At cell 
meetings National Socialist questions were discussed, and 
"School Evenings" were held to keep cell men up to date on 
the party’s program and policies. This educational opera­
tion made it certain that members were well informed and 
able to discuss current issues with the public. It also 
served to immerse individuals in Nazi ideas leaving them 
little time to consider alternative programs proposed by 
other parties. Finally, the cell leader collected member-
12ship dues from each of his men by the tenth of every month. 
Failure to pay dues under these circumstances would be 
personally embarrassing, since the cells consisted of a 
small number of men all of whom knew each other and worked 
together. In this manner the party overcame the sense of 
anonymity so often encountered in large organizations and 
made it much easier for the party to discipline its ordinary 
members effectively.
The Zellenleiter was an intermediate official who 
coordinated the activities of several cells and attempted 
to maintain a degree of unity between them. He eliminated 
unsuccessful Zellenobmanner and encouraged other cell offi­
cials by holding small informal discussion evenings with 
them. Active Zellenleiter were allowed to hold small 
speaking evenings with orators provided by the municipal
l^H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 16.7.30 
Von der NSDAP."
organization. These sessions served to bring all the mem­
bers of several cells together and to promote a feeling of 
camaraderie among those involved. At the same time these 
meetings were not so large that cell men lost their sense 
of personal participation. Everyone attending one of the 
speaking evenings shared the experience of being a cell 
worker and would be able to recount stories of his activi­
ties to an interested and appreciative audience. By August 
1930, these meetings became obligatory in the city sections 
providing a forum for Reinhardt's students to gain exper­
ience and to communicate party programs and ideas to the 
13
membership.
Muchow claimed a great deal for his organization;
he stated that it had enabled the party to score striking
14gains in the Berlin municipal election of 1929. The 
Wttrttemberg Gauleitung, which adopted the system, also con­
tended that it was instrumental in the rapid expansion of 
15
the NSDAP. These claims are by their very nature un- 
provable; however, some striking facts do indicate that the 
street cells were a success. In 1928 only a handful of 
party officials existed in Gau Berlin; by early 1930 there
13Ibid.
14Per Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p., "Kampf urn 
Berlin: Die Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
15H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim
24.4.30 Aus der NSDAP."
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were nine hundred Zellenobmanner and two hundred and eighty 
Zellenleiter * This meant that Berlin alone had around 
twelve hundred party functionaries, the overwhelming major­
ity of whom were unpaid volunteers. This in itself repre­
sented a significant expansion of the number of men involved
16
in National Socialist propaganda work. Other Gaus that 
adopted the Muchow system enjoyed a similar growth in the 
number of official party functionaries, and enough other 
party organizations adopted the street cell system by 19 30 
for Muchow to boast proudly that: "The success of the last
year and a half is best illustrated by the fact that today 
many, many Ortsgruppen of the party have followed our ex­
ample and modeled their internal development after our 
18
form." Finally, on March 11, 1930, the VSlkischer
Beobachter published a report on Muchowfs system describing
it as "a model for others to emulate in its propaganda and
19
organizational form."
The street cell organization was helpful to the 
Nazis in a number of ways. It enabled them to publicize
16VB, March 11, 1930, p. 3, "Die Bilanz der Berliner 
Mitgliedersperre."
17H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim,
24.4.30, Aus der NSDAP."
^®Der Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p. "Kampf um 
Berlin: Die-Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
19VB, March 11, 1930, p. 3, "Die Bilanz der Berliner 
Mitgliedersperre."
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their events and to distribute their written propaganda 
without cost. It also made it possible for the party to 
create a favorable impression on uncommitted Germans by 
saturating cities with party propaganda in a very short 
time. Such intensive campaigning was certain to create an 
illusion of National Socialist strength in the minds of 
the general populace. Everywhere Germans turned they would 
see party posters or have party newspapers or pamphlets 
thrust upon them. Muchow's system had another feature: 
it forced the other parties to deal with the NSDAP contin­
uously. Well publicized Nazi rallies and heavily distrib­
uted Nazi pamphlets and posters attracted public attention. 
Charges against other parties made so frequently had to be 
answered. This created the illusion that the NSDAP was the 
only force that had to be dealt with. The very intensity 
of campaigning made possible by the Muchow system helped to 
eradicate the idea that the party was an insignificant 
faction and forced discontented voters to take the Nazis 
seriously. Overcoming the party's reputation of weakness 
was one of the greatest problems facing the NSDAP in 1928. 
The Muchow system did much to accomplish this task.
The street cells also made it possible for the 
NSDAP to use and to retain its enthusiastic membership 
while attracting new supporters who felt lost in big cities. 
The division of metropolitan organizations into cells 
allowed the party to function as if it were composed of a 
series of village groups. In this manner the problem of
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size was overcome. Party members no longer needed to fear 
that they would become the anonymous statistics of a mass 
movement. No matter how large the party became the basic 
urban unit, the cell, would remain small. The cell provided 
ordinary Nazis both with a political function and with a 
setting in which to develop feelings of camaraderie. In 
this way everyone in the NSDAP could believe that he was an 
important participant in the movement and not just a cipher 
on a piece of paper. The effect of this organizational struc­
ture on party morale was considerable. The evidence pre­
sented by Theodore Abel in his book The Nazi Movement: Why
Hitler Came to Power tends to support the view that the 
street cells convinced even the lowliest party member of 
the importance of his contribution to the success of the 
NSDAP. Abel's six hundred biographs repeatedly referred
to the "small work" performed by the rank and file as being
20
factors in the ultimate party victory. This sense of 
positive participation helped the party to retain the en­
thusiasm of its membership as well as providing it with 
practical assistance in the realm of propaganda. Finally, 
the opportunity of belonging to such a closely knit organi­
zation as the Nazi cell may well have been a powerful in­
ducement to join the party for men who felt atomized in an 
urban environment.
The Muchow system was designed primarily for muni-
20Abel, Nazi Movement, passim.
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cipal organizations numbering several hundred members. It 
was a useful organizational form wherever the Nazis had 
large Ortsgruppen. Records are not available for all the 
Gaus that adopted the system. Yet it is known that Gau
21Hessen-Nassau-Sud established street cells by early 1929,
and Gau Wtirttemberg had a well developed organization in
22operation by early 1930. These examples indicate that
Muchow1s plan was copied by Nazi leaders geographically
far removed from Berlin. In any case all remaining local
reluctance to do so was almost certainly overcome by the
"suggestion" in the Vfllkischer Beobachter that other urban
groups model their own city organizations after Muchow*s 
23
plan. By September, 1930, most Nazi metropolitan units 
were probably able to stage, through the street cells, cam­
paigns touching every block and house in their cities with­
out any additional expense to the party.
The National Socialist Auto Clubs were less impor­
tant to the party than Muchow*s system, but they provide 
an interesting example of how it used the assets of its 
members for propaganda purposes. The idea of setting up 
motoring clubs originated in Gau Halle-Merseburg; it was
21 VB, January 8, 1929, p. 3, " Im Gau Hessen-Nassau-
Sttd. "
^H.A. Reel 58, Polder 1403, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim,
24.4.30, Aus der NSDAP."
23VB, March 11, 1930, p. 3, "Die Bilanz der Berliner 
Mitgliedersperre."
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publicized in the Volkischer Beobachter in the middle of 
241929, and seems to have been adopted in several regions 
by the end of the year. On the surface the auto clubs 
appeared to be little more than another auxiliary organiza­
tion for Nazis with special interests. The Berlin club for
instance held regular meetings to discuss technical mech-
25
anical matters and automobile sports. The original group
2 g
in Halle-Merseburg promised its members "good comradeship." 
Yet, these clubs also functioned as part of the Nazi propa­
ganda apparatus; they provided the party with a readily
27available supply of cars for campaigning trips. The
ultimate purpose of these clubs was to "mechanize propa- 
28ganda." For efforts to open up new territory or to expand 
the party in weakly organized areas, free transportation was 
invaluable. The NSDAP liked to create the impression that 
it was a strong movement with many supporters. The auto 
clubs enabled the party to concentrate its personnel even in
2^VB, May 23, 1929, p. 3, "Kraftwagen=und Motorrad- 
besitzer des Gaues Halle-Merseburg.1'
^ Der Angriff, June 24, 1929, n.p."Nat. Soz. Auto- 
mobilklub.11
26VB, May 23, 1929, p. 3, "Kraftwagen=und Motorrad- 
besitzer des Gaues Halle-Merseburg."
27H.A. Reel 58, Folder 14 03, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wurttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 9.5.30.
Aus der NSDAP."
^®VB, May 23, 1929, p. 3, "Kraftwagen=und Motorrad- 
besitzer des Gaues Halle-Merseburg."
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remote towns and villages. Greater mobility also increased 
the effectiveness of SA men. Storm troopers who could ride 
to rallies were likely to march with greater briskness and 
to be cleaner than those who had to walk to such events. 
Furthermore, with cars SA men could stage marches through 
several towns and villages on the same day. Finally, more 
communities could be canvassed by large NSDAP contingents 
if they did not have to waste a lot of time getting from 
place to place.
The National Socialist Auto Clubs like most Nazi 
organizations were useful to the party on a number of dif­
ferent levels. They mechanized party propaganda without 
costing the NSDAP anything; through the clubs, members with 
automobiles were persuaded to volunteer their cars for 
political operations. In turn, the societies were made 
attractive to Nazi motorists as organizations where they 
could discuss common interests with fellow drivers. The 
auto clubs were a fine example of the way the NSDAP ex­
ploited the assets of its membership for propaganda work.
The Muchow system and the auto clubs were both 
examples of regional experiments that were widely adopted 
by a process of simple copying. They increased the party's 
propaganda capacity at no expense to the NSDAP. In the 
late twenties Nazi regional organizations seemed to have 
been willing to implement successful programs developed in 
other areas even without being ordered to do so by the Reich 
leadership. This in itself was a commentary on the
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abilities of the Nazi regional leaders and on the excellence 
of intra-party communication.
CHAPTER 8
NAZI NEWSPAPERS AND SUBSCRIPTION CAMPAIGNS
Newspapers were never a major means of Nazi cam­
paigning. From the earliest days of the party Hitler tended 
to de-emphasize written propaganda. In Mein Kampf he stated 
unequivocably that "all great# world-shaking events have 
been brought about, not by written matter, but by the spoken 
word." As for newspapers, he commented that they "slide
off the millions of the lower classes like water from oiled 
2
leather." Nonetheless, the NSDAP developed a rather exten­
sive press network. The VSlkischer Beobachter was the first 
Nazi newspaper and the party’s central organ. Another
national paper was the Illustrierte Beobachter, which ap-
3peared weekly from October, 1928 and provided a pictorial 
account of party activities. The number of subscriptions 
to these two national Nazi news organs was quite modest. In 
1928 the Vfllkischer Beobachter had a circulation of only
■^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 469.
2Ibid., p. 471.
-i
H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1516, "Generalmitgliedversamm- 
lung der N.S.D.A.P. am 31 August 1928 im BttrgerbrSukeller" 
Police Report. This report estimated that the Illustrierte 
Beobachter had about 30,000 subscribers.
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18,400, and this only rose to 39,600 by the time of the 
1930 election. Even this small rise in the number of sub­
scribers seems to be attributable solely to the growth of
the party; the newspapers themselves seem to have played
4little direct part in this growth.
The primary purpose of the Nazi national newspapers 
was not to make new converts to the party; instead, these 
papers helped the NSDAP to enforce ideological conformity 
upon party members. In a movement characterized by a high 
degree of decentralization, the VSlkischer Beobachter acted 
as a powerful unifying tool. It presented the official 
party line on all key issues, printed news of party activi­
ties, and fought for Nazi victory during election cam- 
5
paigns. Major speeches by Hitler were reproduced in the 
paper or in special supplements, so that members could be­
come acquainted with his positions on various issues. Page 
three of the Volkischer Beobachter included a section en­
titled, Aus der Bewegung, which printed orders issued by 
Hitler or by other members of the Reich leadership. Through 
these features, party members learned of new decisions on 
policy and tactics. The same page carried articles des­
cribing party events. In this manner, Nazis were familiar­
ized with successful programs and stratagems employed in
^Oron J. Hale, The Captive Press in the Third Reich 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U.P., 1973) p. 31.
5Roland V. Layton, Jr., "The Volkischer Beobachter,"
p. 111.
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other parts of Germany. Finally, there appeared a large 
number of informative and theoretical articles which formed 
the basis for party positions on many issues. It is not 
surprising that Reinhardt used the Volkischer Beobachter as 
a written supplement to his speakers' school lessons. It 
provided an up-to-date guide to Nazi policy.
The role of the Vblkischer Beobachter as a means of 
enforcing unity on the party was especially marked in its 
relationship to the Nazi regional press. These newspapers
were controlled mainly by local Gauleiters who were also
£
responsible for their finances. All Gau newspapers had to
agree to four conditions before they received official party
recognition:
"First, the editor must observe the party 
line and directives issued by the party 
propaganda office; second, editors and 
publishers were subject to reprimand and 
disciplinary action for infractions of 
regulations or breaches of party disci­
pline; third, the paper must publish free 
of charge party announcements and notices 
emanating from the departments of the 
Reichsleitung; fourth, they could not _ 
accept advertising from Jewish firms."
This set of regulations enabled the Reichsleitung to control 
all Gau publications on ideological matters and to subor­
dinate them to the VSlkischer Beobachter.
Even though Gau publications retained no indepen­
dence in the formulation of National Socialist theory, each
feHale, Captive Press, p. 39.
7Ibid., p. 41.
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Gau attempted to establish its own newspaper in the years
after 1928. Before this time many areas had relied upon
Gregor and Otto Strasser's Kampfverlag to provide them with
newspapers. This publishing house, based in Berlin, printed
0
no less than seven weeklies to be sent to various Gaus for 
distribution. The papers published by the Strassers in­
cluded appropriate local news, but local control was en­
tirely lacking. This lack of autonomy was considered 
intolerable by the various Gauleiters who sought to estab­
lish their own news organs to replace those produced by the 
distant Kampfverlag.
The Gau newspapers attracted an even smaller 
audience than the Vdlkischer Beobachter. The circulation 
of the regional newspaper of Baden, Der FUhrer, stood at
9
around three thousand in 1928. The Nazi daily in Schleswig-
Holstein, Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, started
1929 with a circulation of twenty-five hundred— a figure
10that only rose to three thousand by July, 1929. The 
number of readers attracted to these papers hardly justi­
fied their publication, and usually produced only enough 
income to keep the various party news organs from going 
bankrupt.
8Ibid., pp. 40-41.
Q
H.A. Reel 47, Folder 1014, "Erinnerungen aus der 
'Grundzeit’" von F. Moraller.
*°H.A. Reel 48, Folder 1119, "Schleswig- 
Holsteinische Tageszeitung."
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In terms of the audience reached the number of 
regional newspapers was wholly unjustified, but they did 
serve other purposes. The development of these papers may 
well have been an example of empire building by Gauleiters^ 
as well as a way for the party's regional chieftains to 
assert their authority over subordinates. Control of a 
newspaper increased the prestige of a Gauleiter, and the 
Gau press tended to fulfill the same purposes as the 
Vdlkischer Beobachter but on a regional level. These news 
organs publicized party activities, communicated orders 
from the Gauleitung, and criticized local leaders who op­
posed the policies of the various Gauleiters. Another 
possible explanation for the establishment of these papers 
is that the Nazis were simply emulating other Weimar par­
ties, which had established their own press networks much 
earlier. "Newspapers as adjuncts to political parties had
been a feature of public life since the revolution of 
1 21848." Perhaps, the most pressing reason for setting up 
these regional news organs was to improve internal party
There are several examples of circulation battles 
between various Nazi regional newspapers, for example the 
struggle between Streicher and Feder for control of the 
Niirnberg market; see Hale, Captive Press, pp. 44-45. In 
the late twenties all of these intra-party conflicts seemed 
to be centered on efforts by various secondary leaders to 
obtain more power within the movement. There is no evi­
dence of ideological conflict in any of these intra-party 
squabbles. Hitler felt that such rivalries were healthy 
and commented simply that "The stronger will prevail"
(Ibid., p. 46) and that such conflicts only served to im­
prove Nazi newspapers.
*^Ibid., p. 49.
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morale.
The publication of Gau Ruhr, Die Neue Front, pro­
vides a good example of how the local papers functioned.
It was founded in 1928 and was succinctly described by the 
Gauleitung as "their battle paper." Each Ortsqruppe was 
expected to submit reports on its activities by Thursday 
noon, so that they could be printed in the weekly appearing 
on Friday morning.^ Thus, the principal function of this 
publication was to improve the morale of party members. 
Local Nazis were encouraged by having their efforts pub­
licized in the regional press. At the same time, the paper 
fostered a spirit of unity within the Gau by familiarizing 
individual Nazis with the work of other groups in their 
region. This also helped to overcome any feelings of iso­
lation that might sap the enthusiasm of local units. The 
weekly reports reassured all party members in the Gau that 
they were not operating in a vacuum and that they were, in 
fact, part of a dynamic movement.
The Nazi press justified its existence primarily as
a means to inform the rank and file and to raise their
morale, but it also served secondary propaganda purposes.
Party newspapers were often distributed free of charge, as
14if they were political pamphlets. Cities that estab­
lished the Muchow system frequently used street cell men
■^H.A. Reel 5, Folder 136, "Gau Ruhr 
Presserundschreiben" 6.6.28.
^*Hale, Captive Press, p. 60.
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to sell papers. Thus, Nazi publications provided these men
with yet another task for their ceaseless campaigning.
Local groups not only sold the organs of the Gau and Reich
on the streets but were also responsible for obtaining ad- 
15vertising. Given the circulation of Nazi papers ad­
vertising in them was either an act of political faith or 
a recognition of the importance of Nazis to a business. In 
any case spending money to buy space in a National Socialist 
publication was a tangible commitment to the NSDAP.
Finally, intensive campaigns were staged to obtain new sub­
scribers, especially to the VSlkischer Beobachter.
The subscription campaign of 1929 provides an inter­
esting example of how Nazi newspapers were used in propa­
ganda drives. This effort was not intended merely to in­
crease the revenues of the party's central organ. Increas­
ing the paid circulation of the Volkischer Beobachter was 
certainly one of its objectives, but the campaign also 
served other purposes. The Nazis were well aware of the 
fact that only party members were likely to read the NSDAP's 
major paper. In Mein Kampf Hitler stated, "Only a man who 
has already been won to the movement will steadily read the 
party organ."1® Given the meager number of persons willing 
to subscribe to Nazi publications, this prophecy seems to
l^H.A. Reel 5, Folder 136, "Gau Ruhr Presserund- 
schreiben" 6.6.28. Each Ortsgruppe was expected at least 
to get the bar that they held meetings in to advertise.
1®Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 477-78.
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have been accurate. Thus, if the party simply wanted to 
increase newspaper sales, the logical approach would have 
been to order party men to subscribe. The Nazis did this 
on a small scale in December, 1928 when Himmler directed 
every Ortsgruppe and Zelle with more than three members to 
take the Volkischer Beobachter.^  Yet this technique was 
not used in the circulation campaign of 1929. Instead, the 
Nazis concentrated upon trying to get non-members to sub­
scribe. In reality this operation was an effort to ac­
quaint the general public with the Nazi press and Nazi 
ideas. It was also an excuse for staging a mammoth cam­
paign during a period of relative political inactivity; 
the effort took place during the early months of 1929 be­
fore the Young Plan was proposed and well before any of 
the important Landtag and municipal elections of that year. 
Without any important new issues or elections to concen­
trate upon, the Nazis used the campaign for subscriptions 
as a means of staging a national propaganda drive and 
keeping party members active.
18
The campaign lasted from January 1 to April 5 
during which time the entire party was mobilized to sell 
the VClkischer Beobachter in an all-out effort. Proper
l^VB, December 16/17, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 31."
18VB, December 22, 1928, p. 2, "An alle Parteige- 
nossen, Bezieher und Leser des 'VSlkischer BeobachterI'"
For a description of the earlier and cruder 1925 circula­
tion campaign see Pridham, Hitler * s Rise, pp. 60-61, for 
the 1927 campaign see Hale,~Captive' Press, p. 42.
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incentives were provided for individuals, Ortsgruppen and 
Gaus that participated in the campaign. Party members who 
sold five new subscriptions were rewarded with a small auto­
graphed picture of Hitler. If any individual sold as many 
as sixty, he received a giant autographed picture. The top 
ten Ortsgruppen in Germany were awarded exact replicas of 
the 1923 party flag known as the "Blood Banner.” The most
successful Gau in Germany received a new Opel sports model 
19car. Intra-party competition was viewed by the Reich 
leadership as a healthy outlet for party members. It in­
sured that all units would strive to do well and at least 
attempt to surpass neighboring Ortsgruppen or Gaus. The 
prizes themselves were designed to instill a sense of pride 
and accomplishment in the rank and file. Every Nazi who 
applied himself could expect to enroll enough new sub­
scribers to win an autographed picture of the Fiihrer. The 
ten best Ortsgruppen could proudly display their replicas 
of the party's "Blood Banner." Finally, the Gau that won 
the automobile was expected to use it for party work. The 
Opel was both a useful addition to the victorious unit’s 
propaganda apparatus and a continuing reminder of the 
region's successful participation in the competition. As a 
means of insuring that the car was only awarded to a Gau 
that strenuously applied itself, a provision was added to
19VB, December 22, 1928, p. 2, "An alle Parteige- 
nossen, Bezieher und Leser des 'VSlkischer Beobachter.1"
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the contest rules which stated that the grand prize was
only to be awarded if the winning Gau obtained at least six
hundred new subscribers.^
The contest was only one method employed by the
Reichsleitung to insure that all elements of the party
actively participated in the canvassing for subscriptions
in 1929. A more concrete incentive was also provided. For
each subscriber the Ortsgruppe that enrolled him received
6 0 pf., the Gau 30 pf. the town SA group 60 pf., and the
SA leader of the Gau 40 pf. Thus, the party's local and
regional political and SA units were awarded a total of
1.9 RM per subscriber. For purposes of this division four
subscriptions to the Illustrierte Beobachter were consi-
21
dered equivalent to one of the Volkischer Beobachter.
Nazi local and regional organizations were invariably in 
financial trouble, and there were few ways for these groups 
to raise funds. Accordingly, the opportunity to earn even 
a small amount of cash, while at the same time campaigning 
for the party, was an extremely attractive proposition. 
Furthermore, money obtained in this manner was almost cer­
tainly used by party organizations for more propaganda work, 
since these units spent most of their income on propaganda 
campaigns. In this fashion the NSDAP fully mobilized its 
members to sell the party's newspapers without losing any
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
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more than a small portion of the money that would normally 
be used for propaganda purposes. Finally, increased sub­
scriptions to the party's newspapers would mean an improve­
ment in the financial position of the Nazi press and an 
increase in the number of persons who read it.
A good deal of help was provided by the Reich 
leadership to those who wished to participate in the effort, 
All canvassers were given handbills, some illustrative 
matter, and instructions on how to convince people to sub­
scribe to the newspapers. Later in the campaign a formal 
"canvassing kit" was furnished to the chairmen of the vari­
ous Ortsgruppen who were responsible for distributing this 
material to individual members. In addition, they super­
vised party workers and made sure that those who received 
"canvassing kits" made use of them. Finally, in the last 
weeks of February a large number of free samples of the 
Vdlkischer Beobachter were provided to local groups without 
charge for mass distribution. This part of the campaign 
was timed to occur after the initial canvassing had hope­
fully excited some interest in the newspaper. At this 
point potential subscribers had been hearing about the 
paper for well over a month, and receptivity was likely to 
be at its highest. Again the chairmen of the Ortsgruppen
had the duty of seeing that the free copies were used in
22
the most productive fashion possible.
22Ibid.
192
The activities in Frankfurt-am-Main provide a good
example of the methods used by the Nazis in this newspaper
campaign. The canvassing at Frankfurt was directed by
Adalbert Gimbel. This youthful Nazi held the posts of
23organization and propaganda leader for the city. He had
no money for this campaign, but he did have the use of a
truck and numerous copies of the Vdlkischer Beobachter and
24the Illustrierte Beobachter. Gimbel decorated the truck
on one side with advertisements for the VSlkischer
Beobachter; on the other side, he prominently displayed
portraits of various "Jewish department store plutocrats
crushing German business." The theme of Gimbel1s campaign
25was "Germans sell German goods in a German newspaper.” 
Driving about Frankfurt, Gimbel or an aide would stop and 
describe to any group that would listen the virtues of the 
Vdlkischer Beobachter and the wickedness of the Jewish 
businessmen whom the Nazi press exposed. On a number of 
occasions, these trips took the campaigners into the work­
ing class district of Frankfurt where Gimbel attacked 
Vorwarts, the newspaper of the Social Democrats, for being 
financed by the Jewish banker Goldschmidt in the amount of 
800,000 RM.26
23H .A. Reel 28, Folder 534, "So kaempften wir." 
24Ihid.
25H .A . Reel 28, Folder 532, "Kampferlebnisse des
Pg. Adalbert Gimbel." 
26Ibid.
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Gimbel's campaign was a representative instance of 
the combination of conventional propaganda with an effort 
to increase the circulation of the party's newspapers. In 
an attempt intended ostensibly to sell subscriptions, Gimbel 
managed to attack Jews and department stores, two major 
targets of Nazi opprobrium. He also represented the Social 
Democrats as pawns of the Jews rather than as a real 
workers' party. In this case the party's newspapers were 
used essentially as effective props. The main theme--that 
the Nazis were combatting a nefarious and alien enemy— was 
conveyed through the pictures on the truck and through the 
short speeches presented by Gimbel and his aides. These 
devices were designed to convince audiences that they needed 
to know more about the various insidious conspirators 
against Germany. The way to find out more was, of course, 
to subscribe to the Nazi press.
The strategies used by Nazi leaders in their cam­
paigns for subscriptions were left largely to the individual 
Ortsgruppen. Nonetheless, each party group was expected to 
conduct a vigorous drive. Some local groups such as the 
one in Stuttgart relied upon its SA men exclusively. There, 
the storm troopers were ordered to canvass the city directly
seeking new subscribers. The city's SA leader provided an
27array of propaganda material for the individual workers.
^H.A. Reel 48, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei wUrttemberg zur politischen Lage, 3.4.29, Aus der 
N.S.D.A.P."
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They were required to spend many hours distributing this
material on the streets and trying to convince passers-by
28
to read the party's papers.
In territory still occupied or under the jurisdic­
tion of the Allies, the problems of canvassing were some­
what different. Here, the Volkischer Beobachter was pro­
hibited, but not the Illustrierte Beobachter. In these 
areas the party made much of the opposition of the Allies 
to the Nazi press. The main theme of campaigning was that 
buying a subscription to the Illustrierte Beobachter was a
patriotic act of defiance against the Inter-Allied Rhineland 
29Commission. In the Rhineland the party sold newspapers by 
stressing nationalism.
The Nazi campaign for subscriptions in 1929 provides 
an instructive view of the party’s efforts during a period 
of relative political calm. Mobilizing its full membership 
by promises of prizes and monetary rewards, the NSDAP used 
the project of increasing the circulation of party news­
papers to stimulate efforts on the local level. Propaganda 
was provided to party canvassers, and overall direction of 
individual campaigns was left to the discretion of local 
leaders. The approaches adopted would necessarily vary 
greatly from one town to the next. Gimbel in Frankfurt em­
phasized anti-Semitism with additional attacks on department
28Ibid.
29H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, "So kaempften wir."
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stores and on Marxism. Leaders in the occupied Rhineland 
played upon the nationalistic sentiments of the region. 
Finally, the rather unimaginative leadership in Wiirttemberg 
simply used personal solicitation to win new subscribers. 
The one thing that the campaign did accomplish everywhere 
was to stimulate party activity.
No figures were released to reveal the number of
new subscriptions sold in this campaign, and one suspects
that it was not very successful. Nevertheless, because the
car was awarded to Saxony, that Gau presumably enrolled
over six hundred new readers. Gimbel's Gau of Hessen-
Nassau-Sud came in second, and the city of Wiesbaden was the
30
most successful town by far. In any case, the increase of 
circulation was of only secondary importance. What the 
campaign did accomplish was to encourage additional Nazi 
activity in all parts of Germany and to advertise the 
party's newspapers. In this manner, the general public be­
came more familiar with the National Socialist press. The 
Volkischer Beobachter and the Illustrierte Beobachter were 
no longer merely the party's house organs, but had become 
readily identifiable to non-Nazis. The NSDAP had always 
claimed that its newspapers were designed for a national 
audience; through subscription campaigns like that of 1929, 
these papers finally succeeded in gaining recognition all 
over Germany. Those interested in the NSDAP seem far more
VB, July 20, 1929, p. 3, "Parteigenossen."
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likely at least to look at headlines in Nazi papers after 
these forceful introductions to them. This alone tended to 
add to the political impact of the National Socialist press 
on the general populace. Indeed, the canvassing for sub­
scribers may have had an effect on Nazi successes at the 
polls. During election campaigns thousands of free copies 
of the Nazi papers were distributed to the public. After 
the efforts to increase circulation, Germans were more 
likely to recognize Nazi papers and to realize that they 
were not ordinary political literature. Those who had 
become acquainted with the Nazi press and who had been im­
pressed by the canvassers would be more inclined to read a 
free copy than those totally unfamiliar with the newspapers. 
In this manner, the subscription campaigns served to pro­
mote the reputation of National Socialist news organs.
CHAPTER 9
THE ROLE OF THE SA
The SA performed a number of key services for the 
NSDAP. It attracted middle-class Germans through its 
tactically effective use of violence. Confrontations—  
especially with Communists— helped the Nazis to convince 
German burghers that they were in danger of losing their 
property and lives to the leftists and that only National 
Socialism could save the bourgeoisie. The quasi-military 
garb of the storm troopers helped to create the illusion 
that the NSDAP was the heir of Germany's cherished military 
tradition. The trappings of a secret society that were so 
pronounced within the SA attracted declasse young Germans 
who often felt excluded from the social structure of the 
Weimar Republic. The attributes of a secret society also 
helped the SA present the propaganda theme that the NSDAP 
would create a Volksgemeinschaft. The storm troopers 
tried to embody this racial community by highly visible 
displays of internal camaraderie. Finally, the SA pro­
vided the party with martyrs; the storm troopers were the 
party's angels of death and promise of revolutionary change. 
Through a number of quasi-religious ceremonies the storm
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troopers were portrayed as the specially consecrated aven­
gers of the fatherland, a role which was justified by the 
peculiar National Socialist cult of death. This chapter 
will examine the various ways the storm troopers served the 
NSDAP as propagandists.
During the late twenties the SA remained basically 
unchanged. It possessed an autonomous leadership structure 
that did not correspond in all cases to Gau divisions. SA 
leaders were not directly subordinate to the Gauleiter in 
their area and received many of their orders directly from 
Munich where the national head of the SA, Franz von Pfeffer, 
exercised considerable control over the organization. The 
tendency of the storm troopers to support the more revolu­
tionary elements within the NSDAP also remained as it had 
been in the early twenties. At the end of the decade, the 
strongest SA units continued to be those in urban areas, 
and these organizations retained a good deal of the enthu­
siasm for social revolution that had characterized the
1
party under the earlier "socialist" plan.
Nevertheless, the autonomy and radicalism of the SA 
were not major problems for the NSDAP, largely because the 
paramilitary organization was numerically rather small. 
Although there are no reliable statistics a rough reckoning 
is possible of the number of storm troopers in Germany in 
the late twenties. Alan Bullock estimated that there were
^Orlow, Nazi Party, pp. 141, 151, 161.
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one hundred thousand SA men in January, 1931. The figure 
was undoubtedly far smaller in 1928 and 1929. At the end 
of 1928 there were only six hundred and fifty-eight SA men 
in all of Wiirttemberg, and at the Reichsparteitag rally of 
19 29 the Niirnberg police estimated that twenty-five thou-
4
sand storm troopers were present. Since all SA men were 
required to attend this meeting, twenty-five thousand is 
probably a reasonable approximation of the number of active 
storm troopers in August, 1929. Considering these figures, 
Bullock’s estimate of one hundred thousand SA men at the 
beginning of 1931 is probably either overly generous or 
indicative of a major expansion of the organization in the
last months of 1930. In any case, the existing, but frag­
mentary evidence, indicates that the SA was a relatively 
small organization in the late twenties. In practice this 
tended to reduce the importance of the radicalism and
autonomy of the storm troopers. There were not enough SA
men to initiate massive and violent confrontations with 
the party's enemies or to articulate the ideals of social 
revolution effectively. This numerical weakness enabled
2Bullock, Hitler, p. 136.
^H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.12.28,
Aus der NSDAP."
4H.A. Reel 57, Folder 1390, "Polizeidirektion 
Nttrnberg-FGrth 29 August 1929." The Nazis estimated that 
there were sixty thousand SA men at Ntirnberg which is pro­
bably indicative of the party's tendency to exaggerate its 
numbers.
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the Nazis to conceal the radicalism of the SA from the 
general public. The SA's organizational independence also 
produced fewer difficulties in these years than it would 
later. Even SA leaders did not seriously believe that 
their paramilitary units could bring the NSDAP to power, 
and this realization made them willing to subordinate them­
selves to the regional political leadership and to use 
their contingents primarily for propaganda work. Pfeffer 
endorsed this approach at the Reich leadership conference 
in 1928 when he emphasized the political role of the storm 
troopers in protecting meetings and strengthening party 
groups. He went on to denounce those who sought to trans­
form the SA into an independent military organization and 
fully embraced the strategy of gaining power by electoral 
victory.^
As propagandists the storm troopers tended to per­
form most of their duties on the local level. The only 
occasion on which the entire SA was assembled in the late 
twenties was for the Reichsparteitag in 1929. The decen­
tralized character of SA activities makes it difficult to 
discuss all of the work of the organization in detail. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to assess the nature of SA 
campaigning by examining some of their efforts. Storm 
troop units tended to perform the same duties in all parts
5H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1516, "Generalmitglieder- 
versammlung der NSDAP am 31 August 1928 im BttrgerbrHukeller" 
Police Report.
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of Germany. Thus, a few examples serve reasonably well to 
characterize the work of the organization as a whole and to 
explain its role in presenting Nazi propaganda.
The storm troopers have often been referred to as a 
central organization in Hitler's rise to power. One his­
torian described their role in the following way. "As a 
weapon of propaganda; the SA came to rank perhaps higher 
than Hitler's speeches. To stimulate emotion and violence, 
and to benefit by their interaction, were the first aims 
of Nazi propagandists."^ Violence was clearly one major 
activity of the SA, but this organization performed other 
services for the party too. As a quasi-military body, it 
represented a link between the NSDAP and the past. As 
Eitel Dobert— a one-time SA leader who became a bitter 
enemy of the NSDAP in the early thirties— observed, "nothing
impresses the average German as much as military discipline 
7
and order." Looking at columns of marching storm troopers,
Germans could imagine that these man were the heirs of the
old Imperial military traditions and the defenders of estab-
8
lished values. For other voters the SA left the impression 
that the NSDAP was a vast movement that could transform
6Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 18.
7
Dobert, Convert to Freedom, p. 177.
8e.g. Allen commented that in 1930 the identifica-* 
tion of the Nazis by the public with "fervent patriotism 
and militarism . . . .  was a foot in the door of respecta­
bility." In the small town that his study examines these 
values were widely accepted. Allen, Nazi Seizure, p. 28.
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Germany. The Nazi image of a "new Germany" was found first
in the storm troopers— a Germany that was dedicated to the
"'new marriage of life with danger,* and the idea of
9
1 glorious death.*"
The storm troopers of the late twenties were not 
numerically strong enough to seize control of the streets 
for any sustained period of time. Thus, Nazi violence of 
this period tended to take on a symbolic quality; its prin­
cipal function was the creation of vivid, real-life drama. 
The three activities in which SA violence was most likely 
to occur were marches, hall defense and street work. All 
of these duties of the SA had a propaganda impact of them­
selves even without benefit of violence. Violence, however, 
served to heighten the impact of all SA activities and to 
create the impressions that the Nazis most desired.
One example can serve to illustrate the effect of 
violence in campaigning. On August 3, 1929, a fight occur­
red at a party meeting in the Grafs Garten in Frankfurt-am- 
Main. SA man Paul Bierwith reported that "forty red hooli­
gans appeared and demanded entry to the meeting." Bierwith, 
the cashier, forced these men to pay before allowing them 
in. He informed his superiors of the situation, and the 
"reds" were seated in the back of the hall surrounded by 
storm troopers. The Nazi leaders sent out orders for SA 
re enforcements. After a brief exchange between the
^Fest, Hitler, p. 105.
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speaker and the "reds” a fight broke out. The communists
used lamps, waterflasks, and glasses to pelt the audience.
They finally pulled out cudgels, but were overwhelmed by
10the newly arrived SA men and thrown out some windows.
The above incident in itself is of no special significance, 
but it was typical of thousands of hall fights that occurred 
in the last years of the Weimar Republic. As a prototype, 
the Grafs Garten riot can provide us with some clues to the 
importance of violence in winning public support.
Above all, hall riots were a set of actions. The 
whole tone and substance of Nazi propaganda was designed 
to convince potential supporters that the party intended to 
move decisively to solve Germany's problems. Nazi speeches 
were intentionally provocative and crude in their language. 
Campaign activities went on at all times. Marches, speeches 
and rallies emphasized the party's activism, but the riot 
was probably the most persuasive way of convincing Germans 
of the party's willingness to act. Words even in their most 
brutal form were not taken seriously by many voters in the 
Weimar Republic. Every party made promises, but somehow 
nothing ever seemed to happen. Of all the bourgeois par­
ties only the Nazis were willing to fight and bleed for 
their ideals. Such activism was likely to make a favorable 
impression on politically disenchanted middle-class voters.
1®H.A. Reel 28, Folder 532, Paul Bierwith "Mein 
Weg zum Nationalsozialismus und Erlebnisse aus der 
Kampfzeit."
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The hall riot also helped to reenforce Nazi stereo­
types. National Socialist propaganda concentrated upon 
convincing the electorate that Germany was divided into two 
groups. The Jews and their "red" lackeys were on one side 
of this manichean dichotomy, dedicated to the destruction 
of all existing values and the annihilation of the middle 
class. On the other side were the Nazis, defenders of both 
the ideals and persons of bourgeois Germans. The form of 
the riot at the Grafs Garten tended to substantiate Nazi 
claims. The "reds" were described by Bierwith as dirty, 
poorly clothed hooligans. They were admitted to the meet­
ing for ten pfennigs each (the special rate for the unem­
ployed) , because they were so obviously poor. Here was the 
perfect Nazi stereotype of the "red", a dirty unkempt gang­
ster. Bierwith was hardly an objective observer, but his 
Kampferlebnisse also indicates that he was not particularly 
imaginative. His physical description of the "reds" proba­
bly exaggerated their slovenliness, but there may also be a 
good deal of truth in it. Even the manner in which the 
fight broke out was useful to National Socialist propaganda. 
The "reds" indiscriminately pelted the audience with 
glasses, lamps and water flasks.^ Broken glass did not 
differentiate between enthusiastic Nazis and simple obser­
vers. The attack on everyone in the room accorded exactly 
with what Nazi speakers were telling audiences throughout
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Germany: the communists planned to destroy all middle-
class Germans whether they belonged to the NSDAP or not.
In the ensuing melee the audience was presented with the 
dramatic struggle of clean, uniformed SA men against dirty, 
lower class "reds.” In this case the only group protecting 
the spectators from assault was the storm troopers. This, 
the Nazis were contending, was the precise situation every­
where; only the NSDAP stood between the middle class and 
destruction by the communist. It is hardly possible to 
imagine a more effective way to put across the party's 
message to respectable, bourgeois Germans than by such a 
fracas.
A final useful result of hall fights was that they 
left the impression that the SA was the defender of order 
in Germany. Most Nazi violence during this period appeared 
to be "defensive." The numerical weakness of the SA pre­
cluded the organization from launching open attacks on 
enemies in most places. Instead the Nazis provoked their 
Marxist opponents by continual taunting and by such be­
havior as marches through "red" districts. The party's 
"defensive" posture was helpful to National Socialist pro­
pagandists, but even in cases in which the Nazis were the 
aggressors SA violence was usually directed toward Jews 
or Marxists. It is questionable whether these acts were 
considered disreputable by the hard pressed middle class in 
the late twenties. In the case of the Grafs Garten riot the 
"reds" were thrown out windows with no assistance from the
206
police. By usurping the police functions at party meetings, 
the SA also appropriated the respect given to law enforce­
ment agencies as defenders of order. The very absence of 
police at such brawls gave support to the Nazi contention 
that the Weimar Republic was incapable of maintaining law 
and order, or, worse yet, part of a conspiracy with the 
"reds" against the lives and values of middle-class Germany. 
The actions and physical appearance of storm troopers at 
hall riots implied that they were both policemen and 
soldiers, and above all protectors of bourgeois Germans 
against the lawlessness of the unwashed legions of 
Bolshevism.
Most SA violence had the same effect on Nazi cam­
paigning as hall fights. Riots that occurred during marches 
or street duty also helped to create a favorable impression 
for the party. This impression was based in large part upon 
the belief that the SA represented military virtues. The 
popular association of the NSDAP with the second Empire 
arose primarily from the identification of the storm troop­
ers with militarism. This link with the past was very use­
ful in attracting voters; it was also helpful in maintaining 
party unity.
The suggestion that the SA was a military organiza­
tion was one of its greatest assets. This illusion was 
maintained largely by a series of quasi-military regulations 
which made the SA appear to be a disciplined military organ­
ization and prompted storm troopers to believe themselves
20"
to be part of an army. An interesting document known as
12the "ten commandments" of the SA casts much light on the
nature of the organization. This set of directives was
issued to only one large group, but it admirably captures 
the tenor of the SA. The virtues of the storm trooper 
fell largely into two categories. First, he was expected 
to maintain the physical bearing of a soldier, and second, 
he was expected to serve as a model for the future vQlkisch 
community. Storm troopers were not required to emulate the 
strict discipline and class structure of the old Imperial 
army. A certain amount of camaraderie existed within the 
SA, and the relationship between leaders and followers
tended to copy the informality of the Free Corps of the
13 _ _ , . ,. .post-war years. In terms of propaganda this did not
matter much. Audiences that were favorably disposed toward 
militaristic appeals could identify the SA with either the 
Imperial army or the Free Corps according to their prefer­
ences, since the organization's military trappings recalled 
both groups.
*2H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.12.28, 
Aus der NSDAP." See Appendix C.
1 ^ The Nazis consciously tried to identify themselves 
with both the imperial army and the Free Corps. For the 
attempt to link the NSDAP with the Imperial heritage see 
Holborn, Modern Germany, pp. 726-27 for the ceremonies at 
Potsdam in 1933. The Nazis used similar ceremonies to link 
themselves to the Free Corps. See Robert G. L. Waite, 
Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar
Germany 15X8-1923 (New York: W. W. Norton, X952) pp. T95-96, 
530, 254.
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The impression that the SA was the embodiment of
military virtues was based almost entirely upon appearances.
Storm troopers were forbidden to carry weapons, and they
were not allowed to participate in military games of any 
14kind. Absolutely no effort was made to prepare SA men 
for any form of armed combat; the storm troopers bore little 
resemblance to a real army. The only similarity between the 
SA and the Imperial army or the Free Corps was that all of 
these groups impressed outsiders with their external disci­
pline. The illusion of SA military bearing was created by 
regulations that were enforced on storm troop contingents.
In his "ten commandments" Sturmf iihrer Max Biicherl ordered 
his men to do the following. "It is especially important 
that when the SA man appears at the place of assembly for 
setting out on a march that he not have his hands in his 
pockets or a cigarette in his mouth." He went on to direct 
his men to be punctual and to obey orders. As BUcherl put 
it, "We do not need dead carcasses. Support your leader by 
following his orders, dilatory comrades can demoralize 
everyone, so be fast in carrying out orders.” Finally, he
directed his men to ask questions and make announcements in
15"a short and snappy manner.” The SA was interested in 
appearances. Storm Troopers were expected to be neat and 
clean. They were to obey orders in a "snappy manner." They
14Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 152.
15H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.12.28, 
Aus der NSDAP."
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were play soldiers and brawlers and not the heirs of the 
Kaiser's troops or the post-war freebooters.
The second major function of the SA was to serve as 
a laboratory for National Socialist social experimentation. 
Bucher1 in his "ten commandments" described Nazi social 
ideals rather succinctly. "The SA does not represent any 
class. Workers of both the head and the hands find them­
selves together in this fighting society. Personal animo­
sities have no place in our organization. Through this
16fighting society we will build a true vdlkisch community." 
The Nazis believed that class differences were best overcome 
by participation in the same struggle by men of all classes. 
Their socialism was strictly a product of World War I and 
of the comradeship of the trenches rather than any desire 
to level economic differences. The social aspect of the SA 
was very real, though it was often belittled by Nazi oppo­
nents. As an ex-SturmfUhrer described it, "Our enemies were 
wrong when they insisted that our comradeship rested on our 
common experience in daily brawls . . . .  When we climbed 
on our trucks of a cold winter morning, to spend the Sunday 
on a propaganda excursion, we all shivered— intellectuals,
workers, rich landowner's sons . . . .  We shared our bread
17with the poor comrades, and often our money."
The storm troopers were extremely useful to the
16Ibid.
17Dobert, Convert to Freedom, p. 176.
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party as the embodiment of its social ideal. Those who did 
not want social reform simply discounted this characteristic 
of the SA. In this they were aided by the NSDAP's oppo­
nents, who also thought that SA egalitarianism was a sham. 
Many Germans both in and out of the party, however, were 
concerned about the class divisions so prevalent in German 
society. This concern was especially widespread among 
young Germans who had found it impossible to obtain posi­
tions for themselves in the depressed economy of the Weimar 
Republic. These young men often identified with the middle 
or upper class but were not really part of either of these
social strata. In terms of income many of these dfeclass&
youths could be more properly placed in the lower class, but
they rarely had anything in common with unionized factory
workers. For such persons the Nazi claim that it would end 
Germany's class divisions was very inviting. Under the 
old system these men were excluded. Under the National 
Socialist state to come they would be equals in a new so­
ciety based upon the external, physical and military vir­
tues of the German middle and upper classes.
For young idealistic Germans the SA was more than
just a model of the Nazi future; it provided an opportunity
for them to belong at once. In the absence of any other
organization to identify with the storm troopers became an
attractive outlet for youthful energies that were otherwise 
1 8being wasted. The peculiar structure of the SA made it
18The Nazis tended to be interested primarily in
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especially appealing. For of all the Nazi organizations, 
the SA most closely resembled a secret society. Hannah 
Arendt has characterized secret societies as ones that 
"adopt a strategy of consistent lying to deceive the non­
initiated external masses, demand unquestioning obedience
from their members who are held together by allegiance to a
19frequently unknown and always mysterious leader.” She
goes on to suggest that such groups divide the world between
"sworn blood brothers and an indistinct inarticulate mass of
20sworn enemies." This description aptly fits several of 
Btlcherl's "ten commandments." As he put it, "Amongst your 
friends be careful what you say. It is not good to wear 
your heart on your tongue, when everyone within hearing dis­
tance is not with us." And, "Can you discuss matters 
amongst yourselves? Yes, but you must keep it quiet and do
not let anyone in on the discussion. Do not give anything
21away to the enemy rabble." These SA "commandments" urged
(continued) supporters of voting age. As Walter 
Laqueur observed, "All through the twenties the Hitler 
Youth remained a negligible force." Laqueur, Young Germany, 
p. 191. Even in 1930-31 after the Nazi electoral Ibreak- 
through the Hitler Youth only had about twenty thousand 
members. Ibid., p. 69. The NSDAP was not a children's move­
ment; rather, its appeal was to young adults facing an un­
certain future.
1 QArendt, Totalitarianism, p. 376.
20Ibid., pp. 376-77.
2iH.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.12.28, 
Aus der NSDAP."
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members to remain aloof and secretive toward the uninitia­
ted. Other "commandments" ordered storm troopers to "culti­
vate the company and companionship of your fellow members"
and to dedicate their lives to "the great ideas of Adolf 
22Hitler." For those who were otherwise excluded, this 
type of organization offered the intimate identification so 
lacking in the rest of their lives. The organizational 
form of the secret society was also socially acceptable.
For young d€class6 Germans the SA was easily identifiable 
with such harmless secret clubs as the Masons or University 
fraternities, which in turn were strongholds of the middle 
and upper classes. For young men membership in the SA 
meant that they could immediately belong to a socially re­
spectable type of organization while they were fighting for 
their proper place in a future Nazi society. Yet the ega­
litarianism of storm troopers was peculiarly contradictory. 
Members were considered equal within the SA, but they be­
lieved themselves superior to outsiders, especially to such 
outsiders as Jews and Marxists.
A final feature of the SA that underlines its char- 
act.i as a secret society was its emphasis on symbolism and 
ritual. As George Mosse observed, "These myths did not 
stand in isolation, but were made operative through the use
of symbols. Symbols were visible, concrete objectifications
23of the myths in which people could participate." The most
23Mosse, Nationalization, p. 7.
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obvious example of the use of symbols in the SA was the
distinctive collar tabs and other trappings to identify
various storm troop units and ranks. Each SA contingent
24had collar tabs denoting its geographic origin. Officers
were designated by distinctive symobls of rank. Group
leaders wore one star on their collar tabs, troop leaders
two stars, storm leaders three stars and Standartenfilhrer
four stars. Standartenftihrer were also entitled to wear a
silver cord on their shoulders. Their adjutants were
marked by the insignia of a wolf on the right lapel; this
badge symbolized the werewolf, which in German mythology
represented the partriotic guerrilla fighter carrying on
the struggle against an army of occupation. Higher SA
25
officials wore silver and gold oak leaves, specially
decorated caps, and in the case of SA leader Pfeffer, red
26shoulder pads, gold cords and a red cap. All of these 
devices bear marked similarities to the colorful pageantry 
of such benign organizations as the Masons; they were also 
employed in an attempt to ape military forms. Finally, 
such mythological symbols as the wolf and oak leaves were 
part of the effort to make the SA into a quasi-religious
24H.A. Reel 57, Folder 1391, "Festzug der NSDAP 
Ntirnberg."
2Symbolically the oak was the tree of liberty. 
Mosse, Nationalization, p. 41.
2®H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 27.12.28." 
For a list of the various SA ranks and their responsibili­
ties see Appendix C.
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organization. This trait, however, can best be seen by ex­
amining the Nazi cult of death.
The central event and myth of the NSDAP was the Beer- 
Hall Putsch and the blood sacrifice of the Nazis who fell 
on the streets of Munich on November 9, 1923. All SA units 
were ritually linked to the Putsch by means of the conse­
cration of their flags which was carried out at national 
party days rallies by touching the ensigns of new contin­
gents to the party's blood banner, the flag that was carried 
on the day of the Beer-Hall Putsch. For a movement born of 
the bloody sacrifice of World War I and reconsecrated in the 
slaughter of the Feldherrnhalle, a continuing blood ceremony 
was necessary. The dedication of SA flags was useful in 
linking the post-1925 storm troopers with the Putsch, but 
this event occurred only once for each SA unit. The con­
tinuing ceremony that celebrated the cult of death was the 
commemorative day of mourning conducted by every Nazi 
Ortsgruppe from 1926. In memory of those who had fallen on 
November 9, 1923, all flags were placed at half mast or 
unfurled. Members were obliged to visit neighboring grave­
yards to mourn all those who had died for the party since 
1919. All National Socialist daily and weekly newspapers 
appeared bordered in black and Nazis wore black arm bands.
Finally, all party groups proceeded to the highest mountain
27in their vicinity to light a fire symbolic of rebirth.
^7VB, October 25, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung 29” and
VB, October 30, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 47."
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Karl Dietrich Bracher has described this type of observance
as one of the "grotesque practices" that "testified to the
28-quasi-religious impact" of Nazi propaganda. It was, however, 
far more than merely a bizarre Nazi ceremony; it was one of 
the unifying rites of the movement, and the SA played a 
central role in this mummery.
The meaning of the memorial ceremonies can best be 
understood by examining one of them. In 1928 the NSDAP of 
Gau Hessen-Nassau-Stid held its annual Gautag on November 9. 
The event was fully described by an eyewitness. The walls 
were draped with flags of the Third Reich. The platform 
was dressed in black serge. The band played patriotic and 
funeral music as the membership remembered the fallen dead. 
Speakers discussed the German will to freedom with allusions 
to such famous freedom fighters as Andreas Hofer. The meet­
ing concluded with the assembled storm troopers making the 
following pledge. "All of us who dedicate ourselves to the
founding of the Third Reich are willing to lay down our 
29lives." Even death was to hold no terror, since it re­
presented "the first sign of the awakening of the German
30will to freedom" and a form of purification for the 
fatherland.
The cult of death was useful to the party in a num-
28Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 148.
2®H.a . Reel 28, Folder 432, Adalbert Gimbel "So 
Kaempften wir."
30Ibid.
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ber of ways. It was a prime justification for the violence
of the SA and for the activism of the party. According to
Hitler, the NSDAP was born in war and consecrated in the
blood sacrifice of the Putsch. The ultimate victory of the
movement and the revolutionary changes it was to bring about
were legitimized by these blood sacrifices. The cult of
death also established overt parallels between the Nazi party
and early Christianity. For the suffering of Christian
martyrs, the Nazis substituted the death of the men at the
Feldherrnhalle. This parallel allowed Hitler to use the
31Catholic imagery that had so impressed him as a child.
As an acolyte in Lambach monastery, Hitler "was stirred to
the depths by images of suffering and despair against a
32background of triumphant belief in salvation." The cult 
of death secularized this same system of symbols. In both 
Christianity and Nazism the blood sacrifice was a focal 
point of attention. It validated the activities of both 
groups and held the promise of the establishment of a com­
pletely reborn world. The martyrs produced by the activi­
ties of the SA, like those of the early Christians, seemed 
to bear witness to the ultimate victory of their movement. 
For the Nazis the memorial mourning services of November 9 
were the equivalent of communion. These quasi-religious
^Ernst Nolte has properly concluded that, "The 
dominant trait in Hitler's personality was infantilism." 
Hitler's use of Catholic imagery was simply another mani­
festation of that trait. Nolte, Three Faces, p. 368.
-^Fest, Hitler, p. 152.
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rituals of the storm troopers emphasized the revolutionary 
character of the NSDAP, while at the same time they were 
performed in comfortingly traditional forms. Violence, 
tradition and revolution all came together in the SA through 
the cult of death which synthesized National Socialist acti­
vities into a coherent pattern leading both to a real and 
to a mystical rebirth of Germany.
Perhaps the most important function of the SA was 
found in these ritual observances. It staged key party 
rites that lent meaning and significance to Nazi activities. 
The storm troopers were the party's angels of death, mar­
tyrs, and the prototypes of the new society all wrapped up 
in one. They were the promise of the Nazi revolution,and the 
men who, by vicarious participation in the blood sacrifice 
of the Putsch, were entitled to carry out that revolution 
in practice. The role of the SA as agents of the National 
Socialist transformation of Germany continued long after 
1930. The savage street violence of 1932-33 was largely 
the work of the storm troopers. The anti-Jewish pogrom of 
19 38 known as Crystal Night was carried out by the same 
group. Lastly, the final solution of the Jewish problem
was effected by the SS, the direct heir and successor of the 
33SA. None of this was by chance. The cult of death of
33Hitler elevated the SS above the SA in 19 34 mainly 
because the storm troopers had ceased to be an elite group 
as a result of mass expansion and had become a threat to 
Hitler's position because of their continuing revolutionary 
fervor. Nevertheless, the SS which began its career as a 
subordinate group within the SA carried out the same duties 
that the storm troopers were expected to perform after the
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the late twenties had prepared the SA and its subsidiary, the 
SS, for their future tasks. Hitler's promise of a reborn and 
purified Germany was inextricably tied to the existence of the 
storm troopers, the ritually cleansed executioners of the Nazi 
revolution.
SA activites allowed the Nazis to create a series of 
ambivalent impressions for the general public. For conserva­
tives the SA— because of its military trappings and disci­
pline— was the embodiment of Imperial militarism. For others 
it was the necessary tool of repression for a war of the rich 
against the mutinous poor, and a way to avert an eventual com­
munist victory. For dgclassg German youth the SA provided an 
organization that both embraced middle-class external values, 
and promised to reform the class structure that had rejected 
these young men. In the socially appealing guise of a secret 
society, the SA embodied the party's social idealism. The 
storm troopers were all of the above to different people, 
but most of all through the cult of death the storm troopers 
were the sanctified executioners of Nazi policy and the 
living promise of the Nazi revolution of the future. It was 
this promise that enabled the NSDAP to retain its most rad­
ical and energetic supporters. It also helped the party 
attract those voters who desperately wanted major change.
The credentials of the NSDAP as a totalitarian movement 
capable of transforming Germany rested largely on the actions, 
character and rituals of the SA.
33(continued)party came to power.
CHAPTER 10
THE CHARISMATIC NATURE OF THE NAZI LEADERSHIP AND 
THE DYNAMICS OF NAZI CAMPAIGNING
The question of the nature of authority within the 
NSDAP goes to the heart of any discussion of Nazi propaganda 
drives. Throughout this dissertation the party has been 
described as a dynamic movement characterized by ceaseless 
activism. Himmler in his saturation campaigns, Reinhardt 
in his initial recruiting efforts for the speakers' school, 
and Muchow with his street cells— all relied upon the un­
flagging enthusiasm of party men who were willing to volun­
teer their services free of charge. At the same time stren­
uous efforts were made by the propaganda section to central­
ize Nazi activities; Reinhardt's school and the Volkischer 
Beobachter were especially effective in doing this. Finally, 
the party was notable for a considerable amount of local 
initiative and an opportunistic willingness to adopt suc­
cessful regional innovations. In short, the NSDAP managed 
to combine intense activism with considerable centralization 
in a movement characterized by a willingness to experiment 
with new programs on a regional level. One of the princi­
pal reasons the Nazis were able to function in this fashion 
can be found in the party's peculiar leadership structure.
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On a theoretical level the NSDAP appeared to operate 
as a strict hierarchy based upon Fuhrerprinzip. Wolfgang 
Dorn describes this doctrine as the belief that all power 
comes from above and that those in lower positions are auto­
matically required to obey their superiors. Dorn goes on 
to state, however, that this was merely an ideal and that in 
practice considerable internal conflict existed in the 
NSDAP.^ In discussing the Nazi party of the late twenties 
one does not find the concept of Fiihrerpr inzip very helpful. 
It seems to have been primarily a propaganda ploy designed 
to convince the unobservant that the party was a model of 
rational organization. In reality though,the entire National 
Socialist leadership structure— seemingly based upon hier­
archical principles— was little more than a facade masking 
rather chaotic and confused lines of authority.
On the national level Hitler tended to function as
the absolute charismatic leader of the movement. Within the 
NSDAP, he was viewed as the personal embodiment of the
coming German rebirth. During the Weimar Republic the Nazi
party was even referred to as the "Hitler Movement," and 
this designation was entirely appropriate. Belief in Adolf 
Hitler and absolute obedience of his directives were arti­
cles of faith which were never seriously challenged after
2
the Bamberg Conference of 1926. Hitler’s special position
^Dorn, FUhrerideologie, p. 279.
2
Nyomarkay, Charisma, passim. Also see Chapter 2, 
p. 41, ftn. 19. and pp. 50-52.
221
enabled the Reichsleituner to impose its authority of the 
party's subordinate officials, for in practice, it tended 
to function as an organizational extension of the Fuhrer. 
National party leaders resided in Munich and were able to 
meet frequently with him; as a result, orders issued by 
such men as Himmler from the propaganda section and Gregor 
Strasser as organizational chief were taken by the member­
ship as coming second-hand from Hitler himself.
Within the NSDAP such orders had the force of law, 
but this absolute authority was not exercised on most 
issues. The party had the potential for considerable 
centralization, but this remained largely latent in the 
twenties. Instead of controlling all activities, the Munich 
leadership tended to exercise pre-emptive authority over the 
NSDAP. On questions that were considered important, speci­
fic directives were issued, but on most matters Munich re­
mained silent and allowed subordinate leaders to make their 
own decisions.
The theoretically absolute power of the Munich 
leadership has led to some erroneous conclusions about the 
degree of central control present in the NSDAP. Dietrich 
Orlow asserts that the party after 1925 entered a period of 
increasing bureaucratization and centralization. One of the 
main thrusts of Hitler's actions, Orlow states, was "the 
transformation of members into reliable party workers" 
through the establishment of "an efficient administrative
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3
apparatus and bureaucratic forms of administration." He 
further contends that by 1928 this process had reached a 
very advanced stage. "Hitler made all major political de­
cisions (and defined what these were), Hess made the routine 
political decisions, while the division chiefs of the 
Reichsleitung made routine administrative decisions. The 
Gauleiters carried these out for their geographic regions
. . . . Finally local leaders carried out the orders of
4
their Gauleitungs." Thus, leadership in the NSDAP was
characterized by "a concentration of all but routine deci-
5
sions in the person of Adolf Hitler." This description 
of the party seems to be based as much on a priori assump­
tions as upon the evidence. Orlow believes that it was 
only natural for the NSDAP to develop a "highly centralized 
and hierarchical" organizational structure,6 for this was 
"the most effective form of controlling and communicating
within a mass society: they needed a highly bureaucratized
7
administration." He does present some evidence to support 
these conclusions, but it is highly questionable whether 
Orlow's depiction of the NSDAP is accurate.
■^Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 78.
4Ibid., p. 151.
5Ibid., p. 150.
®Ibid, p. 7.
7Ibid.
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The first flaw in Orlow*s view of the Nazi party is 
the person of Hitler himself. In a truly centralized or­
ganization one would expect that all orders would emanate 
from Hitler. In practice, however, very few directives 
were issued by the Fiihrer. Probably the most important 
reason for this was that Hitler was an almost classically 
undisciplined person. He was unable to keep to strict 
schedules, much to the chagrin of numerous assassins. He 
worked in fits and starts and did absolutely nothing much 
of the time. He was incapable of concentrating on routine 
tasks for long periods of time. These personality traits 
seem to have been deeply ingrained perhaps even dating back 
to his youth. In Mein Kampf Hitler severely criticized his 
father, an Austrian customs' official, for wasting his life 
on trivia, and clearly expressed his opinion of routine 
work in the following passage. "I . . . grew sick to my 
stomach at the thought of sitting in an office, deprived of 
my liberty, ceasing to be master of my own time and being
compelled to force the contents of a whole life into blanks
8
that had to be filled out."
In the late twenties the personal characteristics
of the Fiihrer were very much in evidence. During much of
this period he "lived largely in retirement at Obersalzburg,
9
often virtually invisible for weeks.” Hitler even cutback
®Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 8.
9Fest, Hitler, p. 250.
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the number of speeches he delivered. In 1927 he spoke
fifty-six times, while in 1929 he made only twenty-seven
public appearances. It was during these years that he began
to cultivate an image of semi-divine remoteness producing
many complaints about his "negligent conduct of party 
10affairs." Even Orlow comments that, "Hitler often left 
written communications addressed personally to him unans­
wered for several weeks."^
Hitler's neglect of the day-to-day activities of the 
party was partially a result of his temperament, but the 
policy also had a coldly practical rationale. Even while 
he was in prison, the FUhrer realized that one of his great­
est assets was his aloofness from the petty bickering that 
discredited his rightist rivals. The speaking prohibition 
after his release further convinced him of the usefulness 
of personal isolation in enhancing his image. After 1925 
Hitler rarely intervened in party operations and then pri­
marily on a policy level. The Bamberg Conference was almost 
the only major instance of his involvement in intra-party 
affairs during this period. Here, the Fiihrer became active 
only after he was convinced that his position as leader was 
threatened by the northern faction. After settling the 
dispute, Hitler retired to a position of splendid isolation 
and refused to meddle in ordinary party matters. He left
10Ibid., p. 254.
^Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 146.
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the divisive task of running his movement to subordinates 
and concentrated upon allowing his image as a man of destiny 
to grow. Hitler chose to maintain his standing as absolute 
ruler of the Nazi party by refraining from leading it in 
its ordinary activities.
No one within the NSDAP questioned Hitler's all 
embracing power, but in the absence of any action by the 
Ftihrer, his subordinates were not only free but obligated 
to make decisions on their own for the benefit of the move­
ment. The Nazi political machine of the late twenties was 
largely a product of the lack of administrative centraliza­
tion. As propaganda chief, Himmler initiated the saturation
12campaign as well as other techniques. Gauleiter Reinhardt
developed his school for orators without benefit of any
13instructions from the National leadership. Czarnowski and
Goebbels started programs which led to the slide and film 
14services. None of these schemes were originated by 
Hitler. Instead they were developed independently by his 
underlings. Orlow concluded that the NSDAP was character­
ized by "a concentration of all but routine decisions in
15the person of Adolf Hitler." The development of the Nazi
12See Chapter 4.
i:*See Chapter 5.
14See Chapter 6.
15Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 150.
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propaganda apparatus casts much doubt on this assertion. 
Rather, the NSDAP seems to have been organized as "a pliable 
and vigorous instrument for [Hitler's] aims."16 It was only 
selectively centralized. The Munich leadership was capable 
of imposing its will on the party in the name of Hitler and 
did so by adopting successful regional innovations. Other­
wise, Nazi leaders at all levels remained free to conduct 
experiments that might prove useful to National Socialism.
The above conclusions on the nature of the NSDAP 
tend to conflict with the second part of Orlow's descrip­
tion of the party. He asserts that by the late twenties the 
NSDAP was showing tendencies of becoming a top-heavy bureau­
cratic organization with "increasingly cumbersome decision­
making processes that just as inevitably accompanied
17
bureaucratic growth." According to this view, operations
below the national level were conducted on the principle of
strict subordination of lower officials to their superiors
in a chain of command. Yet Orlow fails to provide anything
approaching a comprehensive definition of what he means by
a bureaucracy. The closest he comes to doing this is in
his introduction where he describes bureaucracies as ideally
"human computers" that "systemize the work of the organiza-
18
tion" and'depersonalize the agent doing the work." The
16Fest, Hitler, p. 228.
17Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 150.
18Ibid., p. 7.
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NSDAP, he goes on to explain, did not depersonalize its
19agents but was nonetheless a bureaucracy. This confused 
effort at establishing the bureaucratic character of the 
Nazi party defies refutation, since one remains unclear as 
to what Orlow is trying to denote by the term. Neverthe­
less, it is useful to examine the nature of leadership with­
in the party if only to determine its role in promoting Nazi 
activism.
Before the hypothesis that the NSDAP was a bureau­
cratic organization can be tested, one must first clarify 
the term. According to Max Weber, bureaucracies are 
characterized by 1), "Fixed and official jurisdictional 
areas"? 2), stable distribution and strict delimitation by 
rules of "the authority to give the commands required for 
the discharge of . . . duties"; and 3}, exclusive employ­
ment of "persons who have the generally regulated qualifi-
„ 20cations to serve.
The NSDAP did not meet any of the criteria set
forth in this precise definition. After the party came to
power, it was notable for bringing Germany to the brink of
administrative chaos. Government under the Nazis has been
described best by David Schoenbaum as "institutional 
21
Darwinism." "New institutions grew, flourished or died,
19Ibid., pp. 8-9.
20Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 196.
21David Schoenbaum, Hitler* s Social Revolution: Class 
and Status in Nazi Germany (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 
t^ 7) p. 19<rr
228
spawned mutations, struggled for survival, and thrust their 
offshoots under the very doors of the established minis­
tries . . . .  The process was a kind of bureaucratic state 
2 2of nature." This description of the National Socialist 
state in action hardly fits Weber's definition of bureau­
cracy. Official jurisdictions, duties and lines of command 
were thoroughly confused. In the NSDAP the law of the 
jungle prevailed. Organizations and individuals prospered 
or withered according to their ability to grasp authority.
As for the selection of qualified officials, Hitler followed
no clear pattern in choosing his secondary leaders; they
23came from diverse backgrounds and either succeeded or 
failed as their capabilities dictated. The Nazi party was 
never a bureaucratic institution.
In terms of organizational structure, the NSDAP can 
perhaps best be described as an almost purely charismatic 
movement. Weber defines charismatic movements in the fol­
lowing way:
"In contrast to any kind of bureaucratic 
organization of offices, the charismatic 
structure knows nothing of a form or of an 
ordered procedure of appointment or dis­
missal. It knows no regulated 'career,' 
'advancement,' ’salary,’ or regulated 
and expert training of the holder of 
charisma or of his aids (sic). It knows 
no agency of control or appeal, no local 
bailiwicks or exclusive functional juris­
dictions; nor does it embrace permanent 
institutions like our bureaucratic
22Ibid., pp. 199-200. 
2^Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 172.
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'departments, ' which are independent
of persons and of purely personal
charisma."24
Hitler's charismatic role within the party as a possessor
25of "special gifts . . . not accessible to everyone1 has
2 6never been seriously disputed. Nazis tended to accept 
the Fdhrer's commands because they believed him to be 
Germany's savior and the personalized basis of the coming
German renaissance. Similarly orders from the Reichsleitung
were usually accepted without question because this organi­
zation, composed of men in close personal contact with 
Hitler, tended to act as an institutional extension of the 
Fiihrer. The role of subordinate leaders stationed away 
from Munich, however, was somewhat different. The Gauleiters 
had to assert their authority without any more than formal 
support from the messianic leader of the movement. The 
methods these men employed to control their local organiza­
tions provides numerous clues to the nature of authority 
within the NSDAP.
The Gauleiters asserted control over their sub­
leaders by combining a certain amount of derivative power, 
acquired through their official appointment, with demonstra­
tions of their personal talents for leadership. Hitler, as 
the undisputed master of the movement, was able to transmit
2^Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 246.
25Ibid., p. 245.
2 6See Nyomarkay, Charisma, passim.
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some of his own prestige to his subordinates. These men 
held their offices by virtue of being chosen by the Fiihrer 
and thus were accorded a certain amount of respect automa­
tically. Nevertheless, this delegated authority was rarely 
sufficient to insure that a Gauleiter would be able to con­
tinue to exercise control in his area. Like all party
27
officials, he was essentially a charismatic leader. No­
body expected a Gauleiter to possess the same amount of 
charisma as Hitler. These regional chieftains were not 
expected to be messiahs destined to bring about Germany's 
rebirth. They were, however, expected to possess some 
charismatic qualities. Gauleiters had to demonstrate their 
personal courage, their willingness to make sacrifices for 
the cause and their ability to lead party activities. If 
they failed to convince subordinates that they possessed 
these qualities, sub-leaders were free to revolt— for in 
the last resort authority was based, as in all charismatic 
organizations, upon consent.^ Such insubordination was 
often based upon loyalty to Hitler rather than upon any 
implied criticism of him. A Gauleiter was especially vul­
nerable to attack if it appeared that he was not doing 
enough for the movement. Intra-party factionalism in such
27Orlow does mention that the Gauleiters served as 
"the romantic agent of history in the person of Hitler." 
Orlow, N*zi Party, p. 145. He tends, however, to lay all 
of his emphasxs on their role as "the subordinate of a 
thoroughly unromantic bureaucratic superior, the 
Reichsleitung." Ibid.
28Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 249.
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instances underscores the charismatic nature of Nazi author­
ity; the Gauleiter came under assault precisely because he
29had proven himself inadequate for his assigned task, and 
thus had failed as a charismatic leader. An incident in 
WUrttemberg provides the clearest example from the late 
twenties of a regional dispute motivated by a failure of 
leadership.
Wiirttemberg was an especially unpromising area for 
the Nazis. The state was dominated by the Social Democrats 
and the Catholic Center. Members of both of these parties 
were peculiarly invulnerable to Nazi appeals. The Social­
ists were able to maintain their following largely because 
the SPD was part of an all-embracing working class society. 
The party and its associate organization, the free trade 
unions, represented laborers both politically and in econo­
mic negotiations with employers. Even workers' free time 
was organized through a series of quasi-socialist clubs.
All of these activities tended to re-enforce the identifi­
cation of the working class with the SPD. The adherents of 
the Center party were also part of an all-embracing organi­
zation, which differed from that of the SPD only in being 
less socially homogeneous. Here, the basis of identifica­
tion was religious conviction. From this starting point 
Catholics were organized into various clubs and even into 
labor unions with overtly Catholic allegiances. Politically
29lbid., p. 246.
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the Center party was mainly the representative of church 
interests, and those who showed signs of straying from the 
fold were often subjected to harangues by parish priests. 
The Nazis did not make significant progress in regions dom­
inated by the SPD or the Center until after 1930, and even 
then NSDAP vote totals were lower in these areas than else­
where in Germany.30
Given the best possible leaders, Nazi prospects in 
Wtirttemberg were bleak. Weaknesses in leadership further 
exacerbated the situation. The Gauleiter of Wiirttemberg 
was Wilhelm Murr who lived in Esslingen, instead of in 
Stuttgart, the principal city of the state. Since early 
19 28 he had been carrying on a bitter feud with Nazi Reich­
stag deputy Wilhelm Dreher, the man most closely identified 
with the development of the party in Stuttgart; and the 
dispute was worsened by the failure of the National Social­
ists to make significant progress in this part of Germany. 
Murr's conduct was frequently called into question, and 
toward the end of 1928 an open factional struggle broke out 
between the Gauleiter and the Stuttgart leaders.
The opposition against Murr was spearheaded by the 
youthful chief of the city group, Hans Kuhn. Kuhn also 
served as head of Stuttgart's SA units, a bureaucratically 
unsound confusion of duties. He was supported in his revolt 
by the former leader of the Gau's Hitler Youth, the Gau's
30Besson, Wtirttemberg, passim.
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secretary, the editor of the regional newspaper and the 
area's treasurer. This group charged Murr with a number of 
serious and petty offenses, and demanded that he resign or 
be dismissed. All the allegations focused on acts of either 
incompetence or corruption. The Gauleiter was accused of 
spending party money to buy an automobile that he used to 
take his family on Sunday trips. The Kuhn faction further 
contended that Murr had exploited his position to hire a 
friend as Gau propaganda chief at 80 RM per month, an ac­
tion that his critics considered to be both corrupt and 
incompetent. The person in question was at the same time 
receiving unemployment compensation; moreover, Kuhn dis­
missed him as an effective propagandist on the grounds that
he was born in Bohemia and had "no command of the German
31
language either spoken or written." The Gau's heavy debt,
over 2,000 RM in December, was taken by the rebels as proof
32
of the Gauleiter's poor business management. Finally and
most damning of all, Murr was charged with having no speak-
33ing ability at all. For the Stuttgart faction, this de­
ficiency alone was sufficient cause for his removal, since 
it negated his value as a leader in propaganda actions.
H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wurttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 23.1.29, 
Aus der NSDAP."
32Ibid. For a discussion of the role of Nazi sub­
leaders in maintaining the financial integrity of their 
organizations see Appendix D.
33Ibid.
This often petty and totally non-ideological dis­
pute arose from Murr's complete incompetence and lack of 
charisma. In a purely bureaucratic organization either the 
Gauleiter or Kuhn and his allies would have been dismissed 
at once in order to restore clear lines of command. This 
did not happen in Wiirttemberg. Rather, the factional strug 
gle lasted for over a year with neither side winning in the 
end. The Reichsleitung could not accede to the demands of 
the rebels because Murr was appointed to his position by 
Hitler. Thus, the revolt against the Gauleiter was an in­
direct affront to the Fiihrer' s own authority. At the same 
time, since Murr's failing was mainly a personal lack of 
talent as a leader, headquarters in Munich could not restore 
his authority anymore than they could make him into an 
inspiring commander. Murr attempted to impose his author­
ity upon the Stuttgart branch during a meeting on December
3420, 1928 and was shouted down by the membership. As a
charismatic figure, Murr had been totally rejected, the
membership flatly refusing to follow him. In a party based
35upon voluntary subordination of members to leaders, Murr* 
authority had crumbled.
The factional struggle in Wiirttemberg was embaras- 
sing to the Reichsleitung, especially since no immediate
34H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staats-
polizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 23.1.29,
Aus der NSDAP."
35Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 249.
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solution was possible. It simply dragged on with both sides
making various appeals to national' headquarters in a tho-
36roughly disorganized fashion. Kuhn resigned his office 
as chief of the group in Stuttgart, but kept his position in 
the SA command. Murr was unable to remove Kuhn from this 
post because the city's storm troopers were loyal to him 
and also because the Gauleiter lacked authority over the 
organization. In any case simple dismissal was not enough. 
That had been tried with Murr assuming the duties of 
Ortsgruppefuhrer of Stuttgart, but the membership simply 
refused to obey the Gauleiter. The dispute in Wiirttemberg 
continued, bringing the party in the area to the brink of 
chaos.
The first move by the Reichsleitung to deal with
the situation came in May, 19 28 with the appointment of ex-
Naval Lieutenant a. D. von Jagow as head of the Gau's storm 
37troopers. Von Jagow was technically appointed by the 
national leader of the SA, von Pfeffer, but he seems to 
have been chosen to do far more than command the area's 
storm troopers. His job was to restore some semblance of 
order to the Gau's political organization and apparently 
several members of the Reichsleitung were involved in his
36H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staats-
polizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 3.4.29,
Aus der NSDAP."
3^H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staats-
polizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.6.29,
Aus der NSDAP."
38selection. Von Jagow, a former aide of the notorious 
Commander Ehrhardt, had a considerable reputation as a hero 
of the Free Corps period. He quickly restored discipline 
in the Gau's SA units and apparently began to insinuate him 
self into the process of making regional political deci­
sions. At any rate, after his arrival Wiirttemberg began 
to adopt propaganda programs initiated by the national 
leadership and to copy highly successful local schemes such 
as the Muchow street cell system. The amount of party acti 
vity greatly increased; and with the general upswing in 
National Socialist prospects in late 1929, the quarrel be­
tween Kuhn and Murr became less important to members. As 
late as the beginning of 1930, however, the Wiirttemberg 
police reported that the NSDAP was doing poorly there by
comparison to the rest of Germany at least in part due to
39continuing factional conflict. Von Jagow finally put an
end to this petty internal quarrel by expelling Kuhn as
40Stuttgart's SA leader and throwing him and twenty-eight
41of his followers out of the party on February 16, 19 30.
The solution of the dispute in Wiirttemberg was
38Ibid.
^9H.A. Reel 58, Folder 140 3, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 5.3.30. 
Aus der NSDAP."
40 Ibid.
41H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizel Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 19.3.30, 
Aus der NSDAP."
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exactly what could be expected from a charismatic organiza­
tion. Both factions ultimately lost. Gauleiter Murr was 
never able to regain the wholehearted support of party men. 
He was in effect replaced by von Jagow, who continued to 
play a prominent role into the early years of the Third 
Reich. At the same time, Murr was not dismissed; his power 
simply withered away. This administratively untidy solution 
of the problem of an incompetent Gauleiter was typical of 
the Nazi approach to organization. As Weber put it, "the
charismatic structure knows nothing of a form or of an or-
42dered procedure of appointment or dismissal.” Von Jagow's 
usurpation of power in Wurttemberg was but one example of 
the Nazi practice--that later became commonplace— of allow­
ing party leaders to carve out empires for themselves at 
the expense of men in technically superior positions. This 
kind of empire building and chaotic organization was much 
in evidence after 19 33.
The fact that Murr was not dismissed but simply 
shunted aside was also typical of Nazi procedure. Murr had 
been appointed by Hitler, making it difficult for the Fiihrer 
to remove him in response to ptossure from below. Hitler 
always insisted that his power over the party was absolute, 
and that this power was not based upon any feeble vote but 
upon the universal faith of party members in his mission.
To bow to pressure from below in the case of Gauleiter Murr
42Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 246.
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would be to admit a degree of party democracy. This Hitler 
was unwilling to do. Murr remained secure in his position, 
but he also lost most of his real control.
The fate of Hans Kuhn was also predictable. Kuhn 
was tolerated only until the party was able to siphon off 
his popular support. As soon as von Jagow succeeded in 
accomplishing this, Kuhn was expelled. Inadvertently, the 
young SA leader had challenged Hitler's authority by at­
tacking the Ftihrer's appointee. No matter how often Kuhn 
and his followers proclaimed their loyalty and devotion to 
Hitler, this act of rebellion was unforgivable. Within the 
NSDAP revolt from below could never be completely success­
ful. Such factional struggles might precipitate changes in 
the distribution of political power, but in the end the 
party was always compelled to expell the rebels in order to 
reaffirm Hitler's absolute power and to discourage any in­
cipient signs of democracy within the movement.
The criticism of Gauleiter Murr provides a good
example of what was expected of a Nazi regional leader.
First and foremost, a Gauleiter was expected to lead his
followers in vigorous and hopefully successful propaganda
drives. He usually asserted his leadership in these ac-
43tions by giving speeches. In his role as charismatic 
chieftain, the Gauleiter had to reaffirm his strength con­
tinuously by following a course of never-ending activism.
A
In order to get an idea of the role of the Gau­
leiters as speakers see Appendix A.
Another way for him to impress his subordinates was by con­
spicuous self-sacrifice. He could convince these men of hi
44dedication to the cause by foregoing personal pleasures. 
Lastly, a Gauleiter had to maintain close contact with his 
sub-leaders. Gauleiters did not have Hitler's reputation, 
and thus were unable to foster an image of semi-divine de­
tachment. Their effectiveness was based upon the willing­
ness of members to follow them. This peculiar form of con­
sent could be withdrawn, as it was in the case of Murr. A 
Gauleiter could not afford to ignore widespread discontent 
within his organization. It was not necessary for these 
regional leaders to accede to the demands of their sub­
ordinates, but at the same time it was fatal to a Gauleiter' 
authority to allow dissatisfaction to smolder unnoticed.
The most effective way of dealing with intra-party strife 
was to initiate a program of intense activism. In this 
fashion the Gauleiter was able to divert the thoughts of 
his followers from internal problems and to concentrate 
their attention on external party foes. Consultation and 
activism cured most intra-party difficulties and made obe­
dience to the Gauleiter almost automatic.
Most Nazi Gauleiters in the late twenties seem to 
have understood the requirements of their office. This 
meant that the case of Wilhelm Murr was not repeated else-
44This fits another part of Weber’s definition of 
charismatic leadership. See Gerth and Mills (eds.), From 
Max Weber, p. 248.
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where. Two Nazi Gauleiters provide clear examples of how 
these regional officials were able to assert their author­
ity and to function effectively. Joseph Goebbels and Erich 
Koch were both Rhinelanders appointed to serve as Gauleiters 
far from home. Goebbels was given the task of taming the 
often restless organization in Berlin. Koch took over the 
tiny Nazi party in East Prussia. Both of these men faced 
difficult assignments. They could expect a degree of local 
resentment and were not immediately identified with their 
new Gaus. In both cases these problems evaporated almost 
at once. After a brief initial stage during which they 
relied upon their derivative authority as Hitler's ap­
pointees, they were able to gain the loyalty of their party 
organizations on a personal level. This was done through 
deeds and not by a formal written commission. By their 
actions Goebbels and Koch were able to convince their sub­
ordinates that they were worthy of being obeyed.
Goebbels' method for winning the support of Berlin's
Nazis was a program of intense activism. Almost at once he
began a campaign centering on savage confrontations with
the communists. The most spectacular incident of this poli-
45tical drive was the bloody fight at the Pharus Hall. By 
leading his men at this rally, Goebbels added greatly to 
his prestige. In this battle and in other skirmishes, he 
demonstrated his bravery and convinced the Berlin party
4 5For a description see Chapter 2, p. 59-60.
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that he was a courageous leader. These fights also created 
a common bond of experience between the Gauleiter and his 
men. All Governmental attempts to discipline Goebbels sim­
ply backfired. He was not criticized by his followers when 
the party was banned in Berlin. Instead, the local Nazis 
took a peculiar pride in their Gauleiter being "a bad boy." 
Short stays in various jails also added luster to his repu­
tation. For Nazis living in the Weimar Republic being an 
outlaw was a praiseworthy achievement. In the case of 
Joseph Goebbels activism and lawlessness cemented his per­
sonal hold on the Berlin party and the fact that he was not 
a Berliner was soon forgotten.
Erich Koch in East Prussia established his authority 
in a manner similar to that of Goebbels. He used violence, 
activism and visible self-sacrifice to impress his new 
followers and win their support. Koch arrived in East 
Prussia on September 15, 1928, and by the middle of March 
he had participated in four major hall fights. A brawl in 
the city of Leuth became an East Prussian party legend.
This battle took place on October 2, 1928 and resulted in 
seven casualties. These wounded men were tended by a group
of Nazi wives, as Gauleiter Koch went on to deliver a speech
46in which he denounced Marxism. Koch also used personal 
appearances to cement his authority. In January and Febru-
46H.A. Reel 48, Folder 1101, "Preussiche Zeitung."
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ary, 1929, he spoke fourteen times in various parts of his 
region.47 This grueling schedule was designed to convince 
members of his dedication to the movement and was largely 
successful in doing this. One young bank clerk in recount­
ing his early party experiences made the following state­
ment about his Gauleiter. "If there were times when we 
wanted to give up, we looked to him [Koch], who made the 
greatest sacrifices. He had at his disposal for the support 
of the activities of the district, for travel and propaganda,
and finally for his own maintenance, barely two hundred 
48
marks.” Koch's recipe for success included violence, 
activism and visible self-sacrifice. All of these attri­
butes convinced the East Prussian Nazis that he was an 
effective leader, and eliminated intra-party factionalism 
in this region. The Koch formula was emulated by Gauleiters 
throughout Germany. It insured party unity, but it also 
meant that activism was not merely a desirable quality in 
a Nazi secondary leader but an organizational necessity. As 
charismatic leaders the Nazi regional chieftains could only 
maintain their positions by a continuous series of deeds.
The Gauleiters who failed to lead could expect to see their 
authority wither away as was the case with Wilhelm Murr.
Joint participation in propaganda actions was vital 
in cementing ties between Gauleiters and party members, but
47VB, March 22, 1929, p. 3, "3 Monate Kampf um 
Ostpreussen."
48Abel, Nazi Movement, p. 284.
243
more formal organizational structures were needed to main­
tain contact between secondary leaders and their subordi­
nates. In a bureaucratic organization clear lines of com­
munication could have been established through correspon­
dence. This, however, did not happen in the NSDAP. Even in 
cases in which relatively complete collections of corres­
pondence exist, it is clear that little business was con-
49
ducted in writing. Gauleiters communicated with their 
subordinates in person. This was done casually during pro­
paganda drives and more formally at leadership conferences.
The Nazi regional leadership conferences were un­
usual institutions in a seemingly authoritarian movement.
At these meetings all of the party’s functionaries assem­
bled to discuss plans for forthcoming campaigning. Since 
the Nazi party at its lower levels was notable for the large 
number of offices available to members, this meant that all 
active Nazis were invited to these conferences. Usually 
three or four men from each Ortsgruppe attended. All Gau 
speakers and students in Reinhardt's school were invited. 
Finally, city sub-leaders down to the cell level could 
attend. The leadership conferences were a veritable con­
gress of all the active party men in a region. The purpose 
of these meetings was to formulate tactical policy for the 
Gau usually for a period of three or four months. All
4 9For an example of several years of complete 
correspondence of a Bez irks fiihrer see H.A. Reels 9 and 10, 
Correspondence of Siegfried Kasche.
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decisions on campaigning were arrived at by the consent of 
the officials present. The Gauleiter had to present his 
program and answer any objections from the floor. He had 
to explain party tactics and policies that were unclear to 
the membership, and he had to deal with suggestions or cri­
ticisms. In a way these conferences were the Nazi equiva-
50lent of representative meetings. At these gatherings the 
Gauleiters obtained the active consent of their subordinates 
for propaganda campaigns, while at the same time acquiring 
useful information about the temper of the party and the 
political situation in the area.
The leadership conferences existed because the 
Gauleiters were in no position to give arbitrary orders to 
their subordinates. Lesser party officials had the right 
of prior consultation before they committed themselves to a 
course of action. A regional chief who refused to consult 
his sub-leaders was asking for trouble, since these men 
could simply refuse to obey him. If this type of passive 
revolt occurred, there was little a Gauleiter could do to 
remedy the situation for, in truth, all Nazi officials
^Detailed records of these meetings were not kept, 
but one can get an idea of what went on by studying agendas 
and newspaper reports from the VSlkischer Beobachter. See 
VB, September 7, 19 28, p. 3, "Gautag des Gaues Berlin - 
Brandenburg"; VB, November 3, 1928, p. 3, "Gautag Hessen- 
Nassau-SUd"; VB, January 9, 1929, p. 3, "Gau Oberfranken"; 
VB, January 11, 1929, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg"; VB, Jan­
uary 16, 19 29, p. 3, "Gau Rheinland-Gauvertretertag"; VB, 
February 21, 1929, p. 3, "Organisatorische Arbeit in 
Oberfranken." There are numerous other examples of descrip­
tions of such meetings in the Vfllkischer Beobachter.
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tended to function as semi-autonomous political chieftains 
united only in their common dedication to the cause of 
Adolf Hitler. These men were not paid by the party; so the 
Gauleiter could not fire them. They all had personal fol­
lowings; so it was hard to expell them from the movement.
The case of Hans Kuhn is a good example of the difficulties 
involved in dismissing a Nazi leader. Unless the NSDAP was 
willing to chance the loss of a subordinate leader's fol­
lowers, expulsion was impractical. The only effective way 
of controlling Nazi officials was by involving them in the 
decision-making process and in effect accepting their colla­
boration on terms of a near partnership. As long as a 
Gauleiter appeared to be worthy of his position, he could 
expect obedience after proper consultation. Nevertheless, 
if he displayed personal weakness or excessive arrogance, 
his authority would collapse.
The Nazi leadership conferences are perhaps the 
best argument against the theory that the party was bureau­
cratically organized. Their existence indicates that the 
Gauleiters could not impose their will arbitrarily upon sub­
leaders. Within the NSDAP authority was essentially per­
sonal. Only Hitler, who was viewed as an idol to be wor­
shipped slavishly, could impose his authority in writing.
The Gauleiters and other subordinate leaders had to culti­
vate their followers in person. Only if a Nazi chieftain 
could convince his subordinates that he was serving the 
common cause with special effectiveness could he hope to
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retain their loyalty. The charismatic qualities appropriate 
to a subordinate leader were enthusiasm, dedication and 
above all activism in the interest of the movement. A sub­
leader lacking these qualities would find his power ephem­
eral .
The Nazi party cannot be called a bureaucratic 
organization without destroying the meaning of that term. 
Orlow's description of the so-called bureaucratization of 
the party after 1925 is incorrect. His error is in mis­
taking the trappings of bureaucracy (such as modern account­
ing methods) for the reality of this kind of organization. 
Rather, the NSDAP was almost a classically charismatic 
movement at all levels of command, and this was one of the 
most useful features of the party in the late twenties.
Nazi officials maintained a very weak hold on their follow­
ers. They were only able to exercise authority as long as 
they could convince their subordinates that they deserved 
their positions. In short, legitimacy within the NSDAP 
was based upon deeds and not written commissions. The Nazi 
official was compelled to work tirelessly for the movement 
or drop out of a leadership role. Activism was built into 
the NSDAP's organizational structure and was as necessary 
for party stability as it was for the expansion of the 
movement. Intra-party competition to better serve the 
FUhrer also helped to foster an attitude favorable toward 
innovations that might serve to demonstrate the zeal of 
Nazi sub-leaders in promoting the NSDAP. At the same time.
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efforts to centralize campaigning were immediately obeyed, 
since Munich meant Hitler to the rank-and-file party offi­
cials. In this fashion the Nazi leadership structure man­
aged to promote intense activism, while accepting consider­
able centralized direction from the national leadership and 
at the same time fostered the development of local innova­
tions. Wolfgang Sauer has perhaps best described the Nazi
system, stating that it was based upon the principle of
51
"stability through movement." The facade of monolithic 
solidarity based upon Ftthrerprinzip was merely a propaganda 
device to disguise the charismatic nature of the National 
Socialist leadership structure.
Karl Dietrich Bracher, Gerhard Schulz, and Wolf­
gang Sauer, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung 
(K81n: Westdeutscher Verlag, 19601 p. 689.
CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSIONS
The Nazi political breakthrough of 1930 was the 
result of many factors. Undoubtedly, the severe difficul­
ties facing the Weimar Republic in the late twenties greatly 
assisted the NSDAP. The Nazis systematically exploited the 
onset of the great depression, the Young Plan, and the 
political crisis of 1930. The party was powerless to create 
these difficulties, but it could try to turn fortuitous 
circumstances to its advantage by means of propaganda. The 
impact of Nazi campaigning on the electorate is not subject 
to quantification; we can never know for certain what fac­
tors convinced millions of Germans to support the NSDAP. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Nazis had to convince 
a mass audience that they offered a viable alternative to 
the Weimar system before they could effectively exploit dis­
content. This dissertation has dealt with the character of 
Nazi propaganda and with the development of the Nazi politi­
cal machine. It makes no claim that propaganda alone 
brought about the Nazi electoral victory. The development 
of an effective propaganda apparatus, however, was the most 
important accomplishment of the party between 1928 and 1930;
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this political machine in turn was making a considerable
impression upon the public by 1930, It is the contention
of this dissertation that the existence and actions of
this propaganda apparatus was one of the factors accounting
for Nazi electoral success.
Nazi weaknesses in 1928 were all too evident.
Geoffrey Pridham has succinctly described the situation in
the following passages. "Propaganda had been non-existent
in some areas," and "The Reichstag Election of 1928 . . .
made the Nazis aware of the limitations of their propaganda
The principal defects of the NSDAP that led to its failure
to attract mass support were the following: 1), "the appeal
of the party was limited geographically;" 2), "the scarcity
of party finance reduced the scale of propaganda activity,"
and 3), "the effects of the lack of success on the morale
2
of party workers" were highly deleterious. In short, "the 
Nazis did not possess in 1928 a nationwide electoral machine
3
covering all areas of the country." In the next two years 
the Nazis directed their efforts toward overcoming these 
difficulties and creating a propaganda apparatus that could 
carry the party's message to all Germans and dominate poli­
tical life.
The difficulty of improving sagging morale was
^"Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 84.
2Ibid., p. 56.
•*Ibid. , p. 92.
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dealt with by mobilizing the membership as active parts of 
the new Nazi propaganda apparatus. After 1928 every Nazi 
had the opportunity to play a role in the expansion of the 
movement. Ambitious Nazis could become speakers by taking 
Reinhardt’s course. Humbler members could display their 
loyalty and devotion to the cause by handing out leaflets 
or selling tickets as workers in one the the street cells.
In the years after 1928 the NSDAP became a truly partici­
patory movement in which party men no longer felt themselves 
powerless to shape events. The active role of the member­
ship increased the dynamism of the NSDAP while improving the 
morale of ordinary Nazis, who could now view themselves as 
part of a growing and vibrant movement. The ever increasing 
activism of individual party men made it possible for the 
NSDAP to convince the public that the movement was charac­
terized by dynamic growth. Participation also heightened 
the internal unity of the movement. Activist members shared 
common experiences which made them feel closer to each other 
and to the NSDAP. This camaraderie in turn helped the Nazis 
to convince members and outsiders of the desirability of 
such highly publicized Nazi goals as the Volksqemeinschaft. 
The unity and brotherhood fostered by common experiences at 
the propaganda front seemed to be replacing the lovingly 
remembered camaraderie of the trenches of World War I . For 
outsiders such displays of dedication and harmony must have 
been impressive. Here was a movement that welcomed the 
active participation of common men, inspired open profes-
251
sions of faith and vast amounts of self-sacrificing work.
In the atmosphere of despair and impotence of the late twen­
ties, this was a unique phenomenon. The participatory party 
developed by the Nazis to heighten sagging morale acted as 
a powerful magnet attracting those who felt themselves 
crushed and powerless when faced with the realities of 
Germany in the late twenties.
Reliance upon ordinary party men as propagandists 
also served to overcome the NSDAP's financial difficulties. 
Reinhardt's speakers1 school, Czarnowski's slide service, 
the Muchow street cell organization and the National Social­
ist Auto Clubs all shared one thing in common; they were all 
very nearly financially self-sufficient or even produced a 
profit for the party. Nazi rallies were specifically de-
4
signed to pay for themselves. Finally, the party employed 
very few professional workers. Most Nazi activities were 
staged by unpaid volunteers. Even the party's few employees 
were not paid very well and often depended primarily upon 
their income as members of the Reichstag or a Landtag. In 
short, the party did not need major outside contributors. 
Income from dues and occasional small or moderate contribu­
tions was adequate to support the NSDAP. The secret of Nazi 
financing was self-sufficiency, not a hidden group of 
patrons.
Most previous studies have emphasized the role of 
the Nazi alliance with the conservatives to oppose the Young
^See Appendix D.
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Plan as an explanation of how the NSDAP overcame its finan­
cial difficulties. Konrad Heiden and Ernst Hanfstaengl first 
offered this view. Hanfstaengl went so far as to say that 
the campaign against the Young Plan led directly to the 
financing of Nazi activities by the industrial magnates
5
from the Ruhr, especially Emil Kirdorf. There are several 
problems with this interpretation. Hanfstaengl was politi­
cally inactive between 1928 and 1930. Thus, his observa­
tions were based upon gossip and pure speculation and can­
not be viewed as those of an eyewitness. Furthermore, his 
remarks are not supported by any documentation. Lastly,
Emil Kirdorf joined the NSDAP in 1927, but as Henry Turner
6
revealed, "In 1928 . . . Kirdorf resigned in anger.” He
was not a party member during the crucial two years leading 
up to the Nazi political breakthrough, and it is very un­
likely that he contributed much money to the NSDAP. At 
this time, the theory that big business played a major role 
in financing the party before 1930 stands largely refuted.
The crusade against the Young Plan— even without the 
hypothetical support of big business for the Nazis— still 
remained a focal point of discussion for those interested 
in Nazi finances. Joachim Fest summarized his views in the 
following statement: "After concluding the alliance, the
Heiden, National Socialism, p. 124 and Hanfstaengl, 
Hitler, p. 148.
^Turner, Nazism, p. 93.
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Nazi party for the first time had funds enough to crank up 
its excellent propaganda apparatus. It at once began show­
ing the public a style of propaganda of unprecedented radi-
7
cality and impact." Fest seems to assume that the NSDAP 
needed an infusion of outside funds in order to begin cam­
paigning in earnest. There are several flaws in this in­
terpretation. Fest refers to an already existent and ex­
cellent propaganda machine which the Nazis were able to 
"crank up" for the first time with the funds provided by 
their conservative allies. How such a political machine 
could be created when the party was unable to use it for 
lack of proper funding is not explained. If the Nazi pro­
paganda apparatus already existed at the time of the con­
servative alliance, then this alliance was not crucial to 
the development of the NSDAP*s political machine. Further­
more, money from conservative sources earmarked for the 
NSDAP dried up as soon as the referendum on the Young Plan 
was concluded in December, 1929. As Henry Turner concluded, 
"There is not a trace of documentary evidence . . . that
any of Hugenberg's resources were thereafter diverted to the
g
Nazis." Yet, Nazi campaigning intensified rather than 
diminished in 1930, reaching a screeching crescendo in 
September just before the Reichstag elections. The evidence
7
Fest, Hitler, p. 26 3. Karl Dietrich Bracher also 
emphasized the role of this campaign in providing the party 
with proper finances and undreamed of propaganda and organ­
izational resources. Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 161.
^Turner, Nazism, p. 92.
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seems to indicate that the development and activities of the 
Nazi political machine were in no way directly linked to the 
acquisition of funds from the party's allies in the fight 
against the Young Plan. The most that can be said about 
this added income is that it undoubtedly made it easier for 
the party to conduct massive campaigns for a short period 
of time. Conservative money was helpful but not essential 
to Nazi political drives. The campaign against the Young 
Plan was very important in explaining Nazi success and will 
be discussed later, but the reasons for its significance 
had little to do with party finances.
The emphasis on conservative monetary support of 
the NSDAP in late 1929 is a corollary of the old theory of 
big business financing the party. It is also a sign of 
frustration. The Nazis developed an effective and seeming­
ly omnipresent political machine in the years after 1928.
How was the party able to finance this organization? The 
question has haunted historians for four decades. The 
Nazis themselves helped to cloud the issue by practicing 
"a psychotic form of secrecy concerning their financial 
resources . . . .  From the very beginning it was an un­
written law of the party that no records should be kept of 
contributions." This secrecy plus some exposes originat­
ing from the period 1930 to 194 5 led historians to believe 
that the party might be under the control of covert mani­
fest, Hitler, p. 166.
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pulators who were also major contributors. The time has 
come to jettison these theories for good. The search for 
the money men behind the NSDAP has been a search for the 
little man who was not there. The secret of Nazi financing 
is best exemplified by the development of the party's propa­
ganda apparatus; the secret was self-sufficiency which ob­
viated the need of relying upon the generosity of wealthy 
outsiders.
The development of the Nazi political machine was 
based upon the acceptance of the party's limitations. The 
Nazis made a lack of finances into a virtue; and they re­
stored party morale by vigorously exploiting the willing­
ness of members to become active participants in the move­
ment's unceasing propaganda drives. The last major limita­
tion on Nazi propaganda was the fixed set of rules devel­
oped by Hitler in the middle twenties. The party tended 
to follow these precepts in all of its activities. Nazi 
propaganda consistently stressed violence and emotional 
appeals while shunning any attempt to "educate" the general 
public on the merits of National Socialism. The goal re­
mained to present a picture of the party's model counter­
society or "fictional world." This element of propaganda 
was best exemplified by the party's regional rallies, the 
Reichsparteitag of 1929 and the mystical celebration at 
Caub. It enabled the NSDAP to portray itself as "less a 
party than an association of fighters who made demands 
on the whole man and answered a brittle and crumbling world
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with the battle cry of a new o r d e r . A l l  Nazi propaganda 
devices developed after 1928 attempted to create impressions 
similar to those emphasized at major rallies and stressed 
by Hitler in Mein Kampf.
The principal task facing the NSDAP in 1928 was to 
devise ways to present their message to a mass electorate. 
Heinrich Himmler attempted to do this through his saturation 
campaigns, but these efforts were limited geographically to 
one Gau because of the dearth of available propagandists.
The solution to the problem of quantity originated as a 
strictly local program in Oberbayern-Schwaben. Gauleiter 
Fritz Reinhardt's correspondence school for speakers trained 
almost two thousand orators between 1928 and 1930. This 
vast expansion of the number of Nazi speakers enabled the 
party to stage continuous campaigns in all parts of Germany. 
Such intensive agitation was very important in Nazi politi­
cal drives. It helped to create an image of party strength 
and dedication which added to the attractiveness of the 
NSDAP. As Geoffrey Pridham observed:
"The continuous agitation of the NSDAP 
was necessary in view of the kind of 
electorate to which it was primarily 
appealing— especially to non-voters and 
those whose attachment to other parties 
could be shaken. A series of public 
meetings was the surest way of making 
contact with voters who were either 
politically indifferent or had no strong 
political commitment."11
10Ibid., p. 275.
■^Pridham, Hitler' s Rise, p. 138.
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Reinhardt's speakers made it possible for the party to reach 
and to impress cynical and indifferent voters. The impres­
sion of unceasing activism was important to the party since 
a revolutionary renewal of Germany could seemingly be 
brought about only by a dedicated, militant order. The 
Nazis could best create the impression that they were such 
a movement by continuous agitation, and Reinhardt's speakers 
made it physically possible for the NSDAP to do precisely 
that.
Nazi propaganda was by no means limited to the 
spoken word. In fact, the content of Nazi speeches was 
rarely as important as the quantity of such performances. 
Himmler in his instructions regarding the saturation cam­
paigns did not recommend any particular speaking themes.
Rather, he directed his subordinates to make speeches on
12topics appropriate to the area being canvassed. Most 
Nazi orations were on general themes in any case, in 
keeping with the party's emphasis on its role of bringing 
about a rebirth of Germany. In order to develop this idea 
effectively, Nazi propagandists employed non-verbal techni­
ques as often as the spoken word. Again the problem was 
reaching a geographically diverse mass public. The NSDAP 
through a number of innovations in the years after 1928 was 
able to overcome this difficulty and to present its non­
verbal message to the bulk of the populace.
12H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda Aktion" 
December 24, 1928.
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As with Reinhardt's school most of the party's 
innovations in visual campaigning originated as local pro­
grams. Czarnowski's slide service and the National 
Socialist film agency enabled the party to utilize pictorial 
propaganda extensively. The combination of slides and ver­
bal commentary presented at Czarnowski's shows was espe­
cially effective. Nazi slides reenforced the party’s ef­
forts to create exemplary images of the NSDAP's opponents 
adding validity to Nazi racial stereotypes. Just as the 
Nazis attempted to create a "fictional world" at their major 
rallies, they also tried to heighten the believability of 
their conception of struggle by making enemies seem real and 
omnipresent, something that could best be done with pictures. 
The Nazi tendency to present these ideas by personal attacks 
on individuals was exemplified by the slide show "Isidor" 
which maligned Dr. Bernhard Weiss, the Vice-President of the 
Berlin police. By focusing upon an individual, the Nazis 
were able to make their arguments less theoretical and to 
convince the public that the threats they were referring to 
were real. The other major advantage of visual propaganda 
was the attractiveness of such events. Slide shows and 
films were excellent ways of getting people to attend meet­
ings. In a small town or village with little to do at night, 
such a performance would be welcomed simply for its enter­
tainment value.
Other Nazi : innovations in non-verbal propaganda 
such as the Muchow street cell organization and the National
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Socialist Auto Clubs served to arouse the mass participa­
tion necessary to create a believable image of the Nazi 
counter-society. The Muchow system mobilized large segments 
of the party as workers to distribute pamphlets and hand­
bills, and to sell tickets to Nazi event. These activities 
were useful to the NSDAP in themselves, but a key by-product 
of the Muchow organization was to strengthen the impression 
that the Nazi party was a participatory and militant move­
ment. Muchow*s workers by their efforts were demonstrating 
their active faith in the movement, an impressive quality 
in an age of cynicism. The auto clubs enabled the party to 
mass its personnel at major canvassing events to create an 
illusion of strength. The Muchow system and the auto clubs 
helped the NSDAP to present many of the same images used at 
Nazi rallies on a continuous basis throughout Germany.
Finally, the charismatic nature of Nazi leadership 
enabled the party to heighten the effectiveness of its 
campaigning. Heinrich Himmler as propaganda chief was able 
to initiate useful programs and adopt successful regional 
innovations. These schemes were easily imposed on the 
NSDAP in all parts of Germany because Himmler, as a member 
of the Reichsleitung, was acting as an organizational ex­
tension of Adolf Hitler, the absolute chieftain of the 
movement and the living embodiment of the coming German re­
birth. Orders from Munich were obeyed without question 
enabling the national leadership to impose some central 
direction upon the movement. At the same time, lesser Nazi
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commanders had to display a somewhat different variety of 
personal charisma than Hitler. They had to persuade their 
followers that they were worthy of support by displays of 
courage, self-sacrifice, and above all activism. Nazi sub­
leaders were able to maintain their power only in this man­
ner making activism a necessity for those who wished to 
command and thus reenforcing the party's efforts to create 
the impression that the NSDAP was a dedicated crusading 
order fighting for German renewal. Lastly, the intensive 
intra-party rivalry among leaders continuously trying to 
demonstrate their dedication to Hitler and their effective­
ness in the service of National Socialism engendered an 
atmosphere favorable to local experimentation. Successful 
regional innovations were applauded by the Reichsleitung 
which tolerated a good deal of independence as long as sub­
ordinate leaders obeyed commands emanating from Munich and 
worked hard for the movement. By combining centralization, 
activism and encouragement of local schemes the Nazi leader­
ship structure helped to foster the growth of a dynamic yet 
flexible propaganda apparatus.
The role of propaganda in the Nazi electoral break­
through of 1930 can only be speculatively assessed. The 
documentation on Nazi campaigning is at best spotty. This 
dissertation has tried to surmount the problem by dealing 
primarily with national programs which it can reasonably be 
assumed were adopted in most areas of Germany. There is 
still, however, a great deal that we do not know about the
261
Nazi political machine. We do not know the identities of 
Reinhardt's speakers, or where they spoke, or what effects 
their efforts had on audiences. We do not know the number 
of slide show or film performances staged by the party, the 
size of audiences attending, or even the locations of these 
events. No complete evidence about the street cell organi­
zations exists. Data on rallies are also fragmentary, and 
the sources of such information are often of questionable 
value. Incomplete documentation makes it impossible to 
deal with the impact of Nazi propaganda on the basis of 
quantification. Even if such detailed evidence existed, 
however, it is difficult to see how a quantifier would ap­
proach the subject methodologically. Over six million 
Germans voted for the NSDAP in 1930 for a variety of rea­
sons. To isolate propaganda from all other factors would 
be a near impossibility. This dissertation does not claim 
that the development of an effective political machine alone 
brought about the Nazi political victory of 1930. It simply 
suggests that this was one factor leading to the party's 
electoral triumph.
The existence of a Nazi political machine in 1930 
has been generally accepted. In commenting upon Nazi agita­
tion in Gau Hanover-South Brunswick, Noakes stated that the 
Nazis possessed "a formidable propaganda machine" and staged 
"a campaign of exceptional skill." He summed up the role 
of the Nazi propaganda apparatus in the following, "The 
NSDAP . . . had the advantage that it could simply increase
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the tempo of its already well-oiled machine, while the
other bourgeois parties had to improvise a campaign specif i-
13cally for the election." Bracher described the role of 
propaganda in this way, "The party owed its growth to the 
application of commercial advertising techniques to politi­
cal recruitment, which, violating the rules of good taste
and acceptable levels of noise, began an assault on the
14collective subsconscious." Elsewhere he commented, "The 
National Socialists, with their noisy and violent SA demon­
strations, tireless propaganda forces, turbulent mass meet­
ings, and interminable speeches, dominated public life more
15than any other party.” Fest summed up the general im­
pression of the Nazi political machine. "Nothing of the 
kind had ever existed in Germany."16
The expansion of the NSDAP between 1928 and 19 30 
was a slow process which accelerated considerably from late 
1929 to the Reichstag election of September, 1930. On May
20, 1928 the NSDAP polled 2.6 percent in a Reichstag elec- 
17tion. On the same day the party received 1.8 percent in 
the election to the Prussian Landtag, 6.1 percent in Bavaria,, 
1.8 percent in Wiirttemberg, 7.5 percent in Oldenburg and
1 3-LJNoakes, Lower Saxony, p. 151.
14Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 150.
15Ibid., p. 182.
16Fest, Hitler, p. 263.
17Pridham, Hitler1s Rise, p. 322.
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2.1 percent in Anhalt. On June 1, the NSDAP polled 3.3 per-
18cent in the election to the Lippe Landtag. By the end of
1928 the party was showing some gains in local elections.
In Heimar Nazi totals rose from under 11 percent in May to
19over 17 percent in December. By the middle of 19 29 the
party scored impressively in several elections. In Coburg
the Nazis became the majority party as a result of city
20elections held in June. In Saxony the Nazis almost 
doubled their vote. Nazi progress in Saxony was taken by 
the membership as a barometer of the expansion of the move­
ment everywhere. In 1926 the party received 37,725 votes.
In the Reichstag election of 1928 the Nazis polled 74,343 
and in the Landtag election of May 12, 1929, the NSDAP
21obtained 133,7 92 votes or 5 percent of the electorate.
These results indicate a steady growth in Nazi support.
There is little evidence to suggest that this expansion was 
caused by anything other than propaganda. The Young Plan 
was not submitted until after the election to the Saxon 
Landtag. The Socialist-dominated, national coalition
1 RPridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, p. 382-83.
19VB, December 5, 1928, p. 1, "Nationalsozialist- 
ische Erfolge bei den Gemeindewahlen in Thuringen."
20VB, June 25, 1929, p. 1, "Gewaltiger Sieg der 
Nationalsozialisten bei den Wahlen in Koburg."
^H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei WUrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.6.29, 
Aus der NSDAP" and Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, 
pp. 382-83.
264
government was demonstrating considerable stability, and the 
great depression was not to start for several months. Eco­
nomic conditions were not good in the middle of 19 29, but 
the psychological shock produced by the crash of the New 
York stock market was not present. The absence of this 
fear is especially important in analyzing Nazi growth, since 
the party did not attract a significant number of the unem­
ployed from the working class, but instead scored heavily 
with middle class voters frightened about the future. That 
the Nazis were able to show steady expansion at this time 
was remarkable. External conditions did not favor them, and 
their political machine was by no means fully developed.
Yet, the first effects of massive Nazi propaganda were being 
felt in the year after the Reichstag election of 1928.
The first impressive NSDAP victories came in late 
1929. In Baden the party polled 7 percent in the Landtag 
election of October. In November the Nazis received 8.1
percent in Ltibeck, and in December they obtained 11. 3 percent 
22in Thuringia. In Baden alone this represented a 250 per-
23cent growth in Nazi support from 19 28. The rapid expan­
sion of National Socialism in late 1929 is more complex than its 
slow growth to the middle of the year. By late 1929 the 
Nazis had emerged as major participants in the campaign for 
the referendum against the Young Plan. The first effects of
22Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, pp. 382-83. 
2^VB, October 30, 1929, p. 3, "Unser Wahlsieg in
Baden."
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the great depression were being felt, and the national coa­
lition government was showing the first signs of instability 
after the death of Stresemann. The key issue at this time 
was the Young Plan, and the Nazi role in opposing the re­
parations agreement was the focus of political attention.
The depression and the developing constitutional crisis 
were both more important events, but public attention was 
captured by the referendum, which was the most visible issue 
of the day.
The fight against the Young Plan was the single 
most useful campaign for the NSDAP in the late twenties.
The Nazis received some money from their conservative allies 
to conduct this campaign, but other factors were far more 
important to the party's future growth than monetary consi­
derations. The alliance with the German conservatives was 
very helpful to the Nazis, for it freed them "from the
noisome odor of being a crackpot revolutionary and 
24
putschist" party. It also established links between the
NSDAP and socially prominent and influential German 
25leaders. Hitler and other Nazi luminaries were given 
considerable exposure in magazines and newsreels produced 
by Hugenberg’s publishing empire. All of this spelled re­
spectability. The kind of publicity afforded the Nazis by 
Hugenberg helped to convince middle-class Germans that the
24Fest, Hitler, p. 263.
25Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 161.
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NSDAP was a legitimate political party and not a gang of 
wild-eyed, crypto-socialist fanatics. This type of legiti­
macy was handed to the NSDAP by its conservative allies.
It would have been extremely difficult for the Nazis to 
overcome their reputation as crackpots without this outside 
help.
The party made its mark in other ways in the strug­
gle over reparations. The Nazis were only one of a number 
of parties and groups united to oppose the Young Plan. 
Hugenberg's conservative DNVP was a bigger and a far better 
established political party than the NSDAP. The Pan- 
Germans and the Stahlhelm had better reputations in conser­
vative, middle-class circles. Yet, the Nazis emerged from 
this alliance as the most important party on the right.
The ascendency of the NSDAP over its rightist rivals was a 
result almost entirely of the prowess of the party in pro­
paganda. As Fest concluded, "None of the other partners
in the nationalist alliance could approach the Nazi party
2 6in stridency, sharpness and psychological cunning." The 
campaign established the NSDAP as "the most energetic and
27purposeful force on the divided and directionless Right." 
Thus, the emergence of the Nazis as the leading German 
rightist party was the result of the actions of the Nazi 
propaganda apparatus.
26Fest, Hitler, p. 263.
27Ibid., pp. 263-64.
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The Nazi political machine was fast approaching 
maturity by late 1929. The regional schemes that were begun 
earlier had been adopted as national programs by the 
Reichsleitung during the first half of the year. Reinhardt's 
school was beginning to produce a large number of speakers. 
Czarnowski's slide service was an established party office. 
Apparently, many Nazi local groups had acquired the neces­
sary equipment for the projection of slides and a variety 
of shows were available for distribution. The development 
of the film service was slower, but Goebbels' "Kampf um 
Berlin" was in circulation along with a movie on the 1927 
"Reichsparteitag." The Muchow street cell organization and 
the National Socialist Auto Clubs seem to have been adopted 
and in operation in many parts of Germany. Finally, the 
Nazi rally system was fully mature by the time of the vote 
on the Young Plan. This formidable political machine en­
abled the NSDAP to overwhelm its conservative allies.
By 19 30 the Nazis had severed their ties with the
German conservatives. No further aid was forthcoming from
this source, but the fully grown political machine contin-
28ued to "dominate public life." Theodore Abel has aptly
described this process:
"The Nazi propaganda machine was notable 
for its shrewd and daring use of modern 
advertising psychology and for its mass 
effect. Even more remarkable, however, 
was the sheer bulk of its effort. Prose-
28Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 182.
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lytizing went on unceasingly, 
regardless of physical or man-made 
obstacles. Moreover, the Party 
'covered' Germany with a thorough­
ness that made its doctrines known 
in almost every home, in city and 
countryside a l i k e . " 2 *
The main themes of Nazi propaganda changed very little from 
late 1929 to the Reichstag election of September, 19 30. The 
Nazis continued to emphasize their opposition to the Young 
Plan and attempted to link the ever worsening great depres­
sion to reparations. The party also developed an agricul­
tural program in early 19 30, but the NSDAP continued to 
stress general themes and the Nazi promise to bring about a 
rebirth of Germany. In any case, the contents of Nazi pro­
paganda was never as remarkable as its bulk. Belief in the 
mythical Nazi future was based more on the creation of con­
crete images than on the rough presentation of Nazi ideology. 
It was the party's political machine that enabled the NSDAP 
to implant the images which made it possible for them to 
exploit the political and economic crises of the Weimar 
Republic.
The six million Germans who voted for the NSDAP in 
19 30 were casting their lot with a political movement that 
seemed to represent strength and decisiveness in a period 
of weakness and indecision. They were voting for a party 
that claimed it would renew Germany and was willing to 
undergo considerable self-sacrifice to bring about such a
29Abel, Nazi Movement, pp. 175-76
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rebirth. In the Germany of 1930, the NSDAP was the party 
of faith in an era of impotent cynicism. Above all, the 
Nazis offered the public visible goals, such as the 
Volksgemeinschaft, and equally visible enemies, such as 
the Jews and the Marxists. Enemies could be defeated and 
destroyed. Ideals could be attained or, at least, one 
could strive to reach such goals. This "fictional world" 
was very appealing to those who were frustrated by economic, 
diplomatic, and constitutional crises that seemed beyond 
understanding much less solution. In a period of growing 
complexity, the very simplicity and clarity of the Nazi 
counter-society heightened the party's attractiveness.
Many undoubtedly voted for the Nazis because of their fear 
of Communism, or because of the Nazi agricultural program, 
or the party's anti-Semitism, or any one of a multitude of 
other reasons; but the underlying reason for supporting the 
NSDAP was the fact that the Nazis offered hope in a period 
of hopelessness. As Bracher observed, "Long before the 
famous parliamentary elections of September, 1930, the 
successful course which within three years was to bring the 
splinter party to total power had b e g u n . T h e  successful 
course for the Nazi party was based upon the efficient use 
of a geographically comprehensive propaganda apparatus that 
could persuade the public that the NSDAP offered a viable 
and attractive alternative to the Weimar Republic. Without
^°Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 167.
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such a political machine the Nazis would have been unable 
to exploit the opportunities available to the party in the 
late twenties. The National Socialist victory of September, 
1930 was a result of the political opportunities offered by 
the Young Plan, the great depression and the German consti­
tutional crisis, and the skillful exploitation of these 
opportunities by the Nazi political machine. All of these 
elements were essential for the Nazi electoral triumph.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF NSDAP SPEAKERS FOR 1928
From Vfflkischer Beobachter, January 26, 1929, p. 3 
"20,000 Versammlungen im Jahre 1928."
SPEAKER NUMBER OF MEETINGS
Albrecht, Dr. Herbert 117
Allworden, W.v., Altona 28
Bedenbender, Bergmann, Eisern 30
Benesch, Theo, Mittelfranken 128
Bergler, Johann, Ingolstadt 40
Borchert, Hans, Behra 130
Bolwim, Leopold, Miinster i. W. 46
Brix, Emil, Schleswig-Holstein 92
Bruckner, Helmuth, Gauleiter 138
Biittmann, Dr.,M.d.L. Munich 20
Buradt, Willi, Diisseldorf 68
Czarnowski, Bruno, Aschersleben 116
Czirniok, Hermann, Stettin 4 3
Dauser, Hans, M.d.L. Munich 146
Dietze, Alfred, Weinbohla 13
Dorow, Nordhausen 52
Dreher, Wilhelm, M.d.R. Stuttgart 96
Engel, Hans, Berlin 122
Fiehler, Karl, Munich 51
Fitzner, L.H., Eichelberg 19
Forster, Albert, Flirth 31
Friedrich, H., Karlsruhe i.B. 85
Gengler, Ludwig, Niirnberg 162
Goebbels, Joseph, Gauleiter Berlin 188
Grass1, Hermann, Rottenberg 27
Grimm, G.W. Herrsching, Oberbayern 14
Gronow, Eisner von, Frankfurt a.d. Oder 301
Haag, Hans, Niirnberg 37
Haake, Heinz, M.d.L. 142
Harth, Emil, Haardt 89
Hellmuth, Dr., Marktbreit 17
Hinkler, Gauleiter, Halle-Merseburg 135
Hof fenfelder, Kolberg 33
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SPEAKER NUMBER OF MEETINGS
Jacob, Th., Pirmasens 4 2
Jenke, Breslau 15
Jngwersen, Adolf, Berlin 44
Jordan, Rudolf, Fulda 42
Kasche, Siegfried, Sorau 104
Kayser, Wilhelm 106
Kemper, Friedheim, Mannheim 179
Klein, Emil, Munich 22
KiShler, Dr. Hermann 32
Kleine, Joseph, Elber-Elster 60
Kramer, Baden 180
Krause, Rudolf, Magdeburg 19
Krell, A., Rheinhessend 84
Kunz, Erish, Zwickau 7 3
Lammel, Wilfried, Schaidt 25
Liebel, Ludwig, Contwig 6 2
Lippert, Major 39
Loeper, M.d.L., Gauleiter Magdeburg-Anhalt 80 
Ltitt, Wilhelm, Berlin 157
Mann, Richard, Pirmasens 45
Matusz, Max, Polsnitz 28
Mogunia, W., Kfinigsberg 20
Mflller, Max, Neukirchen 27
Muller, Bergmann Obersdorf 15
Oertel, Carl Albrecht, Frankenberg i.S. 20
Papenbrook, Paul, Gotha 76
Pacher, Willy, Annaberg 24
Preuper, Paul, Weidenau 28
Piihlmann, Rudolf, Stammbach 20
Reinecke, Robert, WUrzburg 26
Roth, Otto, Schornwelsach 30
Rtihle, Gerd, Frankfurt a. Main 15
Schmeer, Rudolf, Bad-Aachen 6 3
SchiSne, Heinrich, Lockstedter Lager 16 8
SchiSnwklder, Bad Freienwalde 30
Schreiber, Waldkirchen 4 3
Schreiner, Dr. Walter, Plattling 18
Schwede, Koburg 60
Senboth, Fritz, Neustadt a.d. Aisch 21
Sperber, Hersbruck 26
StShr, Franz, M.d.R., Berlin 102
Strasser, Gregor, M.d.R., Munich 139
Studentkowski, Werner, Leipzig 197
Theuerkauf, Paul, Schleiz 25
Tiirk, Richard, Schwengfeld, Silesia 27
Wagner, Robert, Gauleiter Baden 100
Wangenheim, Artur v., Berlin 27
Wege, Ernst, Elsterwerda 36
Wohlleben, Heinz, Gera 171
Woweries, Friedrich, Mtlhlhausen i. Thuringia 82
Additional list from Vfilkischer Beobachter, Febru 
ary 3/4, 19 28, p. 3, "Unserer Redner Arbeit im Jahre 192 8
SPEAKER NUMBER OF MEETINGS
Buttmann, M.d.L., Munich 6 0
Florian, Fritz, Bonn 9 3
Grimm, M.d.L., Ansbach 100
Grohfi, Joseph, K61n 76
Gutterer, Leopold, Frankfurt a. Main 77
Haack, Pomerania-West 34
Heidrich, Georg, KSnigsberg 110
Heyse, Hessen-Nassau 20
Jaene, Prenzlau 15
Kobes, Max, Bayreuth 72
Klostermann, Bockenroda 20
Kremser, Gr. Breslau 64
Linder, C., Frankfurt a. Main 32
Lohse, Hinrich, M.d.L. Gauleiter
Schleswig-Holstein 135
Leuterer, Georg, Weimar 28
Maierhofer, Floss 76
Mangier, Siegfried, Zwickau i. Saxony 22
Mttnchmeyer, Minister 19 5
Pape, Alfred, Osterfeld 19
Reinhardt, Fritz, Gauleiter Oberbayern 75
Rentmeister, Lower Austria 131
Ringshausen, Gauleiter Hessen 60
Rosenburg, Erich, Berlin 17
Schemm, M.d.L., Gauleiter Bayreuth 219
Simon, Gustav, Hermeskeil 36
Sonnleitner, B., Kassel 26
Staebe, Gustav, Braunschweig 120
WSchtler 50
Zahneissen, Bamberg 72
M.d.L. means member of the Landtag or provincial assembly 
M.d.R. means member of the Reichstag.
APPENDIX B
THE QUALITY OF REINHARDT SPEAKERS
Dietrich Orlow has drawn some conclusions about the
role of the Reinhardt speakers in Nazi campaigning on the
basis of his assessment of the level of training provided
to the students.
"The series of mass-producred Reinhardt 
speakers were the foot soldiers of the 
NSDAP's army of agitators. The party 
did not expect them to persuade any 
large number of disengaged Germans to 
vote for or join the NSDAP, but, hope­
fully, they would demonstrate the 
party's interest in the village 
audience and stir at least some of the 
hearers to undertake a more or less 
inconvenient journey to a nearby town 
to hear a rhetorically far more effec­
tive Gau or Reich speaker.
Orlow considered the Reinhardt speakers to be specifically
rural and village orators. He contended that Reinhardt's
course "offered no political education in any broad sense"
and only provided students with "some knowledge of the
rudiments of public speaking technique, a store of set
speeches and some memorized answers for typical questions
2
from the audience." Orlow concluded that this training
^Orlow, Nazi Party, pp. 159-60. 
^Ibid., p. 159.
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was inadequate for addressing audiences in towns or cities.
Orlow based these conclusions on a single piece of 
evidence, the descriptive brochure Rednerschule der NSDAP.^ 
This document was issued by Reinhardt in mid-1930 primarily 
as a lengthy advertisement to attract new participants to 
the school. As an illustration of what the program hoped 
to accomplish, the brochure posed a series of rather sim­
ple questions that the students would be able to answer 
at the end of the course. On the basis of this evidence 
Orlow drew his conclusions, which would lead one to believe 
that Reinhardt’s speakers were of only limited value to the 
party as propagandists.
It is very difficult to assess the quality of 
Reinhardt's products. We do not know the identity of most 
of these orators, and thus we cannot examine a series of 
reports on their speeches* The only specific evidence about 
the oratorical ability of the speakers is a report written 
by the Prussian Ministry of the Interior in May, 1930, 
which stated that they showed considerable "Rhetorical skill 
combined with subjects carefully chosen to suit the particu­
lar audience" insuring "according to our observation, halls
which are almost invariably overcrowded with enthusiastic 
4
listeners." This description certainly does not support 
Orlow’s conclusions about the abilities of Reinhardt's
3H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Rednerschule der NSDAP."
^Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, p. 101.
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speakers; however, it is an isolated example and does not 
deal with the central point of Orlow's judgment, his belief 
that the course provided insufficient training to produce 
orators able to address audiences in towns and cities suc­
cessfully .
The best way to judge the quality of training pro­
vided by the Reinhardt school is by examining the contents 
of one of the courses. Unfortunately, no courses from the
1928-30 period have been preserved. One from 1931-1932,
5
however, is available. It does not resemble Orlow's 
description in any way. It lasted one year and consisted 
of twenty-four lessons covering almost two hundred pages, 
not to mention outside reading. It contained no set 
speeches or standard answers for typical questions from 
the audience. Rather, the course was clearly designed to 
instruct the prospective orators on a wide variety of sub­
jects, so that they could operate independently upon grad­
uation. The lessons were certainly not objective, but they
H.A. Reel 14, Folder 274, "Rednerkurs der Gau- 
Rednerschule d. Gaues Munchen-Oberbayern," June 8, 1931. 
Henceforth referred to as "Rednerkurs." This course was 
issued by the Munchen-Oberbayern Gauleitung, but it was not 
a specifically regional course. The authors of the various 
lessons were major party specialists, and instructions were 
included for campaigning in areas other than Oberbayern- 
Schwaben. In any case, after September, 1930, Reinhardt 
was no longer so closely associated with the speakers' 
school. He was elected to the Reichstag at that time and 
became the party's expert on finance and taxation. This 
led to greater decentralization in the administration of 
the courses than had existed before 1930. Gau offices that 
had since 1929 periodically tested students began to assume 
that control of issuing courses and correcting homework. The 
central speakers' office retained responsibility for writing 
uniform lessons for all students.
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did provide a considerable amount of information useful to
the neophyte speaker. For as was pointed out in the first
lesson, "it is only possible to convince people of what one
6
is first convinced of himself."
Even Orlow*s contention that one of the major func­
tions of the course was to teach "the rudiments of public 
7
speaking" is not supported by the extant course, which 
virtually ignored oratorical tricks. In all the lessons
g
there were only five simple suggestions on speaking style.
Ironically, one of these suggestions was to avoid the set
9
speech and work from a simple outline. The written lessons 
did not even attempt to teach students how to speak; this 
skill was to be acquired by practical experience, first in 
addressing fellow members at "Speaking Evenings" and— after 
the fourth month of training--in actually making speeches.
The formal instruction concentrated upon providing the 
students with an adequate supply of arguments, so that they 
would have something to say.
Orlow*s contentions aside, the 1931-32 course is 
helpful in assessing the level of training provided by the 
school. It contained material on general Nazi theory in-
£
Ibid., p. 2. (Pagination is included within the
document.
70rlow, Nazi Party, p. 159.
®H.A. Reel 14, Folder 274, "Rednerkurs," pp. 1,2,
4,26 e.g. pronounce all consonants, wear a dark suit.
^Ibid., p. 2.
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eluding the party's views on race, the Volk, the National 
Socialist state and Marxism. Long-term programs on such 
matters as finance, interest, foreign policy, and agricul­
ture were described in considerable detail. The policies 
of the Bruening government were attacked in a number of 
lessons dealing with current events. Finally, examples of 
opposition speeches were dissected and refuted. Two lessons 
were entirely devoted to this, and many others discussed 
specific attacks on Nazis made in various parts of Germany. 
All of the lessons tended to follow a circular pattern. 
General National Socialist contentions opened each lesson, 
followed by specific short-term programs to deal with ex­
isting problems. Other parties were then blamed for Ger­
many's difficulties with some supporting evidence to prove 
their culpability. Opposition stands on given issues were 
always systematically refuted, often both with statistics 
and with statements by "objective" analysts. The lesson 
ended with a description of the Nazi program designed to 
achieve the originally stated general solution of the pro­
blem. A chain of logic seemed to tie the entire exercise 
together adding to the believability of the Nazi program, 
in fact, making the Nazi approach to a particular matter 
seem both correct and inevitable.
One major topic discussed in the course was the 
state of German agriculture.^ This topic is of special
1Qlbid., pp. 8-11.
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interest since Reinhardt's students were speaking on "the 
expropriation of the German farmer" as early as February, 
1929.^ The lesson followed the pattern described above.
It began with the general statement, "The task of
the National Socialist state is to elevate agriculture to
12the highest estate." This statement was justified by the 
assertion that the farmer was the embodiment of the ideal 
characteristics of the race because of his close connection 
with the land. Typically broad goals were followed by con­
crete proposals. The short-term National Socialist program 
to deal with agricultural difficulties including a two-year 
moratorium on taxes, to be succeeded by a new tax struc­
ture based upon produce and not on gold. The idea of pay­
ing taxes in kind was especially appealing to Germany's 
small farmers who had been adversely affected both by the 
deflationary policy pursued by the Bruening ministry and by 
the declining food prices fostered by the consumer-oriented 
Reich governments since 1919. The final measure would es­
tablish protection from foreign competition through in­
creased tariff duties; this proposal was explained as part 
of the Nazi plan to establish a national economy based on 
the principles of autarky.
The lesson went on to blame the plight of German 
agriculture in the Weimar Republic on the "Jewish world
^VB, January 30, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialist- 
ische Redner=Fernschule."
12H.A. Reel 14, Folder 274, "Rednerkurs," p. 8.
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stock market" and usurious interest rates. To support this
assertion, the lesson discussed the "Jewish control of the
13animal market and the resulting depressed prices." This 
treatment provided the student with solid "evidence" to 
support his statements. The Nazis intended to break the 
"Jewish" hold on agriculture by creating a State Farmers' 
Credit Bank that would lend money at "reasonable" rates 
and by establishing a strict entail on land, which would be 
passed on by primogeniture. Younger sons were to be pro­
vided for by a state-supported program of internal coloniza­
tion that would be profitable with the protective tariffs 
on agriculatural products. Ultimately, land would be ob­
tained by expansion eastward, allowing racially pure German 
farm families to grow larger without fear of having to send 
surplus sons and daughter to the corrupting cities.
After detailing the Nazi agricultural program, 
other solutions to the problems of German farmers were des­
cribed and systematically refuted. Birth control was re­
jected as an assault on the best racial elements of the 
Volk, an argument designed to appeal both to the pride and 
the religious scruples of this group. Sending farm child­
ren to the cities was also attacked as breaking the mystic
tie with the land that made farm children so racially de-
14sirable in the first place. In short, opposition pro­
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
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grams were depicted as degrading to the German farmer.
This lesson very cleverly embodies two basic ele­
ments of Nazi propaganda. It appealed to both the pride 
and innate conservatism of the German farmer. It held out 
hope that in the National Socialist state not only the 
farmer but also his children would find a secure and honored 
station. His arch-enemy, the creditor, was stigmatized not 
only as a usurer but also as a "Jew"; and short-term 
measures were proposed to deal with this particular menace, 
programs, moreover, that seemed both reasonable and easy to 
implement. The ultimate goals of the Nazis in agriculture 
were made to appear eminently conservative; but their means 
to these ends were openly radical, namely eastward expan­
sion. The combination of conservatism and radicalism made 
the Nazi program appealing both to those who desperately 
wanted to hang on to what they had and to those who equally 
desperately wanted major change. A similar use of seemingly 
antithetical measures was repeated in many subsequent lessons 
and was a distinctive feature of Reinhardt's course.
A second lesson provided students with material to 
refute the theory that Germany was guilty of starting World 
War 1 . ^  Tne Nazis had often dealt with this topic in their 
campaigns against the Young Plan in 1929 and 1930, and 
students and graduates of Reinhardt's program had staged 
two saturation campaigns regarding reparations in Febru-
^5Ibid., pp. 14-20.
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ary*® and May, 1930.*^
The lesson began by confronting the view that Im­
perial Germany was guilty of militarism, imperialism and 
chauvinism; statistics were used to demonstrate that the 
Kaiser's government was innocent of all charges. In order 
to negate the charge of militarism, detailed comparisons 
were made of the percentages of men in uniform in all the 
belligerent countries in 1914, while imperialism was dealt
with by pointing out the relative pre-war holdings of the
18major colonial powers. In the matter of chauvinism, 
Germany's record of "peaceful neutrality" during all of the 
crises from Fashoda to the Balkan Wars was cited as conclu­
sive proof that Germany harbored no irrational enmity to-
19ward her neighbors. Throughout, the lesson mentioned 
details useful in argument (for example, the fact that the 
German fleet was in home waters as late as July 27, 1914). 
These isolated bits of information proved very little, but 
they could be used effectively in speeches.
From general points the lesson went on to deal with 
specific allegations. The first was the charge that Germany
^H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei WUrttemberg zur politische Lage=Geheim, 19.3.30,
Aus der NSDAP."
■*"7H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Reichspropaganda- 
Abteilung II 10 Mai 1930."
^H.A. Reel 14, Folder 274, "Rednerkurs."
^ I b i d . , p. 15.
had held a cabinet meeting to plan war on July 5, 1914.
According to the course material, a meeting had taken place
but neither the war minister nor representatives of the
general staff were present. If the cabinet had in fact
plotted war, they would have been in attendance. Against
the allegation that Germany had hindered peace negotiations
the lesson cited the Kaiser's letters both to the Tsar and
to the King of England soliciting their aid in avoiding
hostilities. A final charge--that Germany was responsible
for the conflict because she was the first to declare war—
was countered by an explanation that mobilization and not
the declaration of war was the key event precipitating
hostilities. A detailed time table was provided to prove
that Germany mobilized after Serbia, Austria, Russia and 
20France.
As final proof of Germany's innocence in causing
World War I a number of foreign experts were cited as
opponents of the war guilt clause of the Versailles Treaty.
Such notables as Lord Grey, John Maynard Heynes, Benito
Mussolini and Sidney Fay were all mentioned as supporters
of the Nazi position on this issue. In order to strengthen
student arguments, short statements by these men were in-
21eluded in the lesson. In turn, prominent supporters of 
the Weimar Republic, such as Rudolf Hilferding and Kurt
20Ibid., p. 16.
2*~Ibid., p. 18.
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Rosenfeld, were denounced for defending the war guilt
clause. The Republican system itself was attacked as a
product of the peace treaty and therefore as the offspring 
22of a "lie."
These two lessons illustrate the level of training 
provided by the speakers' school. Students were clearly 
expected to master a considerable body of predigested in­
formation. The purpose was not to educate these new 
speakers but to provide them with an extensive supply of 
effective arguments designed to impress basically un­
tutored audiences. For this purpose a veneer of knowledge 
was enough. What was remarkable about Reinhardt's course 
was that so much detailed material was presented. It is 
clear that Reinhardt expected his graduates to be suffi­
ciently well trained to make and to hold converts even a- 
gainst determined and relatively competent opposition.
There is no way of determining how successful graduates 
were in practice. Nevertheless, the Prussian Ministry of
the Interior report indicates that they were able to
23
attract and to impress sizable audiences in 1930. The 
weight of the existing--though inconclusive— evidence seems 
to indicate that these speakers were well prepared agita­
tors able to operate independently to further National 
Socialism. In any case, it seems clear that Reinhardt school 
graduates were capable of far more than delivering a few
22Ibid., p. 17.
^Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, p. 101.
24set speeches to groups of "shy, sullen farmers" and 
answering some typical questions from the audience.
^Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 159.
APPENDIX C
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF THE STORM TROOPERS 
AND AN SA TABLE OF RANKS
The ten commandments of the SA as presented to the 
Stuttgart storm troopers by SturmfUhrer Max Bucherl.
1. The brown shirt is a dress of honor. The wearer must
above all represent the National Socialist world view
and conduct himself appropriately. It is especially 
important that when the SA man appears at the place of 
assembly for setting out on a march that he not have 
his hands in his pockets or a cigarette in his mouth.
2. Punctuality must always be observed. The SA man must 
appear on time to do his duty.
3. You are in the service, so do your duty. We do not 
need dead carcasses. Support your leader by following 
his orders, dilatory comrades can demoralize everyone, 
so be fast in carrying out orders.
4. It is a duty to respect your leader. Should you have
a question or want to make an announcement, say your 
piece in a short and snappy manner. The leader by 
virtue of his position deserves to be called Herr.
Omit unnecessary questions.
5. Can you discuss matters amongst yourselves' Yes, but
you must keep it quiet and do not let everyone in on
the discussion. Do not give anything away to the 
enemy rabble.
6. The SA does not represent any class. Workers of both
the head and the hands find themselves together in this 
fighting society. Personal animosities have no place 
in our organization. Through this fighting society
we will build a true vOlkisch community.
7. Amongst your friends be careful what you say. It is
not good to wear your heart on your tongue, when
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everyone within hearing distance is not with us.
8. There are no politics within the SA. Each knows the 
politics of the others because he and they are SA men. 
Politics is for the professional leaders of the move­
ment .
9. Cultivate the company and companionship of your 
fellow members, but let such meetings be orderly.
Do not let them degenerate into drunken brawls.
10. Be diligent in your private life for you work for the 
great ideas of Adolf Hitler.
Source: H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401 (1928) "Berichte
der Staatspolizei Wtirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Aus der 
NSDAP; Geheim 12.12.28."
The ranks and responsibilities of SA leaders were 
not the same at all times, but the following will give the 
reader some idea of how the organization was structured and 
a key to SA abbreviations.
UNIT
Gruppe
(10-13 men)
Truppe
(3 Gruppen)
Sturm
(2 Truppen)
Standarte
(varies)
Gausturm
(2 Standarten, in
one Gau there could
more than one Gausturm)
Brigade
(2 Gausturmen)
COMMANDER 
Gruppenf tihrer
Truppenf llhrer
Sturmf lihrer
Standartenf tihrer
Gausturmf lihrer
ABBREVIATION
Gruf
Truf
Stuf
Staf
Gaustuf
Brigadef lihrer Brigaf
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UNIT COMMANDER ABBREVIATION
SA Oberst Sturm OSAF
Abteilung FUhrer 
(for 1928-30 
Franz von Pfeffer)
The SA also had special Gau ambulance sections and marching
bands.
Source: H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401 (1928),
"Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen 
Lage, Aus der NSDAP; Geheim, 12.12*28."
APPENDIX D
FINANCING NAZI REGIONAL ACTIVITIES
One of the major criticisms of Gauleiter Murr was
that he was a poor business manager who had gotten his Gau 
deeply in debt. In the late twenties the Nazis expected 
their activities to pay for themselves. Most party pro­
grams were organized with the understanding that they would 
be economically self-sufficient. Reinhardt’s school, 
Czarnowski's slide service and the Muchow system were all 
examples of this. Regionally and even locally the same 
principle applied. The following is a balance sheet for 
Nazi rallies held in the Volksbildungsheim Hall in Frankfurt- 
am-Main.
"Cost of the Rally
a. Rent, lights, heating
b. Signs 84 cm. x 120 cm.
c. Advertising for two days
d. 3,000 handbills
e. Banners
f. Other expenses, speaker's
RM 200 
RM 80 
RM 100 
RM 4 0 
RM 30
fee, etc. RM 25
RM 475
Income from the Rally
a. 600 tickets at 50 pf.
b. 300 tickets at 30 pf.
RM 300 
RM 90
RM 390
The remainder of the expenses to be
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made up out of voluntary contributions."^
The above provides a good ideas of how the party financed 
its activities. Handbills, newspaper promotion, and large 
signs were used to advertise events. Halls were selected 
on the basis of the party's ability to fill them. In 
Frankfurt the NSDAP held most of its rallies in the 
Volksbildungsheim in 1928. With the expansion of 1929 the 
Nazis began to rent the larger and more expensive 
Zoologische Garten. The Nazi attempt to make rallies pay 
for themselves was also useful to the party in terms of 
the effectiveness of propaganda drives- This method in­
volved all party members in propaganda actions. Handbills 
were distributed and tickets were sold by rank-and-file 
Nazis. Since only those who were willing to pay the price 
of admission were allowed to attend, the Nazis were assured 
of audiences that were interested in the movement. Even 
the party’s opponents had to pay for the privilege of 
attempting to break up one of these meetings.
In cases where income was insufficient to defray 
expenses, the activity's organizer had to make up the dif­
ference out of his own pocket. Kreisleiter Adalbert Gimbel 
of the Frankfurt area once had to go without food for a few
days, because more SA men showed up at the provisioning
2
center in his charge than he had made allowances for. The
1H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel, "So 
kaempften wir."
2Ibid.
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self-financing aspects of Nazi campaigning allowed the
3
party to operate with few big contributors. The amount of 
self-sacrifice and hard work demanded of party members to 
conduct this kind of campaigning was beneficial to the 
NSDAP. It served to heighten the sense of positive partici­
pation so vital for mobilizing the energies of ordinary 
party men, and it eliminated the danger of the party being 
identified with any big contributors who might be thought 
to be in secret control of the movement.
A minor source of supplemental income to the 
Gauleiters was the National Socialist Hilfbunde. These or­
ganizations developed by the Gauleiters collected contribu­
tions from those who favored the NSDAP but did not want to
become openly associated with the Nazis for business or
4
personal reasons. As a source of income the HilfbQnde were 
only of minor importance. Most party activities did pay 
for themselves especially after 1929. The HilfbUnde, how­
ever, did provide the Gauleiters with a small discretionary 
income that they were free to use when necessary. These 
funds were helpful in defraying extraordinary expenses, such 
as those incurred in an election campaign or in efforts to 
open up new territory. The availability of this extra 
money made it possible for the Nazis to be more flexible in 
their planning, and helped the Gauleiters keep their
^Turner, Nazism, pp. 89-108.
.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 7."
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organizations financially sound, if not wealthy. Under
this system heavy debts usually implied abuse of Nazi
techniques of campaigning. It was for this reason that
Gauleiter Murr was so scathingly criticized for allowing
5
his command to fall 2,000 RM in debt.
"*H. A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staats- 
polizei Wurttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 23.1.29, 
Aus der NSDAP."
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